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PREFACE 
I certify that this dissertation is the result of my own work and includes nothing 
which is the outcome of work done in collaboration. Where another author has been 
quoted or otherwise referred to, this is indicated in the course of the text. 
I further declare that this dissertation is not substantially the same as any that I 
have submitted for a degree or diploma or other qualification at any other university. 
No part of my dissertation has already been or is being concurrently submitted for a 
degree or diploma or other qualification. The dissertation is, however, on a related 
topic to my M. Phil. thesis which was submitted to the University of Cambridge in 
1985, and published in an expanded version the following year under the title The Case 
for Muslim Voluntary-Aided Schools: some Philosophical Reflections. The main 
arguments of the M. Phil. thesis are summarised in the last section of Chapter Eight of 
the present dissertation, and brief references to it elsewhere in the dissertation are 
indicated by the reference '(Halstead, 1986)'. 
I further certify that the dissertation does not exceed the prescribed limit of 80,000 
words. 
Finally, I acknowledge with warm gratitude the advice and support of my 
supervisor at the University of Cambridge Department of Education, Mr T. H. 
McLaughlin, throughout the period of writing. 
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SUMMARY OF DISSERTATION: 
EDUCATION FOR MUSLIM CHILDREN IN THE U. K: 
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF SOME ISSUES ARISING FROM 
CONTRASTING LIBERAL AND ISLAMIC APPROACHES TO 
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS. 
BY J. M. HALSTEAD 
An analysis of contemporary trends in the education of Muslim children in the 
U. K. indicates that in the 1960s and 1970s there was a strong emphasis on meeting the 
special needs of Muslim children, but these needs were neither defined by the Muslim 
community nor based on any framework of Islamic values. More recently, some 
educational providers have sought to respond at least to some Muslim demands, and a 
notion of accountability to the Muslim community is developing in some quarters. 
Accountability, however, implies rights, and rights are usually understood from 
within a liberal framework of values. On a liberal view, the rights of Muslim parents to 
bring up their children in their own religion and the rights of the Muslim community to 
educate Muslim children in keeping with distinctive Islamic beliefs and values are 
constrained by the claim that the autonomy of the child must be vouchsafed in any form 
of educational provision. There is clearly a deep-seated clash of values between Islam 
and liberalism. From a sketch of fundamental Islamic values, an Islamic view of 
education may be developed which is in disagreement with liberal education particularly 
on three points: the need for critical openness, the need for personal and moral 
autonomy and the need to negotiate a set of agreed values if any common educational 
system is to be achieved. The search for sufficient common ground between liberals 
and Muslims is unsuccessful because Muslims insist on building their education around 
3 
Summary 
a set of religious beliefs which liberals believe schools have no business to reinforce, 
while liberals offend Islamic principles by insisting that religious beliefs, like all beliefs, 
must always be considered challengeable and revisable and should therefore be 
presented to children in a way which respects the ultimate freedom of individuals to 
make choices for themselves. The only way out of this impasse in practice is for 
liberals to back down from their insistence on a common education for all children, and 
to accept that Muslims should be allowed their own denominational schools. The 
danger that the Muslim community may become isolated and socially vulnerable may be 
reduced through increased co-operation with other faith communities, especially 
Christians. 
The dissertation thus consists of three intertwining strands: multi-culturalism in 
educational policy; applied social philosophy, especially relating to rights and liberal 
education; and Islamic theology. It begins with an examination of contemporary 
practice, moves to an analysis of the issues and principles underlying that practice, and 
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CHAPTER ONE 
EDUCATION FOR MUSLIM CHILDREN IN THE U. K.: 
THE PROBLEMS 
The question of what sort of education should be provided for Muslim children in 
the U. K. has become one of the biggest issues facing educational decision makers at the 
present time. The problem is a recent one, for it is only in the last thirty years that a 
Muslim community of any significant size at all has existed in the U. K., and only in the 
last ten years or so that demands for educational change have been voiced seriously by 
Muslim parents and leaders. 
There are still no accurate figures of the numbers of Muslims in the U. K. A total 
of one-and-a-half to two million is often mentioned (cf McDermott and Ahsan, 1980, p 
11), but this may be an over-estimate. What is not in dispute, however, is the fact that 
the Muslim community is the fastest growing of all religious, racial or ethnic minority 
groups in the U. K. The Central Statistical Office estimates that the number of Muslims 
has risen from 400,000 in 1975 to 750,000 in 1983 and to 900,000 in 1989 (CSO, 
1989, para. 11.8), making them the third largest religious group in the U. K., after 
Anglicans and Roman Catholics. 
The Muslims, of course, are only one of several groups of immigrants to arrive in 
this country over the last 150 years. Earlier groups, such as the Irish, the Jews and the 
East Europeans, were expected to integrate and become assimilated into British culture 
as quickly as possible and were generally welcomed to the extent that they were 
prepared to conform (cf Halstead, 1988, ch 1). On the whole, they learned to do this, 
and gradually became almost indistinguishable from the indigenous population. Thus 





from the late 1950's onwards, to supply a demand for cheap and compliant labour, it 
was assumed that if they stayed in the UX - and many came originally with the 
intention of returning to their country of origin in due course - they too would gradually 
integrate. It has taken some time for it to become apparent that Muslims may not, in 
fact, follow the pattern of previous waves of immigrants. 
Some of the characteristics of the Muslim community which mark them out as 
distinct from the indigenous population are naturally the same as those of earlier 
immigrants: the use of unfamiliar languages and corresponding inadequate grasp of 
English; the emotional and other links with their place of origin; the strong emphasis on 
family and community loyalty; the initial desire to maintain their distinctive culture; and 
the tendency to be concentrated at the lower end of the scale in housing and employment 
(or, more recently, unemployment). Other distinguishing characteristics, however, 
may prove more difficult to cast off. In common with more recent waves of immigrants 
such as the West Indians, the Hindus, the Sikhs and the Vietnamese boat people, the 
vast majority of Muslims in the U. K. have a racial origin and skin colour which make 
them immediately distinguishable from the indigenous white population and which can 
easily form the basis for prejudice and discrimination. The lack of a common European 
culiure, as seen in their dress, diet, music, habits of bargaining and many other areas of 
behaviour, makes their 'foreignness' more noticeable. The practice of arranged 
marriages among Asians has ensured that there has been virtually no intermarriage with 
other communities. In many of the larger British cities, Muslims and other Asians have 
set up a whole network of small businesses which serve to make their communities 
more self-contained. As Shepherd points out, 
The cotVlete range of commercialfacilities available is one reinforcer of the 
separateness of the South Asians. There is little needfor contact with the 
host population except in the areas of education and employment, and it is 
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thus easier to mintain identification with cultural roots. 
(1987, p 264) 
Undoubtedly, however, what binds the Muslim community together most 
strongly and marks them out as separate from the indigenous population is their 
religion. 
Islam presents itself as a complete way of life. Religion for the Muslim is 
essentially a matter of following the divine law (sharia), which contains not only 
universal moral principles, such as justice or charity, but also detailed instructions for 
every aspect of human life, both relating to God (e. g. the obligation to pray, fast and 
perform the pilgrimage to Mecca) and relating to fellow human beings (e. g. the 
commendation of hospitality, or of female modesty). 'Ibis commitment (or submission) 
to the divine law, which is based on the Quran and the sayings of the Prophet 
Muhammad, provides the unifying element in the community of believers, both 
worldwide and within the U. K. It also lies behind all the requests and demands made 
by Muslim leaders to secular authorities in the U. K., including requests for halal meat 
to be provided for Muslims in schools and hospitals, and demands for the banning of 
The Satanic Verses by Salman Rushdie, which is considered blasphemous. The 
various educational demands made by Muslims, which are set out in Appendix One, 
also stem from their concern that educational provision for their children should be in 
harmony with their distinctive beliefs as Muslims. This concern has led to a variety of 
outcomes, from the insistence on single-sex education at secondary level, to the 
establishment of a number of independent Muslim schools, to the call for separate 
Muslim voluntary-aided schools, and to the continued practice of sending Muslim 




ý How far the commitment to live strictly in line with Islamic principles is a reality 
in the lives of ordinary Muslims in the U. K. is a matter for empirical investigation. My 
own fieldwork (Halstead, 1988), suggests that many Muslims would rather accept the 
authority of the local irnam (religious leader) when making decisions about how to live, 
than their own independent judgement. Not everyone adopts such an uncritical 
approach, however, in her research on the Mirpuri villages in Bradford, Saifullah Khan 
(1975) blames the imams for damaging the chances of integration by their emphasis on 
the fundamental religious principles and traditions of Islam. In 1987, a programme on 
Pennine Radio in which Asian teenagers from Bradford aired their views on life in 
Britain, seemed to confirm her findings: one claimed that politicians were making 
integration more difficult by making concessions to Muslim demands, and that the 
provision of halal meat in schools was a'political stunt', while another maintained that 
many Muslims were not particularly interested in multi-million pound mosques which 
the community could not afford'. Others claimed to be engaged in the process of 
educating their parents in Western values, and that they themselves are leaming to 
combine the best qualities of both cultures - respect and an ability to question (cf 
Telegraph-and Areu-s., 26 September 1987). However, the imams could have no power 
and influence in the Muslim community if there were not significant numbers who 
accepted their religious authority, and it is clear that there are many Muslims in the 
U. K. who seek to live their own lives in accordance with Islamic principles and values 
and who believe that they should bring up their children to share the same values. 
Kitwood and Borrill (1980) have shown that although Muslim adolescents in Bradford 
experience conflict between rival value systems, the primary loyalty of most of them is 
still to their own families and Islamic culture. And many Muslim parents believe that 
the preservation of this loyalty is one of the main purposes of education. 
My own research (Halstead, 1988, pp 13-19) has shown that Muslims in the 
U. K. are typically brought up in large families living on a low income in sub-standard 
and overcrowded housing and that they commonly experience the kind of disadvantages 
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associated with an inner-city upbringing (cf Wedge and Prosser, 1973; Murphy, 1987; 
West, 1987). Poor qualifications and the experience of discrimination ensure that they 
are at or near the bottom of the pile in the search for employment. In addition to the 
pressures arising from the struggle to find their own identity between conflicting 
cultures, they often have to cope with direct experiences of racism at the same time. 
Not unexpectedly, Muslim parents look to education as a way of solving such social 
and economic problems and of ensuring a better economic future for their children than 
they have had themselves. 
To sum up, there are two basic principles which many Muslim parents and leaders 
in the U. K. consider essential for their children's educatiow, first, access to the 
opportunities offered by a general education, which include living as full British citizens 
without fear of racism or other forms of prejudice, competing in the employment market 
on an equal footing with non-Muslims, and, more generally, enjoying the benefits of 
modern scientific and technological progress; and secondly, the preservation, 
maintenance and transmission of their distinctive Islamic beliefs and values, which will 
help to shape the identity of Muslim children, give them a rootedness and stability as 
they grow up and provide the foundation for a harmonious Muslim community in years 
to come. Leaving aside for the moment the question of whether these two aims are 
themselves compatible, I want to consider briefly how they relate to the goal of social 
integration. This is often regarded as a crucial educational aim in the West, because it is 
seen as the only way of creating social stability, harmony and bureaucratic efficiency in 
a pluralist society, and of facilitating the development of common values and moral 
understanding between the various groups in society. The first Muslim aim would 
appear in itself to be in complete harmony with the goal of social integration: education 
would be used to remove any barriers (such as inadequate English or cross-cultural 
understanding, or the experience of racism or other forms of prejudice) which might 
prevent them from competing on equal terms with their indigenous peers in the 
employment market and elsewhere. It is not difficult to see, however, that the second 
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Muslim aim is pulling in a quite different direction than social integration; for in seeking 
to preserve their own distinctive beliefs and values, Muslims are not only emphasising 
their differences from other groups in society, but are also challenging what liberals 
would see' as fundamental values in our contemporary society, such as personal 
autonomy and critical openness. Indeed some Muslims see the need to protect their 
children from the undesirable influences of the broader society (cf Husain and Ashraf, 
1979, p 40). 1 have discussed the apparent incompatibility of the aim of 'preserving 
religious or cultural identity' and the aim of 'achieving social integration! in more detail 
elsewhere (Halstead, 1986, pp 5 ff), but two examples will serve to illustrate the 
problem here. The first is the practice of some Muslim parents of taking or sending 
their children on extended trips to the Indian sub-continent (cf Halstead, 1988, p 40f). 
No doubt such trips help their children to develop a greater awareness of their cultural 
and religious roots, but equally the trips may hold back their development of the 
English language and other skills they require if they are to participate fully in the 
political, social and economic life of the U. K. The second example is the question of 
co-education, which is widely perceived in this country to have educational advantages. 
However, the Muslim belief that boys and girls should not mix freely after puberty has 
made single-sex schools, particularly for Muslim girls, one of the most persistent 
demands of the Muslim community. The conflict between 'preserving cultural identity' 
and'achieving social integration' as educational objectives appears to be a fundamental 
one (Schofthaler, 1984, p 11), and there would seem to be occasions where the one 
objective can be promoted, only at the expense of the other. It is with this 
incompatibility of educational aims and with the conflicting values that lie behind the 
incompatibility that I am primarily concerned in the present thesis. 
The ramifications of this conflict would no doubt provide a fruitful field for 
sociological research, and such an approach may well represent the conflict in terms of 
a struggle of power and interest between a don-dnant majority and a dominated minority. 
Weber (1968, p 342) sees social closure (Schliessung der Gemeinshaft as a way of 
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excluding groups who do not conform in language, religion and customs from social, 
political and economic advantages. The dominant group resents the non-integrated 
minorities (such as immigrants) and seeks to consolidate its own power and control at 
their expense (cf Schutz, 1964), but the minority group might turn the social closure to 
its own advantage by making the ensuing minority group solidarity a source of strength; 
in this case, social closure would be resisted by the dominant group. The case of the 
Muslims as so far described seems to fit this analysis closely. Economically deprived 
and discriminated against in housing, employment and other areas, the Muslims have 
found strength and solidarity in their distinctive religious beliefs and values; but, 
perhaps because of fears that such group solidarity would undermine the cohesion of 
the broader pluralist society, the Muslims have been discouraged by the dominant 
majority from using education to reinforce their own distinctive beliefs and values. 
In the present thesis, however, I am not so much concerned with the underlying 
motives and power struggles at work in the disagreements between the Muslim minority 
and the indigenous majority in the U. K. Rather, I am concerned with the actual 
arguments used by each side. For in such a debate about educational goals, a way must 
be found of weighing one set of claims against the other, otherwise, the debate may end 
up merely as a process of assertion and counter assertion (cf MacIntyre, 1981, p 8). 
My approach, therefore, will be broadly philosophical, rather than sociological, and I 
intend to examine, from a standpoint of applied social philosophy, the main issues that 
lie behind the question of educational provision for the Muslim community in the U. K. 
This will involve both the mapping out of what Ryle (1949, p 11) calls the 'logical 
geography' of relevant concepts such as needs, accountability, rights, autonomy, the 
public interest, community, pluralism, religious beliefs and values, critical openness 
and democracy, and a comparison between Islamic educational ideals and those 
prevalent in contemporary British education, with a view to discovering what common 
ground there is and what fundamental differences. It is hoped that the thesis will not 
only (to use Gribble's terminology: 1969, p 3) make aTew inroads'into thejungle of 
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unanalysed verbiage! about the education of Muslims in the U. K. and place a few 
signposts at strategic points where none existed before, but will also by a clarification 
of the underlying issues be able to point to certain courses of action as being more 
justifiable and appropriate to the present situation than others. 
**** 
An appropriate starting point is to look at four possible ways of resolving the 
conflict between social integration and the preservation of cultural identity as 
educational aims. There is, of course, a whole spectrum of possible approaches to the 
problem, but the four I have chosen form interesting contrasts and serve to highlight the 
central issues. Two of the approaches are extreme, two more moderate; two are drawn 
from a Muslim perspective, two from a Western; two conclude that social integration is 
of prior value and two the preservation of cultural identity. The two extreme 
approaches I have called assimilationism and isolationism. 
Assimilationism is based on the idea that 'the responsibility for the adaptations 
and adjustments involved in settling in a new country lies entirely with those who have 
come here to settle' (Honeyford, 1982b). If immigrants or minority groups seek to 
preserve intact their own social customs, manners and behaviour, religious and moral 
beliefs and practices, language, aesthetic values and leisure activities, this is seen as 
likely to stand in the way of their progress. Minorities are thus encouraged to turn their 
back on their own culture and to become absorbed by the majority culture. Indeed, so 
far as they refuse to do so, this is sometimes thought to justify inferior treatment and 
discrimination. I have suggested elsewhere (Halstead, 1988, pp 145-7) that this 
insistence on assimilation may be a form of racism. Certainly, to insist on cultural 
conformity without good reason is a form of domination and oppression, but because 
cultural differences often go hand in hand with racial differences, hostility towards a 
racial group often finds expression in hostility to that group's 'alien' culture. It is not 
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uncommon to find that members of ethnic minorities who turn their back on their own 
distinctive culture and who conform to the cultural values and expectations of the 
majority are treated with respect, whereas those who retain their cultural differences are 
treated with racial hostility. The demand for assimilation is associated particularly with 
the political philosophy of the New Right. Thus Casey (1982), writing in the first issue 
of The SalisbuIX Review, argues that the presence of different cultures in a single 
country is likely to cause unacceptable social divisions. He claims that this problem can 
only be overcome by the assimilation of minority groups, but if they resist assimilation, 
the only 'radical policy that would stand a chance of success is repatriation. It is not 
only right-using Conservatives, however, who see assimilation as the answer to the 
problem of immigrant or religious minorities who do not share the values of the 
majority. Writing from a liberal perspective, Raz (1986, p 423-4) argues that if the life 
offered to the young in such communities is too impoverished, 
assimilationist policies may well be the only humane course, even if 
bnplemented byforce of law. 
Isolationism is the refusal of a minority group (in this case, the Muslims) to make 
any concessions to the fact that they are living in a society where the majority do not 
share their own beliefs and values. Tbough isolationist tendencies among the Muslim 
community in the U. K. have already been noted in the present chapter (living in ghetto 
communities, continuing to u se mother tongues, engaging in socially exclusive leisure 
activities, maintaining traditional patterns of food and clothing, marriage within the 
community, making the mosque the centre of community life, and so on), it seems 
unlikely that complete isolation could ever occur. Indeed, it is hardly compatible with 
the first aim of education mentioned earlier, of coming to live as full British citizens. 
Muslims in the U. K. still typically interact with the broader society to a greater or less 
extent in education, (except for the few who attend independent Muslim schools), 
employment and political and commercial activity. Perhaps isolationism is best 
16 
Chapter One 
understood as a state of mind. The case of Abdullah Patel in the early 1970s illustrates 
this isolationist attitude. He objected on religious grounds to the placement of his 
daughter Kulsumbanu in a co-educational upper school, and despite very strong 
pressure to conform from the local education authority, he kept her at home until she 
reached school-leaving age. When asked whether his strict Quranic stance would 
damage Braffords hopes of integration, he replied: 
Integration was never possible ... Co-existence, yes, but integration is the 
dream of an idealist. Our cultures, religions are too far apart. When the 
British were in India, did they integrate? 
(quoted in Yorkshire Evening Post, 3 December 1973) 
Muslims in the U. K. are frequently depicted in the British press as isolationists, 
though not necessarily always with complete justice. Selbourne (1984; 1987, p 115) 
fiercely attacks what he sees as the reactionary, undemocratic and anti-social Muslim 
imams who'are trying to hang on to ... the village Islam of a quarter of a century ago', 
Pedley (1986) writes of the dangers of 'monocultural self-imposed apartheid', and 
Honeyford frequently criticises the 'purdah mentality' of Muslim parents who refuse to 
conform to the values of the indigenous population whether in morality, in dress or in 
ways of expressing their ideas (1983a, 1983b, 1984). 
Honeyford sometimes seems to imply in his articles that assimilationism and 
isolationism are the only Teal possibilities when it comes to a fundamental conflict of 
educational values. On one occasion, he writes about a Muslim father who tried to 
withdraw his daughter from swimming lessons on religious grounds. Honeyford saw 
this as a direct clash over educational principles: 
I had to run a school which was obliged both from conviction and legal 






right to swim clearly isolated ourprinciples ... I had no right to restrict her 
hurnan possibilities in the way herfather wanted. 
(1987) 
Honeyford sees such a situation in terms of a straightforward conflict between basing 
educational decisions on a 'purdah mentality' (that is, on isolationist principles) and 
seeldng to liberate children from the restricting cultures of their parents and thereby 
encouraging them to assimilate the values of the broader society. When he uses the 
metaphor of the school as a'cultural bridge' (1983b), he appears to envisage that the 
traffic on it is travelling only one way, from the 'purdah mentality' of the home to the 
traditional culture and values of British society. 
But there are more moderate paths between the two extremes of assimilationism 
and isolationism, two of which will now be discussed. The first involves the 
application of long-established liberal educational principles to the comparatively new 
social situation of pluralism in the U. K. it is multi-cultural education. The second 
involves the willingness of Muslims to participate fully in all areas of British life and 
culture, so long as they are able to retain, and transmit to their children, their 
fundamental Islamic values and beliefs, though in cases of conflict. ' the latter are 
considered to be of prior importance. 
The term 'multi-cultural education! is commonly used in two distinct senses. 7be 
first refers to the attempt in schools to respond positively to the cultural requirements 
and sensitivities of children and parents from minority groups, though liberals would 
add that this is justifiable only in so far as it can be achieved without contravening 
fundamental educational objectives as they understand them. The second refers to the 
sort of education which is considered appropriate for all children if they are to be 
adequately prepared for life in a pluralist society. The first is grounded on the wish to 
demonstrate respect for the religious and cultural beliefs of the minority groups. It may 
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be seen in the conscious avoidance of putting children in the position where they are 
expected to act in a way that is contrary to their deeply held beliefs; it therefore includes 
matters of clothing and diet, the observation of religious festivals, and so on. More 
positively, it may involve making educational use, for children from minority groups, 
of the cultural identity and experiences which they bring to their school; hence it will 
seek to make use of pupils' mother tongues. The second is based on a positive view of 
cultural and religious diversity as a source of enrichment and breadth of perspective. It 
entails encouraging all children to develop a spirit of enquiry in relation to. other 
cultures, an openness to and sympathetic understanding of a variety of ways of looking 
at the world, a willingness to enter into the spirit of different civilisations and societies, 
and a sensitive respect for those with different religious beliefs and cultural values from 
their own. 
These two senses of multi-cultural education are of course closely connected and 
inter-dependent. In particular, schools can hardly encourage children to respect other 
beliefs and cultures (type two) if they do not demonstrate such respect in their own 
dealings with ethnic minority pupils (type one). However, the distinction remains a 
valid one in a number of ways. The first type is possible only for schools which 
contain children from minority groups, whereas the second is considered by its 
advocates to be just as important for schools with no such pupils. Multi-cultural 
education of the first type has been campaigned for, sometimes quite passionately, by 
various minority groups, including Muslims; multi-cultural education of the second 
type, however, has not generally been campaigned for by minority groups (cf Swann 
&=, 1985, p 238), but has been devised as a rational response to the educational 
requirements of our contemporary pluralist society. 
Multi-cultural education in both senses is closely linked to the search for racial 
justice. A desire to avoid the cultural domination associated with assimilationism has 
clearly provided a significant impetus to multi-cultural education of the first type. 
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Similarly, the wish to discourage racism, prejudice, bias and ethnocentricity has been a 
major factor behind the development of the second type. Even critics of multi-cultural 
education acknowledge this. Those on the left often see it as having similar aims to 
anti-racist education, though watered-down and ineffective in comparison; those on the 
right, including Honeyford, crificise it for damaging the possibility of social integration 
by accentuating both cultural and racial differences. Supporters of multi-cultural 
education, however, argue that it is clearly in the interests of the state to show respect 
towards the religious and cultural beliefs of minority groups and to avoid any 
appearance of majoritarian domination, for this will encourage the minority groups to 
develop a sense of loyalty to the broader community, and social harmony and cohesion 
will be increased. 
Similarly, it is appropriate for the state to demonstrate the justice, tolerance and 
celebration of diversity which it expects its component groups to show towards each 
other. It is in the interests of children to be encouraged to develop a coherent self- 
identity, and not to be put in a position where the values they are presented with in 
school are in serious conflict with those they have encountered at home. A strong 
argument can therefore be developed that multi-cultural education of the first type is in 
the interests of both the broader society (by encouraging social stability) and in the 
interests of the individual child (by providing a more stable base for a consistent self- 
concept to develop). The aim of the concessions involved in this type of muld-cultural 
education is not to'inculcate an uncritical acceptance of any conception of the good life' 
(Ackerman, 1980, p163), which would, of course, be unjustifiable on a liberal view, 
but to provide children with continuity and stability and to avoid unnecessarily 
disorienting them. 
The second type of muld-cultural education, which seeks to prepare children for 
life in a pluralist society by encouraging them to respect those whose beliefs and values 
differ from their own, to see diversity as a source of enrichment, and to be open to a 
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variety of ways of looking at the world, is even more in line with a liberal view of 
education. As Parekh (1985) points out, if children never get beyond the framework of 
their own culture and beliefs (even if these are shared by the majority in their country), 
they are unlikely to develop lively, enquiring minds, imagination or a critical faculty. 
A mono-cultural diet is likely to breed 'arrogance and insensitivity' among children 
from the majority culture and'profound self-alienation' and a distorted self-concept 
among minority children. Multi-cultural education, on the other hand, is 
an education infireedom -fireedomfirom inherited biases and narrowfeelings 
and sentiments, as well as freedom to explore other cultures and 
perspectives and make choices in full awareness of the available and 
practicable alternatives. Multi-cultural education is, therefore, not a 
departure from, nor incompatible with, but a further refinement of, the 
liberal idea of education. It does not cut off childrenfrom their own culture. 
Rather, it enables them to enrich, refine and take a broader view of it 
without losing their roots in it ... if education is concerned to 
develop such 
basic human capacities as curiosity, seyý-criticism, capaciryfor rej7ection, 
ability toform an independent judgement, sensitivity, intellectual humility 
and respect for others, and to open the pupil's mind to the great 
achievements of mankind, then it must be multi-cultural in orientation. 
(Parekh, 1985, p 22f) 
In the same article, Parekh dismisses the view that multi-cultural education is 
necessarily based on cultural relativism, as has been implied by Scruton (1986) and 
others. Parekh argues that different cultures have a right to be understood in their own 
terms, and that they need to be explored sympathetically, not judged superficially on the 
basis of the norms and values of another culture; but this is not to claim that they are 
above all criticism and judgement. The debate about cultural relativism is, of course, an 
extended one (cf Warnock, 1979; Cooper, 1980, pp 138 ff, Walkling, 1980; Zec, 
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1980, etc. ), but the onus clearly lies with those who want to argue that multi-cultural 
education is based on relativist assumptions to attempt to justify their view. Parekh 
further points out that even if a culture is ultimately judged to be defective, this must not 
be taken to mean that its adherents are less deserving of respect as human beings or 
have a weaker claim to basic human rights. 
Thus, without necessitating an acceptance of cultural relativism or claiming that 
different cultures cannot be criticised and evaluated, multi-cultural education in both 
senses provides a serious attempt to resolve the conflict between social integration and 
the preservation of cultural identity. It is integrationist to the extent that it stresses the 
need for a common educational experience for all children and that it is committed to the 
search for a framework of agreed values which will help to encourage a sense of 
belonging to the broader community. In its tentative vision of the future, the Swann 
Rej2crt (DES, 1985, p 8) goes so far as to say: 
We are perhaps lookingfor the assimilation of all groups within a redefined 
concept of what it means to live in British society today. 
But thisredefined concept! includes the belief that members of minority groups should 
be free to maintain their distinctive cultures and lifestyles within the limits mentioned 
above and that children from minority groups have a right not to be put in a position in 
schools where they are expected to act contrary to their own beliefs and values. Multi- 
cultural education is thus a rational response to the presence of ethnic minorities in the 
U. K., based on the values of freedom, equality and justice. It does not lack attachment 
to history and tradition, for its roots can be traced through the long history of liberal 
education. 
The final way of resolving the conflict between social integration and the 
presentation of cultural identity that I want to consider is a moderate Islamic approach. 
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It rejects isolationism and indeed encourages Muslims to participate in all areas of 
British life and culture, so long as they are free to retain their distinctive religious beliefs 
and values and transmit these to their children. Thus Ashraf writes, 
In two or three generations a group of Muslims will emerge who will be 
British in their use of English, in some of their customs and conventions, 
even in their love of English literature, but they will be Muslims not only in 
their positive absolute values, but in those values that are completely anti- 
modemist and anti-secularist. 
(1986a, p vi) 
It is noteworthy that in some respects this approach is more integrationist than 
liberal multi-culturalism, for whereas the latter allows, and even encourages, the 
maintenance of mother-tongue teaching, the Islamic approach is happy to allow English 
to take over completely as the language of day-to-day communication both within and 
outside the Muslim community. Indeed, in many areas of culture, Muslims are happy 
to absorb British customs and conventions. But they insist on distinguishing, in a way 
that many contemporary sociologists do not, between 'culture' and 'religion'. 'Culture' 
on an Islamic view encompasses all the customs, patterns of behaviour, human 
institutions and lifestyles of a society, whereas 'religion' is based on divine revelation 
and hence has a fixedness which is quite alien to culture. On the approach under 
discussion, Muslims are happy to accept any Idnd of cultural change except where the 
culture is directly linked to religious principles. Tbus it is quite acceptable for a Muslim 
to wear Western clothes so long as they do not breach the principles of decency and 
modesty prescribed in the Quran and the hadith. But Muslims do not accept that 
religion should itself be treated as one of a possible range of cultural options open to the 
individual child. For Muslims, religion is the basis of the unity, indeed the very 
existence, of the community of which, by birth and upbringing, they are a part. They 
23 
Chapter One 
believe that the interests of the individual child do not exist in isolation from the group. 
For the Muslim community religion provides 
A comprehensive viewpointfrom which perspective on other areas of life is 
gained. Other domains are not adequately grasped until they are assimilated 
into the religious outlook. 
(Strike, 1982b, p 88). 
Such a view, of course, has potentially very profound educational consequences. It 
may involve rejecting the autonomy of the academic discipline, which has traditionally 
been cherished in liberal education. It may also involve a reassessment of the meaning 
of personal and moral autonomy; if it means simply that one consents oneself (autos) 
to be bound by a rule (nomos), this would be quite consistent with a religious 
perspective on education, but more commonly held liberal concepts of autonomy would 
not (see below, Chapter Eight). 
Muslims who adopt this approach have shown no reluctance to accept the 
minimum set of common values (including a basic social morality and a common 
system of law and government) without which there could be no society at all, or to 
accept that these should occupy a prominent place in public education. However, they 
believe that all values have mots in religion and that it is only through an exploration of 
'those fundamental absolute values which all religions share! (Ashraf, 1986a, p vi), that 
an adequate conceptualisation of 'shared values' can be reached. A major Muslim 
anxiety is that liberal multi-culturalism (as typified in the Swann ReI2M. for example) is 
seeking to establish a set of foundational agreed values which are secular rather than 
being grounded in religion, and then to base a common education for all children on 
these values. 7be anxiety is hardly likely to be diminished by the claim by one liberal 
that the price minorities must pay for general toleration in a pluralist society is 'the 
acceptance of a public order at odds with (their) fundamental ideals' (Crittenden, 1982, 
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p 50). The anxiety is likely to turn to despair when Muslims find their own presence in 
the U. K. being used by liberal educationalists to justify policies quite alien to their 
wishes. This last point has been explored in more detail elsewhere (Halstead and 
Khan-Cheema, 1987), but for now one example will suffice. Both before and after the 
1988 Education Act, the presence of Muslim and other non-Christian children in our 
schools has commonly been used as a major argument (for example, in the Swann 
Re]2ort. 1985, pp 497,519) against the continuation of a compulsory daily act of 
collective worship. However, many Muslim organisations have made it clear that they 
do not wish to see any diminution of religion in schools and do not wish school 
worship to be discontinued, merely to be adapted so that it does not conflict with the 
different faiths represented in schools (cf Khan-Cheema et al., 1986, pp 13,16). 
The fight to give religion a more central place within a common system of 
education must seem like an uphill task for even the most optimistic Muslim, and 
therefore the possibility of establishing Muslim voluntary-aided schools is being 
examined by an increasing number of Muslim organisations. The aim of such schools 
would not be to take another step towards isolationism, any more than existing Catholic 
or Anglican voluntary schools isolate their own pupils from the broader society, but to 
provide perhaps the only means of allowing the Muslim community to preserve what it 
sees as the most essential element in its identity - the Islamic religion - while at the same 
time preparing Muslim children to play a full part in the broader British community (cf 
Ashraf, 1988b; Halstead, 1986, p 15 ff). 
For the sake of brevity, I shall call the last two ways (as discussed above) of 
seeking to resolve the conflict between the need for social integration and cohesion on 
the one hand and the right of minority groups to preserve their own culture on the other, 
the liberal perspective and the Islamic perspective. Although they have both been 
described as moderate approaches, there is clearly strong opposition between them. 
There is considerable evidence, for example, that many Muslims would like to have the 
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same choice which is available to Catholics, Anglicans, Jews and others, to send their 
children to a county school or to a voluntary-aided school, but this is strongly opposed 
on the liberal perspective. In response to the Muslim request, the Swann Committee 
has urged a reconsideration of the whole dual system of education (DES, 1985, p 514), 
and this appears to imply a belief that the system is no longer justifiable and should be 
abandoned (cf Dummett, 1986, p 13). The argument seems to be that there are no 
grounds under present legislation to refuse Muslims permission to establish such 
schools; but the existence of Muslim voluntary-aided schools may strongly militate 
against the kind of pluralist society envisaged by the committee, by encouraging 
socially divisive attitudes in minority groups and racism in the majority; therefore the 
best course of action is to reconsider the whole legislation. Haldane (1986, p 164), 
however, has drawn attention to the irony of this proposal as far as Muslims are 
concerned: 
How could it satisfy the Muslim wishfor their own religious schools, to be 
required to send their children to secular institutions? And what view 
should theyform of a society that would respond to their expression of deep 
attachment to tradition by casting off its own inheritance? 
It is with this clash between liberal and Islamic approaches to the education of 
Muslim children in the U. K. that I am concerned in the present thesis. From a liberal 
point of view, the crucial questions are: how far, if at all, do minority groups like 
the Muslims in the U. K. have the right to expect education to reinforce their own 
distinctive beliefs and values with regard to their own children? What 'concessions' 
can justifiably be made to Muslim demands? From an Islamic point of view, the 
questions are: is it in fact possible in a secular society for children to be educated in a 
way which enables them to remain loyal to their religion? Can sufficient common 
ground be found with non-Muslims for a workable common education for all children 
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to be set up? And from the point of view of educational policy, Lustgarten (1983, p 98) 
highlights the crucial question: 
How within the overarching political unity, are conflicts engendered by the 
co-existence of diverse, and at times opposed, cultural values and ways of 
life to be resolved? 
**** 
Although the present thesis is being written from a broadly philosophical 
perspective, or perhaps because of this, it seems important to start with an examination 
of contemporary practice in order to ensure that the issues under discussion in the 
remainder of the thesis are actually central ones to the education of Muslim children in 
the U. K. Thefirst stage of my research therefore consists of an empirical investigation 
of the educational provision made by one local authority for its Muslim community. 
Bradford was chosen for this case study for a variety of reasons. First, a clear majority 
(probably over 85%) of its 'immigrant! children (i. e. those whose ethnic origin is other 
than from the U. K. ) is Muslim (CBMC, 1984a, p 52); thus any special provision for 
the education of ethnic minority communities in Bradford is primarily designed with 
Muslims in mind. Secondly, Bradford has for a number of years enjoyed a reputation 
as a pace-setter among local authorities in the field of race relations and multi-cultural 
policies (Allen, 1970, pp 102,123; Spencer, 1983; Morris et al., 1984; Pedley, 1986). 
Thirdly, there are now a number of schools in Bradford where Muslim children form a 
large majority. The intake of children to Drummond Middle School in September 1984, 
for example, was 125 Asians (the vast majority Muslims of Pakistani origin), two 
indigenous whites and one West Indian, and this is by no means untypical of certain 
inner-city areas of Bradford. Fourthly, the problems arising from the presence of a 
substantial minority of Muslims in a British city have been focussed particularly clearly 
in Bradford; the city's Muslims, for example, have played a major part in the protests 
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against Salman Rushdie throughout 1989. Finally, the research was carried out at the 
time of the Honeyford affair, which, I have argued elsewhere (Halstead, 1988), 
highlights in a unique way some of the problems of educational provision for Muslim 
children in the U. K. In one respect the Muslims of Bradford are perhaps not typical of 
the broader Muslim community in the U. K., for whereas in the U. K. as a whole there 
are large numbers of Muslims of Turkish Cypriot, Arab, Iranian, Bangladeshi and 
central African origin, the vast majority of those in Bradford originate either from 
Pakistan or the Mirpur district of Kashmir. Thus they are united not only by religion 
but also by ethnic origin. However, this atypicality is not seen as a disadvantage for the 
purposes of the present thesis. For whereas ethnic origin is a vital consideration in 
matters relating to the maintenance of ethnic culture and language, it is not a particularly 
significant factor in considering principles such as the rights of minority communities 
and the place of religion in education. 
The findings of this first stage of my research have already been published 
(Halstead, 1988), and instead of repeating them in their entirety in the present thesis, I 
intend merely to make reference to them where appropriate to my argument, as indeed I 
have done in the present chapter. In Chapter Two of the thesis I shall look more closely 
at contemporary educational provision for Muslim children in the U. K., with a view to 
elucidating the principles on which it is based. The rhetoric of such educational 
provision is almost always couched in terms of 'meeting the special needs of Muslim 
children, or of the Muslim community'. However, the way these 'special needs' have 
been defined seems to have changed within the last decade. Previously, they had been 
defined by the non-Muslim majority in line with Western liberal value assumptions: I 
shall argue that the mainly benign paternalism of such an approach may be viewed as a 
kind of racism, in that it denies Muslims the freedom to determine for themselves the 
pattern of their own and their children's lives. More recently, however, there has 
emerged a greater willingness for educational decision-makers to consult directly with 
minorities such as the Muslims. While political self-interest has no doubt sometimes 
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played a part in such consultation, it appears that what is emerging is a new belief that 
educational decisions should take account of the wishes and beliefs of minority 
communities such as the Muslims. The emerging notion of educational accountability 
to minority communities is itself problematic, however, and in Chapter Three I examine 
a number of possible models of accountability, which I seek to apply to the Muslim 
situation. If it is accepted that educational decision-makers should be responsive to the 
wishes of the Muslim community or of individual Muslim parents, this implies that 
Muslims have certain rights. But what is the basis of these rights? If it is claimed that 
the basis lies in fundamental liberal values, do not those same values also presuppose a 
particular approach to the education of children? Is it possible to lay claim to the rights 
which liberalism accepts as justifiable while rejecting a liberal view of education? How 
are liberals to respond to a minority group such as the Muslims who do not fully share 
the fundamental liberal values? How far do Muslim rights extend in this case, and how 
are the limits to those rights determined? Are there any circumstances in which such a 
group can or should be compelled to act against their conscience or fundamental beliefs? 
Part Two seeks to examine these questions from a liberal perspective. Chapter 
Four provides a brief sketch of fundamental liberal values, and seeks to show how the 
notion of 'rights'fits into this framework. This then forms the basis for a discussion in 
Chapter Five of the rights of Muslim parents to bring up their children in their own 
religion and in Chapter Six of the rights of the Muslim community to use education to 
preserve, maintain and transmit its fundamental beliefs and values intact in a non- 
Muslim society. In Chapter Five it is argued that on a liberal view parents can claim 
certain paternalistic rights in connection with their children, but that these rights are 
constrained by considerations of the public interest and the need to promote the personal 
autonomy of children. The effect of these constraints is that although parents may be 
justified in bringing up children in an environment of religious belief, they are not 
justified in seeking'to inculcate an uncritical acceptance of any conception of the good 
life! (Ackerman, 1980, p 163). Chapter Six examines a liberal view of pluralism. The 
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freedom of the group is subject to two major constraints: first, priority must be given to 
taking on the shared values of the broader society, since without these the stability and 
cohesion of society as a whole would be in danger of fragmenting; and secondly, the 
freedom of the individual to chose his or her own way of life must be respected. This 
has profound consequences for education: children need to be taught the shared values 
of society and to appreciate the diversity of life-styles and backgrounds which make up 
our society, but apart from that it is seen as preferable on a liberal view for children to 
learn to question their assumptions, to grapple with conflicting world views and to 
engage in rational debate, rather than passively accepting the beliefs and values of the 
group into which they happen to be born. In so far as Islam is a fundamental religion 
which values the acceptance of a particular conception of the good more highly than 
autonomy or critical openness, it is clear that the constraints which liberalism places on 
Muslim rights are problematic for Muslims. 
Just how large is the rift between the liberalism and Islam can only be appreciated 
by a much closer examination of the Islamic world view and this is provided in Part 
Three. Chapter Seven outlines an Islamic framework of values and compares and 
contrasts this at several key points with a liberal framework. Chapter Eight then applies 
the Islamic values to education and begins to sketch out a distinctively Islamic 
perspective on educational aims, teaching, school ethos and the curriculum, with 
religion at the very heart of the educational experience. The main liberal criticisms of 
this approach to education are considered: first, that to transmit religious beliefs in a 
way which does not leave them open to critical evaluation is a form of indoctrination; 
and secondly, that to seek to confirm children in the culture into which they were born 
involves a failure to respect their personal and moral autonomy. As a response to the 
liberal critique, the Islamic view of education is re-expressed in terms that are more 
accessible to liberals, -and this suggests that some sort of dialogue between Muslims and 
liberals is possible in spite of their very different world views. Chapter Nine attempts 
to take the process of dialogue further, to see if sufficient common ground can be found 
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on which to construct an agreed common system of education. The search for common 
ground breaks down, however, over both the liberal insistence that no community has 
the right to prejudge the truth of their own claims on behalf of their children and that 
children must be encouraged to recognise the essentially challengeable nature of all 
religious belief, and the Islamic insistence that critical openness is not an appropriate 
approach to fundamental religious beliefs and that any proposed common system of 
education that is based either on secular principles or on religious neutrality is 
unacceptable. 
After standing back from (or perhaps above) questions of practical educational 
policy in Parts Two and Three in order to obtain a birds eye view of the network of 
concepts and principles involved, we can now turn again in Part Four with an enriched 
understanding of what is involved to questions of educational policy and practice. 'Me 
attempt to match policy and practice in a given situation to underlying principles seems 
to me to be an important part of the philosopher's task, though there is an apparent 
reluctance in much contemporary British philosophy of education (though not, for 
example, in American, or indeed classical, political philosophy: cf P White, 1983, p 6f) 
to dirty one's hands with empirical matters by suggesting ways of applying general 
principles to concrete contemporary problems. The problem I have been concerned 
with in this thesis is how educational conflicts engendered by the existence of diverse, 
and sometimes opposed values and ways of life are to be resolved. There is a dilemma 
for liberals if they are unable to persuade Muslims to share their educational 
convictions: either they can insist on resolving conflicts with their own framework or 
premises (which would be tantamount to imposing an alien set of values on an 
unwilling minority); or they can tolerate the co-existence of a version of education 
which is in conflict at crucial points with the liberal version. I argue in Chapter Ten that 
there are compelling reasons, both in principle and in practice, why liberals must opt for 
the latter alternative. The liberal task therefore becomes one of ensuring that if Muslims 
are to be allowed a place on the religious side of the dual system of education, this does 
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not pave the way towards the isolation of the Muslim community. The thesis concludes 
with several suggestions of ways in which the danger of Muslim isolationism may be 
avoided; the most important of these is greater educational co-operation between 
Muslims and Christians. 
It is hoped that two underlying structures will be recognised in the present thesis. 
The first is that each of the four parts of the thesis explores a separate issue or set of 
related issues and in seeking to resolve one particular question ends up raising a further 
set of questions and thus leading on to the next part. The second refers to the structure 
of the thesis as a whole. It is written in the belief that an investigation of the specific, 
practical problems of educational provision for Muslims in the U. K. will lead us, pretty 
quickly and directly, to questions of concept and fundamental philosophical principles, 
and that conversely the careful examination and analysis of the underlying issues will 
point the way, fairly unambiguously, to certain kinds of practical action. Indeed, as 
will soon become apparent, this statement has become an overall plan for the thesis. 
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EDUCATION FOR MUSLIM CHILDREN IN THE U. K. 
CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE 
Ile present chapter is based on the findings of my research into the provision of 
one local education authority - Brafford - for its Muslim pupils. The most immediately 
striking feature of the situation is its complexity. First, Muslim pupils may have a 
range of different educational needs and problems resulting, for example, from 
experiences of racism, conflicting cultural demands or a poor grasp of English. Which 
particular needs are closest to their experience may vary from pupil to pupil. 
Sometimes one need is highlighted in the media or in educational research, sometimes 
another. The situation is made more difficult by the necessity for policy to take account 
of fundamental clashes of principle, as between the right of children not to be trapped in 
a restricting culture and the right of parents at least to ensure some degree of continuity 
between what their children learn at home and what they learn at school. These 
difficulties are clearly open to a variety of possible solutions, and the situation is further 
complicated by the not uncommon changes of policy on the part of the Bradford 
Council and the significant opposition to some of these policies from sections of the 
teaching profession. On top of this comes the activity of a large number of pressure 
groups among the city's Muslims, often pulling in different directions and sometimes 
making conflicting demands. The intervention of white activists adds still further 
complications, either by seeking to win the Muslims to their particular cause (as in the 
case of Workers Against Racism; see Halstead, 1988, pp 30,125), or by totally 
opposing a provision decided on by the Council (as in the case of the opposition of 
animal rights activists to the provision of halal meat in schools: see Appendix One). 
The net result is a situation of such complexity that it is easy to get bogged down in 
detail or to end up succumbing to bias or preconceptions in the representation of events 
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and policies. What is needed is some way of accurately mapping out the issues to give 
direction to our thinking and to prevent us from wandering aimlessly in this largely 
uncharted jungle. 
I have attempted to provide this initial analysis in three stages. The first involves 
the provision of a chronology of all the major events in Bradford in the last twenty-five 
years relating to the city's educational provision for Muslims and other ethnic 
minorities. The second is an analysis of the specific educational demands made by 
Muslims in Bradford and the detailed and varying policies agreed by the local authority 
in response to those demands. The third seeks to draw out the principles underlying 
Bradford's developing policies towards its Muslim community. 
The first stage, consisting of a chronological survey of all the main events 
involving the education of Muslims in Bradford and Council policies, together with 
sociological and other surveys and full details of the Honeyford affair, is based on as 
many of the available printed sources as possible: Council publications and 
unpublished documents, local and national newspaper articles, educational research and 
other reports on the situation in Bradford published in books and journals, reports by 
headteachers, educational advisers and the city's Director of Education, and policy 
statements and press releases from ethnic minority and other pressure groups. This 
strong emphasis on documentary evidence has been balanced by the personal 
experience of teaching in Bradford for twelve years during the period under discussion, 
and by interviews and informal conversations with many of the personalities involved. 
This first stage provides the raw data needed for stages two and three, but since the 
chronology is not itself directly relevant to the developing argument in the present 
thesis, I have not included it here. It has, however, already been published elsewhere 
(Halstead, 1988, pp 231-284), with a full list of sources and references. 
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The second stage is an attempt to analyse the main educational demands of 
Muslims in Bradford. On the basis of the chronology, ten issues have been identified 
as the major concerns of the Muslim community in the last twenty years: the teaching 
of Islam in state schools; the retention of single-sex schooling; the abandonment of 
mono-cultural education; the cessation of the policy of dispersal; the provision of 
mother-tongue teaching; permission for extended trips to the Indian sub-continent; the 
development of anti-racism policies in education; the establishment of Muslim 
voluntary-aided schools; the provision of hatal meat in schools; and the removal of Ray 
Honeyford from the headship of Drummond Middle School. Iliese ten demands are 
described in more detail in Appendix One. In each case a brief note is provided on the 
arguments for and against the Muslims' demands, and the LEA response and ensuing 
problems are also described. 
- The final stage moves from analysis to interpretation of data. It seeks to bring to 
light underlying patterns and trends in educational provision for Muslim children and to 
show what fundamental values, beliefs and principles underpin LEA policies. It is only 
with this third stage that the present chapter is concerned. There appear to be two 
distinct phases in Bradford's educational provision for Muslim children. I shall call 
them the Integrationist Phase (which was dominant, historically, from the early 1960s 
to about 1981) and the Accommodationist Place (which has dominated policy in 
Bradford since about 198 1), and each will now be examined in turn. 
**** 
Bradford's policies in the Integrationist Phase appear to have been based on the 
principle of acting in the public interest. What was perceived to be the primary interest 
shared by every member of the public equally was the peaceful co-existence of the 
various groups that made up the broader society in Bradford - in other words, the 
avoidance of racial and cultural tensions. This was to take priority over considerations 
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such as what might be of benefit to individuals as individuals or as members of 
minority groups. In the Integrationist Phase it was taken for granted that the best way 
to achieve what was in the public interest (i. e. peaceful co-existence) was through the 
integration of minority groups such as the Muslims into the social, political and 
economic life of the broader community. Cultural and religious differences were not 
ignored, but neither were they encouraged; they were tolerated in general (even to the 
extent of allowing instruction in Islam to be carried on in schools) so long as they did 
not conflict with the goal of social integration. 
It would be untrue to claim however, that local authority policy in this phase was 
as fully assimilationist, or as oppressive in intention, as it is sometimes portrayed. The 
policy of dispersing ethnic minority pupils throughout the city's schools to ensure that 
no school had more than 33% of immigrant children (commonly known as'bussing'), 
which was introduced in 1964 in accordance with DES guidelines, is a case in point 
(see Appendix One). In Bradford's case at least, it seems hardly fair to describe the 
policy as a measure intended'to disrupt the education of indigenous children as little as 
possible', as the Swann Report (DES, 1985, p 195-6) seems to suggest. Indeed, had 
such been the intention it could have been achieved more effectively by allowing the 
unchecked growth of 'ghetto schools', which did indeed grow quickly once the policy 
was phased out in 1980; if that had happened, indigenous parents would not have 
found their own children being refused places at local schools in order to make way for 
Muslims and other ethnic minority children who were being bussed in. The primary 
justification for'bussine was in terms of the public interest: through increased contact, 
pupils of different cultures would come to understand each other better and learn mutual 
tolerance; and if they could learn to live in harmony in school, this might carry through 
to adult life. What was wrong with'bussine was not the intention which lay behind it 
(to benefit the whole community by promoting mutual understanding and tolerance and 
to benefit minority children by giving them the best possible introduction to British 
culture and the English language), but the methods used (which involved 
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discrimination: only minority children were 'bussed') and, more fundamentally, the 
way the benefits accruing from the policy were conceived. Behind the talk of mutual 
understanding and tolerance lay a serious imbalance of power. Virtually all the cultural 
adaptations and transformations were expected from the side of the minority groups like 
the Muslims. 
The goal of social integration is ultimately related to the values of fairness and 
equality, and the equal treatment of all people, irrespective of race, colour or religion, 
became one of the directing principles of Bradfords educational policy. But equality of 
treatment was understood in the Integrationist Phase to mean treating all pupils the 
same; the only justification for different treatment was to facilitate identical treatment 
later in the pupils' school career. This was the rationale behind the establishment of the 
Immigrant Language Centres in Bradford in 1965, to help minority pupils to gain the 
proficiency they needed if they were to compete later in the state schools on an equal 
footing with indigenous children. 
The case of Abdullah Patel, which has already been mentioned in Chapter One, 
provides a good illustration of the way the principle of equality of treatment was applied 
in the Integrationist Phase (cf Halstead, 1988, p 47-8). Patel objected on religious 
grounds to the placement of his daughter in one of Bradford's co-educational upper 
schools, and requested transfer to a girls' school. The local authority refused, a 
subsequent appeal to Mrs Thatcher at the DES was turned down, and when Patel 
insisted on keeping her at home rather than send her to a mixed school, he was put 
under strong pressure to conform, being served with an attendance order and taken to 
court by the local authority. What this case illustrates is that in the Integrationist Phase 
the local authority was not prepared to make exceptions in general educational policy on 
cultural or religious grounds. To make an exception for parents such as Patel would be 
to undermine doubly the Council's policy of treating all pupils the same: he wanted 
Muslims to be treated differently from non-Muslims, and girls differently from boys. If 
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there were sound educational reasons for a policy such as co-education in the first 
place, however, and if the policy had been agreed by the democratic decision of the 
Council, then it was considered justifiable to compel parents to conform. Indeed, the 
Council could defend such compulsion in terms of protecting the rights of individual 
children to equality of treatment, as well as in terms of the promotion of the public 
interest. 
In addition to the principle of acting in the public interest and the principle of 
treating all pupils equally, there was a third main principle behind educational policy for 
children from minority groups such as the Muslims in the Integrationist Phase. This 
was the principle of 'meeting the special needs' of minority children. Many of the 
changes that were made in educational provision in Bradford to take into account the 
growing number of ethnic minority school children were financed under Section 11 
provisions, which provided grants from central government under the terms of the 1966 
Local Government Act to meet (currently) 75% of the costs of providing for the'special 
needs of immigrants' (cf Willey, 1984, pp 93-5; Troyna and Williams, 1986, pp 66f, 
108f, 118). It has been frequently pointed out, however (for example by Dearden, 
1966, pp 14-18; Gribble 1969, pp 80-86; Hirst and Peters, 1970, pp 32-36), that 
behind any statement of needs lie certain assumptions about what is valuable or 
desirable. For to need something implies not only that one has not got that thing, but 
that to obtain it would be to achieve something that is regarded as desirable. It is thus 
appropriate, as Dearden (1968, p 16) points out, 'to look behind statements of needs to 
the values that are guiding them, for it is here that the issue substantially lies'. What 
appears to be the case in the Integrationist Phase is that the needs (and the 'problems') 
of ethnic minority children were being defined by the indigenous majority. The value 
system on which educational decisions and judgements were based was often alien to 
the minority groups affected by the decisions. 
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I have suggested elsewhere (Halstead, 1988, pp 151 ff) that the policies of the 
Integrationist Phase, though not intentionally oppressive, may be viewed as racist in 
some sense. In fact, two different types of racism may be distinguished, which I have 
called Paternalistic Racism and Colour-Blind Racism. Paternalistic Racism refers to the 
process whereby the freedom of minority groups, whether racial or religious, is defined 
or restricted by generally well-intentioned regulations that are drawn up by the majority. 
It is based on the assumption that the white majority has the right to interfere in the lives 
of minorities for their own good and the power to define that good. As Kirp (1979, p 
64) points out, 
In all the discussions over the proper place of race in educational policy, 
non-white voices have seldom been heard. The government undertook to 
act in the best interests of a silent constituency. It acted for the racial 
minorities rather than with them, and in that sense was truly paternalistic. 
More recently, a minority group leader in Bradford has commented: 
The current race relations policy appears to be based on the assu"Ttion that 
whitepeople have a natural right to set the agendafor blackpeople. Such an 
assumption has more in common with the perpetuation of colonial 
relationships than the creation of racial harmony. 
(Courtney Hay, quoted in Yorkshire Post, 13 June 1987). 
Paternalistic Racism can be seen, for example, in the practice of 'bussing' black 
children (but not white) to ensure a racial mix in local authority schools, and in some 
forms of positive discrimination and tokenism, especially where these are intended as a 
way of placating agitators, defusing protect and maintaining tolerance and social 
stability without tackling the underlying injustices experienced by minority groups (cf 
Nixon, 1985, p3l). It may often be benign, as in the establishment of special language 
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centres for ethnic minorities, and may actually bring considerable advantages to 
minority groups. Whether or not the paternalism has a harmful outcome, however, and 
whether or not it is consciously used by the white majority to reinforce their own 
privilege, Paternalistic Racism can be viewed as oppressive of racial and religious 
minorities in two ways: it denies them the freedom to determine for themselves the 
pattern of their own future lives; and it implies (sometimes in a rather subtle way) the 
superiority of the white people who make the decisions. In sociological terms, 
Paternalistic Racism is thus principally concerned with social control (cf Dhondy, 1978; 
Mullard, 1980, p 18). 
Colour-Blind Racism, which grows out of the refusal to acknowledge relevant 
differences between races, focusses primarily on race and colour rather than on religion 
and culture, but the principle is the same in both cases, as the example of Abdullah Patel 
which was mentioned above shows. Evidence gathered for the Swann Report shows 
that many people believe that recognising differences between racial groups is racially 
divisive and may 'constitute a major obstacle to creating a harmonious multi-racial 
society' (DES, 1985, p 26). On these grounds, official policy in the U. K. (and in 
America: cf Glazer, 1983, p 126f) has sometimes self-consciously played down the 
significance of race. In 1973, the DES discontinued the practice of gathering statistics 
on pupils' ethnic or racial origins. Willey (1984, p 95 f) examines the arguments for 
and against this practice. For similar reasons, many teachers have deliberately sought 
to make no distinction between black and white pupils, but rather to treat them all 
equally (cf Little and Willey, 1983). However, the Swann Report concludes that such 
'colour-blindness' is 
potentially just as negative as a straighiforward rejection ofpeople with a 
different skin colour since both types of attitude seek to deny the validity of 
an important aspect of a person's identity. 
(DES, 1985, pp 26-7). 
40 
Chapter Two 
The problem may go further, since treating racial groups equally without 
distinction is usually understood as treating them the same, and treating them the same 
usually implies treating them in accordance with assumptions based on accumulated 
white experience. In this sense, equal treatment can become a vehicle for white 
domination. 'Colour-blindness' thus not only leads to undesirable outcomes (the 
disadvantaging of black people by marginalising their distinctive needs, experiences and 
identity), but may also involve racial injustice. It is not a new idea (indeed, it can be 
traced back to Aristotle) that there can be injustice in treating people the same when in 
relevant respects they are different, just as much as there can be in treating them 
differently when in relevant respects they are the same. Recently, however, empirical 
research by feminists has illustrated the effects of this principle: in equal opportunity 
situations such as co-education, males are generally able to dominate because the terms 
in which the initial situation is defined are male-oriented and take little account of 
relevant differences between males and females (cf Spender and Sarah, 1980; Deem, 
1984; Mahoney, 1985). In the same way, when a'colour-blind' approach is adopted to 
any social policy in this country, white people are usually able to dominate because the 
common experiences are defined in terms which white people can more easily relate to 
than blacks and which tend to bolster the white self-image at the expense of the black. 
Thus even if the books which all the children at a school are expected to study are 
chosen for purely educational reasons, the fact that they all happen to be written by 
white people is likely to convey the hidden message that white people are cleverer or 
that what they write is more significant - the more so if similar messages are picked up 
in other school subjects and activities. As well as the danger of damaging the self- 
concept of ethnic minorities through such hidden messages, the'colour-blind approach 
may deny the relevance of the distinctive experiences of minority groups, such as the 
fact that they are on the receiving end of racial abuse and harrassment. 'Colour- 
blindness' falls down because it is based on an idealistic principle (that all people are 
equal), which may be valid sub specie aeternitatis but which fails to take account of the 
contingent facts of racial inequality and disadvantage in our present society. 
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Undoubtedly one of the factors which led to the phasing out of integrationism in 
favour of accommodationism was the growing realisation that cultural domination, 
however unintentional, was undesirable and unjust. 
**** 
What distinguishes the Accommodationist Phase of Bradford's educational 
provisions for its minority communities is a much greater willingness to take the 
religious and cultural values and beliefs of communities such as the Muslims seriously. 
A new concept of integration emerged in Bradford's Race Relations Policy Statement of 
1981, which did notassume a supremacy of one culture into which others would be 
easily assimilated', but which aimed instead at the creation of 'a society in which there 
is a co-operative and peaceful living together based on mutual respect for differences'. 
The Council was now committed to ensuring that 'so far as is compatible with 
individual needs, the provision of services will at all times respect the strength and 
variety of each community's cultural values. The proviso contained in the phrase 'so 
far as is compatible with individual needs' once again begs the question of who is to 
adjudicate these needs and on what basis of values; this will be discussed more fully 
shortly. But what is significant here is that Bradford's policies had ceased to be based 
on the need to promote the public interest as directly as possible, and instead merely 
acknowledged the necessity to avoid things that were against the public interest. This 
opened the way for policies to develop based on the freedom of individuals and groups 
to pursue their own good with like-minded people, so long as they respected the rights 
of others to do likewise. A letter distributed to all Council employees in 1981 pointed 
out that 'we no longer expect minority communities to integrate and change their ways 
to suit us', and that'every section of the community has an equal right to maintain its 
own identity, culture, language, religion and customs'. 
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The guidelines issued by Bradford Council in 1982 regarding the education of 
pupils from ethnic minority groups were based on two fundamental beliefs, both of 
which had been set out in the policy statement on race relations the previous year. The 
first was that all sections of the city's population had an equal right to the maintenance 
of their distinctive identities and loyalties of culture, language, religion and custom, and 
that so far as was compatible with individual needs, the authority's provision of 
services should respect the strength and variety of each group! s cultural values. The 
second was that all children in Bradford were entitled to equality of treatment, equality 
of opportunity and equality of services and should be offered a shared educational 
experience. Together, these beliefs gave rise to the following statement of the aims of 
education in Bradford: 
1. To seek ways of preparing all children and young people for life in a 
multi-cultural society. 
2. to counter racism and racist attitudes, and the inequalities and 
discrimination which results (sic)from them. 
3. To build on and develop the strengths of cultural and linguistic diversity. 
4. to respond sensitively to the special needs of minority groups. 
The Authority recognises the organisational difficulties of achieving these 
aims, while at the same time responding to the individual needs of children, 
and safeguarding the rights ofparents under the terms of the 1944 Education 
Act. Nevertheless, it is convinced that, with sensitivity and a sympathetic 
understanding of cultural and religious issues, the educational needs of 
ethnic minority children can be met within the one educational system and 
within theframework of a common school curriculum. 
(City of Bradford Local Administrative Memorandum (LAM) No. 2/82). 
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No doubt many causes contnbuted to this change in policy. There had been civil 
disturbances in Toxteth, Bristol, Brixton and Southall in the summer of 1981 (cf 
Jacobs, 1986, ch 6; Cashmore and Troyna, 1983, p 172 ff) and in Bradford itself 
twelve youths were arrested in July 1981 after the discovery of a crate of petrol bombs 
they had made. Complaints against un-Islamic practices in schools, such as mixed 
swimming, were becoming increasingly vociferous, and Muslim demands, especially 
for single-sex education for Muslim girls, were better publicised. Powerful pressures 
groups like the Commission for Racial Equality were beginning to have an impact on 
policy. Not least, the protracted trial of the Bradford Twelve (which ended in the 
acquittal of all the defendants), brought to light many of the legitimate grievances and 
constant fears of the ethnic minority groups in Bradford (cf A Wilson, 1981,1982; 
Pierce, 1982; Leeds Other Paper (LOP), 1982). 
What is more difficult to assess is how much political opportunism there was in 
the new policies. It is true that the voting power of the minority groups was now 
sufficiently large to have an impact on local elections, particularly since Bradford was a 
hung Council. Morris et al (1984) argue that the inclusion of racism on the education 
policy agenda by some Conservative councillors was a clear attempt to attract the black 
vote, and quote an unnamed Conservative councillor: 
Any political party that tells you that it's doing things for purely altruistic 
reasons is either a fool or a liar. Clearly both political parties or three 
political parties are looking to take a chunk of the black and Asian vote. 
Speaking as a Conservative, I am realistic in realising that at the moment my 
party is not receiving a great number ofAsian votes. 
Selbourne (1985) similarly describes the 'many layers of hyprocrisy' which lay 
behind the'public facade of local Labours righteous crusade for mutual respect among 
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the West Riding's races'. On the other hand, there is also evidence to suggest that the 
local political parties were not merely involved in a scramble for the ethnic minority 
vote. Ile race relations policy statement had all-party support, and such disagreements 
as there were over specific provisions (such as whether halal meat should be provided 
in schools) were not along party lines. Neither is there any evidence to suggest that the 
policies were motivated by the political radicalism which was apparent, for example, in 
some London boroughs. It may well be that the development of the new policies had as 
much to do with a genuine desire to act in justice and fairness to minority groups as 
with political manoeuvrings. 
Whatever considerations lay behind them, however, the policies were generally 
presented to the public as a practical response to a practical situation. Peter Gilmour, 
the Conservative Chairman of Bradford's Educational Services Committee at the time 
the policies were approved, drew attention to their pragmatism: 
They'rejust realistic. One in six of our children comefrom Asianfamilies. 
By the turn of the century it will be one in three. The parents are ratepayers. 
It is the sinple duty of the Council to vy to satisfy their needs. 
(quoted in Cross, 1984). 
The policy changes ushered in as a result of the new emphasis on respect for the 
cultures of minority groups fall into two main categories. The first is positive, 
involving the incorporation of elements from minority cultures, particularly Islam, into 
the curriculum of the common school, in an attempt to broaden and enrich it and make it 
more acceptable to the minority communities, particularly the Muslims, by taking 
account of their beliefs and values. For example, a new multi-faith RE syllabus was 
published in June 1983 after extensive consultation between Muslims, Christians, 
Jews, 11indus and Sikhs. It also includes positive attempts to encourage racial tolerance 
understanding and respect through a variety of anti-racist policies and statements. Since 
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1983, there has also been a conscious drive to appoint more school governors from 
ethnic minorities. The second category involves an increased number of concessions to 
the Muslim community, such as the retention of the two remaining single-sex schools in 
spite of the previously announced intention to go fully co-educational; the provision of 
halal meat, now extended to all schools where there are more than ten Muslim children; 
the provision for separate PE and swimming lessons for boys and girls; permission for 
Muslim girls to wear a school uniform and sports kit in keeping with Islamic notions of 
modesty and decency; the teaching of minority languages such as Urdu as official 
school subjects; permission to withdraw from assemblies, RE and sex education; and 
perriiission to attend Friday prayers led by an Imam in or out of school and to be absent 
from school on religious festivals. The guidelines provided by Bradford Council in 
1982 in fact granted ethnic minority parents more rights than they had ever had before, 
but it is worth noting that the roots of both categories of change may be traced back 
clearly to the Integrationist Phase: the first major concession granted to a minority 
group was the granting of permission in 1972 for Muslim children to receive instruction 
in their own faith in secondary schools; and even earlier, in 1970, a commmittee was 
set up to revise Bradfords RE syllabus, to ensure that it reflected the variety of faiths in 
the city. The change of direction from the Integrationist to the Acommodationist Phase 
was thus perhaps not so abrupt as I have implied. 
The Accommodationist Phase involves a recognition of the difficulty of 
developing an educational policy based solely on the public interest in a pluralistic 
society where different groups each have their own concept of what sort of education is 
in the best interests of the child. The aim is to avoid putting minority children into 
situations where they are required to act in conflict with their parents' beliefs and 
values, and to present a positive image of their faith and culture to all children in the 
district. It is based on the hope of retaining the commitment of the minority 
communities to the principle of common schooling and the continued acceptance of the 
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right of the local authority to make final decisions on educational matters. Such a policy 
inevitably makes demands on the indigenous population, however; they might find 
traditional modem language options in schools reduced in order to make room for 
Urdu, or the traditional emphasis on Christianity in RE reduced to make room for the 
study of Islam, Hinduism and Sikhism. In order to overcome possible tensions 
resulting from these changes, the local authority has begun to put less emphasis on the 
mere toleration of cultural differences and more on the need to welcome them as 
culturally enriching. The problem here, of course, is that the celebration of diversity 
sits rather uneasily with commitment to a particular set of cultural or religious values 
and beliefs. Accommodationism, as the Swann Relipri has shown, requires that a 
commitment to fundamental shared values, including the value of pluralism, should take 
priority over a commitment to specific religions or cultural values; and such a scheme of 
priorities is not likely to commend itself to Muslims or other minority groups. There 
are also those among the indigenous population who doubt that such a policy can work, 
or is even desirable, and in expressing such doubts, Honeyford seems to have had 
considerable popular support (see Appendix One). 
The rhetoric used to persuade people of the importance of the educational 
provisions introduced during the Accommodationist Phase still involves the invocation 
of the principle of 'meeting the special needs of ethnic minorities'. Councillor Ajeeb, 
Bradford's first Muslim Lord Mayor, is quoted as saying: 
What we want is accommodation of our cultural needs, expecially in the 
educational system. 
(Selboume, 1984, p 136). 
And the use of the term'needs! by the Chairman of the Educational Services Committee 
and in the Local Administrative Memorandum No. 2/82 has already been noted. But 
the 'needs' are no longer defined, as they were in the Integrationist Phase 
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by the indigenous majority on the basis of values that are not shared by the minority 
groups. On the contrary, there is very considerable evidence that in assessing the needs 
of the minority groups, direct account is now being taken of their wishes and of the 
values that underpin those wishes. This is seen in three ways: first, the demands of 
minority groups such as the Muslims are being taken seriously, and concessions are 
being made in response to those demands, even in the face of the opposition of sections 
of the indigenous majority to the demands. Thus it was agreed to provide hatal meat for 
school dinners for Muslims (i. e. meat slaughtered in accordance with Islamic law), in 
spite of strong opposition from local animal rights campaigners. Secondly, there is a 
greater willingness to consult directly with Muslims in the preparation of policy: this 
can be seen in the way the new RE syllabus was developed. Thirdly, Muslims are 
increasingly being encouraged to participate directly in the process of educational 
decision-making; this results in particular from the appointment of more ethnic minority 
teachers and school governors, particularly in inner-city schools (though such 
appointments are not being made as quickly as many Muslims would like: cf Halstead, 
1988, p 53). 
It must be acknowledged that to talk of cultural concessions to minority groups 
does itself involve the adoption of a cultural (and some would say a racist) stance. For 
what is seen by the indigenous population as a cultural concession to Muslims (for 
example, the provision of halal meat in schools) may be seen by Muslims as no more 
than ceasing to demand a cultural concession from them (i. e. forcing their children to 
eat only vegetarian dishes at school dinners). This merely draws attention to the 
difficulty of establishing cultural norms in a multi-cultural context. But in 
acknowledging the right of minority groups such as the Muslims to pursue their own 
good, so long as this does not conflict with the public interest or the rights of others, 
and in providing for these rights to be put into practice, the local authority seems to be 
acknowledging some sort of accountability to the Muslim community. 
48 
Chapter Two 
The exact nature of this developing nation of accountability to the Muslim 
community, however, is by no means clear. Peter Gilmour, in the speech quoted 
earlier in the present chapter, seems to see the accountability in terms of a recognition of 
the rights of Muslim children and parents as consumers. Elsewhere, however, it is 
interpreted as strictly legal accountability. It is claimed in the Local Administrative 
Memorandum No. 2/82, for example, that the new policies are mainly merely a 
clarification of existing legal rights, such as the right of parents to withdraw their 
children from worship and RE lessons, as allowed in the 1944 Education Act. This is 
not the whole truth, however, for in some cases the legal position has deliberately been 
left unclarified (as in the question of extended visits to the Indian sub-continent by 
Muslim children); in others, the law has not always been enforced (as in the case of 
breaches of planning regulations by Muslim supplementary schools, or the Muslim 
practice of keeping their daughters at home in order to protect them from un-Islamic 
influences); while in others the Council appears to have made a moral judgement when 
faced with conflicting rights (for example, when Muslim demands for the provision of 
halal meat in schools were strongly opposed by animal rights campaigners, or when 
Racism Awareness Training courses were instituted with the overt aim of changing the 
attitudes of Council employees). Clearly, moral considerations tempered the 
interpretation of legal rights in the Council's decisions about educational provision for 
Muslim children. The involvement of Muslims directly in the process of educational 
decision-making adds yet another dimension to the developing notion of moral and legal 
accountability. 
The Honeyford affair, which is discussed briefly in section ten of Appendix One 
and more fully in Halstead (1988), highlights in a unique way some of the problems of 
educational provision for the Muslim community and some of the difficulties with the 
notion of accountability to a minority community such as the Muslims. It raises 
questions such as: what happens when the beliefs and aspirations of a minority group 
are not compatible with those of the broader community? To which group is a 
49 
Chapter Two 
headteacher primarily responsible? More fundamentally, what values should a school 
promote in a multi-cultural society? Is it a school's business in any way to preserve 
minority cultures? Honeyford's controversial articles (1982b, 1983a, 1983b, 1984), 
which led to the protracted campaign against him, seem to be attempting to criticise not 
only the cultures of minority groups in the U. K. and the multi-cultural and anti-racist 
policies developed in Bradford and elsewhere, but also the idea that the LEA should 
assume so much responsibility for what goes on in schools. Implicit in the notion of 
moral and legal accountability which lies behind the LEA policies of the 
Accommodationist Phase is the idea that headteachers are merely employees paid to put 
LEA policy into practice and that they should do little off their own initiative. Peter 
Gilmour, Chairman of Bradford's Educational Services Commitee, is quoted as saying, 
'We expect our heads to comply'Me Times Educational Supplement. 16 March 1984, 
p 9), while Mike Whittaker, the Council's Policies Development Officer, commented, 
'We're simply not allowing teachers to run their schools as they see fif (quoted in 
Selbourne, 1987, p 105). Honeyford, however, argues - and he has the weight of a 
good deal of support from liberal educational theory - that the head should have a 
substantial degree of autonomy in the running of the school, and that accountability 
consists of professional responsibility, plus a willingness to offer an account of one's 
actions when this is requested, for example, by the school governors. In his guide for 
probationary teachers, Honeyford writes, 
An aspect of the job which is immensely prized by teachers is that of 
professional autonomy. There is afeeling of independence and individuality 
for the teacher in an English classroom which few vocations can match. 
Teachers are particularly flerce when it comes to what they should teach, 




If we flesh out his views a little, we find that he stresses a relationship of trust 
between the various parties involved in the educational experience, rather than one of 
compulsion; he stresses the professional judgement of the individual teacher, rather than 
the following of externally imposed rules; he stresses the common needs and rights of 
all children (including the right to be treated as an individual), rather than the rights 
and needs of particular groups; and he stresses the autonomy of teachers, not their 
status as employees. In brief, his view of accountability is not very different from that 
widely supported by many liberal educationalists and taken for granted by a large 
section of the teaching profession. In Chapter Three I argue that although this notion of 
professional accountability works well under a system of Integrationism, it appears to 
break down under a system of Accommodationism, for a variety of reasons. On the 
one hand, a headteacher can easily get caught up in clashes between rival pressure 
groups as they battle to establish a pecking order of influence on local authority 
decisions. On the other hand, the professional accountability model leaves the door 
open for unconscious cultural bias, for all too often we find that the autonomous 
decisions of headteachers turn out to be'our judgements as to the worth of elements of 
their culture (Harris, 1982a, p 227). Nfinority groups cannot take it for granted that 
the decisions and value judgements which form part of the everyday duties of the head 
of a common school will be in harmony with their own distinctive values. If minority 
groups are to have confidence in the decisions, it is clear that an agreed structure of 
rules and values is needed, together with some system of calling the decision-makers to 
account if the rules are not adhered to. In the protests against Honeyfords articles, 
another approach to accountability emerged that was more in line with this idea that a 
head can be called to account by parents and the local community. Indeed, it was not 
only Honeyford himself who was called to account for expressing opinions that were 
considered divisive, insulting and provocative and for behaving in what some 
considered a professionally irresponsible manner; the Council and the Directorate of 
Educational Services were also called to account for failing to take prompt action against 
a head accused of directly contravening the spirit of the Council's policies on race 
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relations and multi-cultural education. In the end it was direct action by the parents and 
other members of the mainly Muslim local community in making the smooth running of 
Honeyfords school impossible, that forced the Council and Honeyford, irrespective of 
the rights and wrongs of the case, to agree on a package which took him away from the 
school for good. 
One of the important issues to come out of the Honeyford affair is thus the 
question to what extent the providers of education should be responsive to the wishes 
of parents and the local community, especially when those wishes are in conflict with 
either the wishes of the broader community or with policies agreed by democratic 
procedures, rational debate or professional expertise. In Honeyfords case, he was 
trapped between conflicting educational demands and expectations, and found it 
impossible to please all the parties at the same time. The Drummond Parents' Action 
Committee which was set up to campaign for Honeyford's dismissal never claimed to 
represent the views of the broader community; indeed, the 600-signature petition it 
gathered looked very weak compared to the 23,000 signatures collected in support of 
Honeyford. But what it did claim to represent - and the evidence in support of the 
claim is very strong - was the views of the majority of parents and members of the 
community immediately surrounding Honeyford's school (most of them Muslims). 
And on that basis it claimed the right not only to a say in decisions affecting the school, 
but to an effective veto of decisions it did not like. 
The concept of accountability that emerges here thus focusses primarily on the 
wishes of the parents and local community. In contrast to the notion of professional 
accountability that is implicit in Honeyford's writings, it stresses the contractual 
accountability of a head to the LEA, and the accountability of both to parents and the 
local community, who may in extreme cases take matters into their own hands directly. 
In contrast to the notion of moral and legal accountability that is reflected in Bradford's 
policies in the Accornmodationist Phase, on the other hand, it denies that representatives 
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of the broader community should have the final say in matters affecting the education of 
minority communities. It is no longer enough for the authorities to take account of 
wishes and beliefs of minority communities; now they are liable to be called to 
account if they contravene these wishes. 
The Honeyford affair appears to be the first Teal eruption that has been brought to 
public attention of the problems of educational provision for the Muslim community, 
and it draws attention to two crucial underlying issues: the question of minority rights 
and the question of shared values. The question of minority rights is raised in 
considering whether a minority community has the right in any circumstances to 
demand the dismissal of a head who has the support of the broader community, 
whether a minority community has the right to demand concessions some of which may 
be considered ridiculous by the majority, whether a minority has the right to demand 
that the education of its young should proceed along different lines from those approved 
by the majority, and so on. Behind these specific issues lie more general questions 
about the basis on which the Tights of minorities in a democratic system are determined, 
what the rights actually are and how far they extend, what principles should determine 
the resolution of clashes between the majority and the minority, and how these 
principles should be applied in the specific case of the educational demands of Muslims 
in the U. K. The question of shared values is raised because unless there is a common 
framework of values shared by all the groups that make up our present-day society, 
then the attempt to provide ac ornmon educational experience for all pupils seems certain 
to entail to a greater or less extent the imposition of the values of one group on another. 
If there is no common framework of shared values, then there is no room for teacher 
autonomy, or indeed for the autonomy of the LEA, for neither would provide sufficient 
guarantee that pupils were not being influenced against their parents'values and beliefs. 
If there is no common framework of shared values, the members of minority groups 
can hardly be expected to be enthusiastic about a common system of education at all. It 
thus becomes a matter of vital concern to establish just how far the values and 
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educational goals of Muslims in the U. K. are compatible with those of the broader 
society and to decide what should be done in cases where the two sets of values are not 
compatible. Most of the rest of the thesis will in fact be concerned with these two 
underlying issues of minority rights and shared values. 
Before these two issues are approached directly, however, the concept of 
accountability needs a more structured examination than has so far been provided. In 
fact, accountability is one of the few areas where some sort of attempt has been made in 
the last few years to match philosophy of education and educational practice (e. g. 
Sockett et al, 1980; Elliott et al, 1981a, Kogan, 1986). Chapter Three will thus 
examine these attempts, outline current theories of accountability, and assess their 
relevance and value to the demands made by Muslims regarding educational provision 
for their children. 
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EDUCATION FOR MUSLIM CHILDREN IN THE U. K.: 
THE PRINCIPLE OF ACCOUNTABILITY 
Towards the end of Chapter Two it was argued that Bradford's innovative multi- 
cultural policies, which have subsequently proved very influential on both the Swann 
Report and the policies of other LEAs, were based on a belief in the right of all 
interested parties, including minorities such as the Muslims, to have their wishes and 
needs taken into account in educational planning and decision-making. This notion 
of accountability, however - and in this thesis I am concerned specifically with 
accountability to the Muslim community - is far from unproblematic. At the end of 
Chapter Two I drew attention to some of the complications which were highlighted by 
the Honeyford affair. Implicit in the developing concept of moral and legal 
accountability on the part of the LEA is the idea that teachers are merely employees 
of the LEA, paid to put the policies into practice. The moral and legal accountability of 
the LEA to the electorate thus involves a strong emphasis on the contractual 
accountability of heads and other teachers to the LEA. Not surprisingly, a number 
of teachers, including Honeyford, resented this erosion of their professional autonomy; 
professional accountability in their view involves the freedom to make judgements 
on educational matters according to appropriate educational criteria and the 
responsibility to offer an account of these in accordance with professional codes of 
practice when required to do so by interested parties. When the Drummond Parents' 
Action Committee (DPAC) attempted to call Honeyford to account, however, their 
main objection was that he was not being sensitive to their cultures or responsive to 
their special needs. Responsive accountability implies an obligation to take 
account of the wishes of interested parties beyond the letter of the law or the teacher's 
contract; but the term gives no clue as to who the interested parties are or whose claim 
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must take priority in the event that the interests of the parents, the children, the local 
community or the general public are not compatible. To talk in an unqualified way of 
the accountability of teachers to their employers and parents may therefore be 
misleading since it does not distinguish between different forms of accountability and it 
does not acknowledge the difficulty of being accountable to different interested parties 
at the same time. 
Two needs emerge from this brief review of accountability in relation to minority 
communities such as the Muslims in the U. K. Ile first is a clarification of the concept 
itself. A considerable amount of research has been carried out in the field of 
accountability in recent years, (e. g. Becher et al., 1979; Sockett et al., 1980; Elliott et 
al., 1981a, 1981b; Kogan, 1986), but this research has sometimes been based on 
conflicting conceptual frameworks. The second is to consider whether any of the 
models of accountability point to ways of making decisions about the education of 
Muslims that are acceptable to all the parties involved, including the Muslims 
themselves. These two issues will occupy the remainder of the present chapter. 
Dictionaries (e. g. the Concise Oxford) usually define 'accountability' either in 
terms of an agent' s obligation to 'give an account' of his actions or as 'responsibility'. 
Neither definition is adequate without qualification. To define accountability in terms of 
delivering an account is inadequate since it is clear that a headmaster who harangues his 
assembled school with political propaganda for half an hour every morning will not 
have fulfilled the requirements of accountability so long as he is happy to describe or 
explain his actions to anyone who requires him to do so. Educational accountability also 
involves taking into account the requirements of the law, the values of the broader 
society, the guidelines of the local authority, the professional code of conduct, the 
rights of the parents, the interests of the children and so on. In addition, accountability 
implies that the educators' account of their actions should (implicitly if not explicitly) be 
judged to be satisfactory by those who have a legitimate stake in the educational 
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process. Accountability thus inevitably raises questions about who should have a stake 
in the educational process, and is never far removed from questions about the control of 
education. As Bridges points out, 
an explanation of educational accountability couched simply in terms of a 
school's concern to communicate what it is doing to an outside audience 
fails to tell us enough about educational accountability as a political concept 
located among discussions about the control of education. 
(1981, p 224) 
The equation of accountability with responsibility involves different problems, not 
least that it provides too easy a justification for the claim that the teacher should be 
accountable in the main'to his or her own informed conception of the role of a general 
educator' (Bailey, 1983, p 11). Bailey argues that 
the more I am morally responsible or accountablefor my own actions, the 
less it is reasonable to expect me to be responsible or accountable to 
anyone else in the sense of simply obeying them; though it might indeed be 
reasonable to expect me to give an account of, explain orjustify my actions, 
if only to show publicly that I am acting in a morally responsible way. 
(ibid., p 14) 
The trouble with this argument is that 'responsibility' is a much broader concept than 
'accountability', and one cannot therefore make distinctions that relate to the former and 
apply them uncritically to the latter. The primary force of the sentence, Titty is 
responsible for her own actions' is that the origin of her actions can be traced back to 
Titty herself. Miis implies (a) that she is capable of rational conduct and (b) that she is 
free to choose between courses of action. It may also, but need not, imply that she is 
liable to be called on to answer for her actions. Accountability, however, means 
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responsibility only in this latter, narrower sense of answerability. But to be answerable 
implies an audience (whether explicitly referred to or merely understood) in a way 
which acting in a morally responsible manner does not, and thus it is not possible to 
discuss educational accountability without asking to whom the educator is to be 
accountable. It may be possible under certain conditions to justify a professional model 
of accountability which lays stress on the teacher's autonomy, as I shall argue later, but 
a justification that is based on too broad an understanding of the concept will not do. 
An adequate account of educational accountability must therefore steer a middle 
path between control and autonomy. The autonomy of educators will be tempered by 
the fact that they are accountable to those they serve, and that those they serve have 
legitimate expectations and requirements which should be satisfied. On the other hand, 
the control of education can never be so tight that educators are reduced to the status of 
conveyor belts carrying precious nuggets from the mines of knowledge to the rows of 
empty minds waiting to be filled. From what has been said so far, it appears that there 
are six conditions which any case of educational accountability must satisfy: 
(1) The person who is accountable is the holder of a defined role. 
(2) ne role-holder' s accountability relates to actions carried out in connection with 
the requirements of the role. 
(3) The role-holder's accountability is to one or more specific audiences - those 
who have delegated the responsibilities of his role to him, and/or those who are 
on the receiving end of his actions. 
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(4) The audience has certain legitimate expectations which the role-holder should 
take into account, and has grounds for insisting that those expectations be 
satisfied. 
(5) The role-holder should be willing to accept that some account of how the 
expectations are being satisfied should be prepared if the audience requires it, or 
at least that evidence should be made available to the audience so that some 
assessment of how the expectations are being satisfied can be made. 
(6) Sanctions or other forms of appropriate action (including professional advice, 
remedial help, further feedback) are available if the account or assessment 
indicate that the legitimate expectations are not being satisfied. 
Two main types of question emerge from these six conditions. The first concerns 
who defines the responsibilities of the specific role - the role-holder himself relying on 
his own professional expertise, or the audience; and if it is the latter, does this refer to 
those who foot the bill, or those who receive the service? The second concerns the level 
of control implicit in the notion of accountability to a specific audience. Should the role- 
holder merely be responsive to the expectations and requirements of those he serves, or 
is he answerable to them? The way in which educational accountability is understood in 
practice depends on the answers given to these two questions. Let us look at the two 
questions in more detail. 
Accountability is usually invoked when there are three parties to an agreement 
rather than just two, i. e. when the role-holder is engaged to provide a service but is paid 
by someone other than the person who receives the service. In other words, a is paid 
by b to provide a service for c, and a is accountable to both b and c for providing that 
service. Tbus a bus driver is accountable both to the bus company which hires him and 
to the passengers he serves, though on some occasions he might allow his own claims 
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to expertise to override the requirements of the other two parties (Tve been driving 
buses fifteen years, and I know what I'm doing). Accountability procedures are less 
likely to be invoked in a situation where b pays for a service which she herself receives 
from a, since the direct control she can exert (e. g. by refusing to pay for the service) 
normally obviates the need for a more time-consuming and less clear-cut calling to 
account. In education, there is some uncertainty about who b actually is (the local 
government, the national government, the tax payer or the rate payer), about who c t 
actually is (the child, the parent, the local community or society as a whole) and about 
the legitimacy of the claims of other groups (employers, unions, universities and so on) 
to have a say in the process. The situation is further complicated by the fact that parents 
may well pay for education as taxpayers as well as being on the receiving end as 
consumers. Nevertheless, the crude distinction between a (the educator), b (those who 
employ him) and c (those for whom he carries out a service) still has some validity. The 
question of which of these should have the greatest say in determining the 
responsibilities of educators lies at the heart of the debate about accountability. 
The second question requires a distinction between on the one hand the 
answerability of educators, their responsibility to demonstrate that they are satisfying 
the expectations of the audience and that, for example, pupils are in fact learning what 
they are supposed to learn (which I shall call 'contractual accountability'), and on the 
other the process of taking into account the requirements of all interested parties when 
making educational decisions (which I shall call 'responsive accountability'). The 
former category is exemplified in the question whether we are getting value for money 
from our educational service, the latter in the question which figured highly in 
Callaghan's 'Great Debate' launched in 1976, whether education should be more 
accountable to industry. Contractual accountability is primarily concerned with 
educational outcomes and results, whereas responsive accountability, while not 
ignoring these, puts more emphasis on educational processes and decision-making. 
Contractual accountability is directed more towards control (though, as we shall see, 
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self-accounting procedures are an attempt to fulfil the requirements of contractual 
accountability while playing down the element of control); responsive accountability is 
directed more towards involvement and interaction between the decision-makers and 
those whom the decisions affect. In contractual accountability, the requirement for 
educators to give an account of their actions means no more than that they should give a 
description of them; in responsive accountability, on the other hand, giving an account 
of one's actions involves explaining and justifying them. 
An analysis which combines the distinction between contractual and responsive 
accountability with the dominance of one of the three main parties to the accountability 
process - the employer (i. e. the LEA, the governing body or other employer), the 
autonomous professional and the consumer - produces six possible models of 
educational accountability. These are: 
1. The Central Control Model (contractual, employer dominant). 
2. The Self-Accounting Model (contractual, professional dominant). 
3. The Consumerist Model (contractual, consumer dominant). 
4. The Chain of Responsibility Model (responsive, employer dominant). 
5. The Professional Model (responsive, professional dominant). 
6. The Partnership Model (responsive, consumer dominant). 
These models are, of course, ideal types, but it is hoped that, in spite of the 
inevitable oversimplification, a brief examination of each will help to shed light on the 




The Central Control Model lays stress on teachers' status as employees with a 
contract of employment (at least in some sense), who are under the obligation to 
demonstrate that they are in fact doing what they are paid to do (cf Gibson, 1980). Even 
after payment by results was abandoned, the accountability of educators was for many 
years judged primarily in terms of their students! success in public examinations. The 
requirement of the 1980 Education Act that schools should publish a detailed analysis of 
their examination results for the benefit of prospective parents, and the requirement of 
the 1988 Education Act that pupils should be tested at the ages of 7,11,14 and 16, 
both reflect this view of accountability. One of the purposes of the new national 
curriculum is to 
enable schools to be more accountablefor the education they offer to their 
pupils, individually and collectively. 
(DES, 1987, p 4) 
A similar approach has been much in vogue in the U. S. A. since the 1960s: 
educators are accountable to the general public (who pay for the education through 
taxes) for the achievement of pre-specified objectives by the children they teach, and 
this achievement is assessed on the basis of the test scores gained by the children. Test 
results thus loom large in the accountability process, and the question of whether the tax 
payer is getting value for money from the educational system can be answered in terms 
of what results are achieved from what outlay of resources. The main objections to this 
approach to accountability have been set out by Sockett (1980, p 17-19). A much less 
crude approach to central control, which takes account of the fact that the success of a 
school can never more than partially be judged by test or examination results, is seen in 
the external monitoring of schools carried out by representatives of the teachers' 
employers (HMI at the national level and LEA advisers or inspectors at the local level). 
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The Self Accounting Model involves schools and teachers monitoring their own 
activities in an attempt to satisfy the requirements of contractual accountability while 
holding on to as much professional autonomy as possible and avoiding increased 
bureaucratic control of education. The Cambridge Accountability Project (Elliott et al., 
1981 a, 1981b) was mainly concerned with investigating schools that were committed to 
the Self-Accounting Model. Both Scrimshaw (1980) and Becher et al. (1981, p 75ff) 
offer a number of arguments in favour of a school offering an account of its activities 
rather than being called to account by an external body. Sockett (1982, p 544), on the 
other hand, questions whether self-accounting is a credible alternative to the 
bureaucratic centralism of the first model, since 'accountability without redress is 
empty'. 
Ile Consumerist Model introduces the mechanisms of the free market in place of 
central or professional control as the primary means of enforcing educational 
accountability (cf Kogan, 1986, p 51ff). The model is based on the belief that if schools 
or LEAs no longer have a guaranteed clientele, this will create an incentive to compete 
which will in turn push up educational standards. The model is exemplified in 
proposals for a voucher system such as that advocated by Coons and Sugarman (1978) 
and more recently by Seldon (1986), whereby parents! influence on the character of the 
school would be strengthened by their freedom to spend their vouchers at the school of 
their choice. Honeyford, too, argues that under such a system 
parents would become much more involved in the accountability of schools, 
since they possess 'the power of exit" and control the purse strings. 
(1986) 
Of course, individual parents who are dissatisfied with the educational provision at one 
school have always had the right to transfer their children to another. The William 
Tyndale affair, for example, started with a considerable number of parents transfering 
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their children to other schools before the ]LEA began to investigate what was going on 
at the school (Gretton and Jackson, 1976; Ellis et al., 1976; Scrimshaw and Horton, 
1981). But the Consumerist Model goes beyond this in that it involves a radical 
redistribution of power and authority in educational matters. The model clearly lies 
behind the provisions of the 1988 Education Act which allow the governing bodies of 
schools to opt out of local authority control and allow parents greater freedom to send 
their children to the school of their choice. 
The Chain of Responsibility Model is a form of responsive accountability based 
on an acknowledgement of the complexity of the relationship between employer, 
practitioner and client in the field of education, and an acknowledgement that different 
types of educational decisions may reasonably be considered the domain of different 
groups. The model has three main features. The first is that an initial distinction is made 
between those who make educational decisions and those whose wishes, interests, 
requirements or opinions are merely taken into account by the decision-makers. The 
second is that the various groups of decision-makers, who consist of different 
categories of elected representatives and their employees, are ranked in a chain which 
extends from parliament and the DES, to local councils and LEAs, to school governors, 
to headteachers, to senior staff and finally to assistant teachers. In some respects the 
relationship between the links in the chain is hierarchical, in that each link can control, 
to a greater or less extent, the practice of subsequent links, and the autonomy of any 
given link is subject to the constraints which may be placed upon its freedom of action 
by the preceding links. However, to describe the relationship as hierarchical or as one 
of control is to oversimplify it. For the elected representatives are unlikely to act without 
at least seeking the professional advice of their employees, and those at the teaching end 
of the chain have a variety of means open to them for diminishing the effectiveness of 
policies initiated without their approval. These include tacitly ignoring the policy, going 
through the motions of compliance, campaigning against the policy through their 
unions, working to rule and so on. The third characteristic feature of the model is that 
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FIGURE ONE: THE CHAIN OF RESPONSIBILITY MODEL 
THE CHAIN responsive to ... ' THE INTEREST GROUPS 
Parli UDES amen 
Head 
General public, CBI, TUC, universities, national 
pressure groups. 
Rate payers, local electorate, employees, local 
industry 
Parents and local community 
Parents, higher education, colleagues 
Parents, pupils, colleagues, unions, other 
educational institutions 




each link in the chain has a special responsibility to particular interest groups, as set out 
in Figure One. Each link demonstrates its responsiveness to its interest groups in two 
ways: sounding out opinion and engaging in dialogue on the particular educational 
decisions for which it has responsibility, and delivering an account of the decisions it 
has made. One disadvantage of the Chain of Responsibility Model is that it might lead 
to a growth of bureaucracy and to power struggles between different links in the chain. 
Another disadvantage is the implicit hierarchy of interests which results from the more 
or less explicit hierarchy of educational decision-making and control. Thus the interests 
of the parent qua parent rank lower than the interests of the parent qua rate payer, and 
both rank lower than the interests of national industry. An interest group may appeal to 
a higher link in the chain if it believes the response to its wishes and demands has been 
unsatisfactory, but has no guarantee of a sympathetic hearing. Sir Keith Joseph, for 
example, was very responsive to a small number of complaints about Peace Studies in 
schools (Joseph, 1984), but refused to get involved in the Honeyford affair; and 
Kenneth Baker, who intervened in the McGoldrick affair, held back from involvement 
in the dispute at Headfield Middle School in Dewsbury (Caudrey, 1987). 
The Professional Model avoids the problem of a hierarchy of interests by leaving 
educational decisions (except on matters on which they are contractually accountable) to 
the judgment of the professional educators - or of the school, though I tend to agree 
with Sockett (1980, p 13) that school accountability is reducible to the accountability of 
the head and other teachers. On this model, which is set out in more detail by Bailey 
(1980,1983), professional educators seek to retain control over educational decisions 
which affect themselves, and see themselves as the arbiter when they are faced with 
conflicting demands from different interested parties. Their professional status requires 
them to take account of all the expectations, wishes and criticisms emanating from those 
with a legitimate interest in the education they are providing, but as they are ultimately 
responsible for educational practice, so they claim the right to make final judgments and 
to define the boundaries of their own accountability. This right is based on their 
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professional training and expertise, on the standards they have implicitly committed 
themselves to when entering the profession, and on the professional autonomy that 
teachers have traditionally been allowed in this country. How far the claim of teachers 
to be professionally autonomous is justifiable in our contemporary pluralist society will 
be considered in the final section of the present chapter. 
The Partnership Model combines two main principles. The first is that the 
responsibility for educational decisions should not lie with one dominant group, but 
with a partnership of all those directly affected by a particular decision or with a 
legitimate interest in it. The second is that all the parties to the partnership are not merely 
consulted before the decisions are taken, but have a share in the actual decision-making, 
either directly or through their representatives (the distinction between representation 
and direct participation, which Pateman (1970) makes much of, is not central to the 
argument here). There are likely to be three stages in decision-making on this model: (a) 
the pooling of ideas and the critical discussion of options; (b) 'the negotiation through 
argument and compromise of whatever can satisfy most people as being the most 
rational, or, failing that, the most reasonable solution! (Bridges, 1978, p 118); and (c) 
the acceptance of the obligation to abide by and help carry through the decisions which 
have been reached in this democratic manner. This model therefore provides a quite 
different approach to accountability from the Chain of Responsibility and Professional 
Models. Each member of the partnership is accountable to the other members in the 
sense of being under an obligation to take their views and interests into account, but is 
not accountable to any outside interest group (unless of course he has been elected as a 
representative of a broader group, in which case he will be answerable to them for the 
way in which he represents their interests). 
A major obstacle facing the Partnership Model is the difficulty of gathering all the 
parties with a legitimate interest into a single manageable committee which can actually 
make decisions. Usually in practice only some of the main interested parties are brought 
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together on a decision-making body. The Schools Council was one such attempt, but 
was perhaps too dominated by teachers (Plaskow, 1985). Prior to the 1986 Education 
(No 2) Act, governing bodies were often dominated by political nominees. The theory 
behind the encouragement of greater extra-professional participation in educational 
planning and decision-making is set out in the Taylor Report, to which the roots of the 
1986 Act can be traced: 
The Secretaries of State have pointed out that curricula must meet, and be 
responsive to, the needs of society.. Jf ordinary people do not, as some 
teachers suggest, understand what schools are trying to do, it is in part 
because they have traditionally not taken an active part in determining the 
educational policy of the schools. 
(DES, 1977) 
Elliott (1980, p, 82), however, has argued against the participation of non-professional 
bodies in final decisions about educational policy, and in any case it has been suggested 
(Bridges, 1982b, p 14) that many parents do not see PTA committees and parent 
governors as a genuine vehicle for the expression of their concerns. 
It may be helpful at this stage to look back at Bradford! s educational provision for 
its Muslim community and ethnic minorities generally in light of the distinctions which 
have so far been made. 
The Accommodationist Phase of Bradford's policy towards its minority 
communities described in Chapter Two provides an archetypal exarnple of the Chain of 
Responsibility Model. A number of features of the policy make this clear. First, the 
council and LEA were attempting to respond to the perceived needs and wishes of the 
particular interest groups to which they were responsible. The comment of the former 
chairman of the Educational Services Committee has already been referred to: 
68 
Chapter Three 
One in six of our children come from Asian families.. Jt is the simple duty 
of the Council to try to satisfy their needs. 
(quoted in The Times Educational Supplement, 25 May 1984) 
Secondly, though they took care to engage in dialogue with the minority communities, 
the Council and LEA emphasised their own right to interpret and evaluate the 
requirements of those communities. Thirdly, the Council and LEA drew attention to the 
fact that they were acting within the guidelines defined by the government or the DES; 
usually, they claimed to be 'clarifying' or 'interpreting' or 'acting within the spirit of 
the 1944 Education Act. Fourthly, the Council and LEA expected subsequent links in 
the chain of responsibility to take account of their guidelines and definitions of good 
practice and to act in accordance with them. 
Honeyfor&s stance, on the other hand, provides an equally clear example of the 
Professional Model. Where LEA guidelines were specific, he took these to form part of 
his contractual obligations and carried them out to the letter. But where LEA guidelines 
were expressed in general terms as recommendations for good practice, he considered 
these as advice which he as an autonomous professional could weigh alongside other 
considerations before making decisions about educational practice within his own 
school. The high value which Honeyford put on professional autonomy is made clear in 
his guide for probationary teachers (1982a, p 158) as well as in the reports he was 
required to prepare for the crucial meeting of the Schools (Education) Sub-Committee 
on 22 March 1985 when a vote of no confidence in him was passed. 
The view of accountability which emerges from the protests against Honeyford, 
however, is much less straightforward. The protest may be divided into three stages. 
The first stage involved the two logical courses of action open to parents according to 
the analysis of responsive accountability which has been offered: organising a protest 
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group (the DPAQ to co-ordinate action against Honeyford and to put pressure on the 
LEA to respond to their demands (in keeping with the Chain of Responsibility Model); 
and urging the school's parent governor to press the claims of the DPAC on the 
governing body as a whole (in keeping with the Partnership Model). In the event, the 
existing parent governor could not handle the demands and resigned, and the election of 
the DPAC chairperson as the new parent governor by a large majority put her in a 
strong position to urge both governors and LEA to call Honeyford to account. The 
LEA! s response to this first stage of the protest appeared to miss the point, however, 
the DPAC were objecting to Honeyfords failure to be responsive to their wishes and 
needs, but the LEA sent in a team of inspectors to Honeyford! s school to check that its 
educational provision was in line with LEA policies. In other words, complaints about a 
lack of responsive accountability were being met in terms of the contractual 
accountability of the Central Control Model. 
In the second stage of the protest, the DPAC began to call the LEA to account. 
Iley claimed to be supporting LEA policies on race relations, and called on the LEA to 
take what was in their eyes the necessary step of dismissing a head who was 
contravening these policies. The Council's response this time was to require Honeyford 
to prepare six reviews of aspects of his school's provision -a requirement which was 
closely in line with the Self-Accounting Model, except that there was still a strong 
element of central control in the advisers' evaluation of these reports. The main 
complaints against Honeyford in the second report by the advisers were that he had not 
changed his attitude in any way and that he was not sufficiently responsive to the 
requirements of the particular interest groups that according to the Chain of 
Responsibility Model were primarily his responsibility - the parents and the local 
community. As a result of this report he was suspended. 
The final stage of the protest, after Honeyford had been reinstated, had much 
more in common with the Consumerist Model. This stage was marked by direct action 
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aimed at making his school unworkable and thus his departure inevitable. The 
justification for this action was based on the claim that the parents had the right, as the 
representatives and trustees of the children at the school, to call a head directly to 
account themselves. This of course raises the question whether the wishes and 
judgments of parents should be paramount in the education of their children, a question 
which has been much debated in recent years (cf Coons and Sugarman, 1978; O'Neill 
and Ruddick, 1979; Bridges, 1984; Hobson, 1984; McLaughlin, 1984,1985), and 
which is central to the present thesis (see Chapter Five). The mode of Honeyford's 
actual departure, however, was such that he could claim it was an autonomous decision 
on his part, in line with the Professional Model; although he was willing and able to 
carry on as head, he weighed the effect the dispute was having on his wife's health, the 
morale of the staff and the education of the pupils and decided that the best course of 
action was to accept early retirement. 
'Me fact that all six models were thus operating in the Honeyford affair highlights 
the difficulties in any discussion of accountability to the Muslim community. Clearly, 
we are concerned primarily with responsive accountability rather than contractual 
accountability, but there are a number of crucial questions that must now be considered. 
How should educational decisions be reached? How much account should be taken of 
the wishes of interested parties? Is it in fact possible to take account of conflicting 
wishes, and if not, whose interests are to take priority? Are there basic criteria 
according to which educational problems should be resolved irrespective of the wishes 
of interested parties? If there are, are teachers in the best position to understand these 
criteria and should they therefore have the final responsibility for decisions relating to 
educational policy and practice? 'Ibe final section of the present chapter briefly examines 
the kinds of answers provided to these questions by the three models of responsive 
acountability and considers the arguments relating to each model with particular 
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reference to the needs and aspirations of the Muslim community. 
**** 
Let us start with the Professional Model. Accountability according to this view 
involves professional responsibility, plus a willingness to offer an account of one's 
actions when this is required of one (for example, by a school's governors). It stresses 
a relationship of trust between the various parties involved in the educational enterprise, 
rather than one of compulsion, and stresses the professional judgment of the individual 
teacher rather than the following of externally imposed rules and guidelines. Bailey 
argues that it is based on the principle of teacher autonomy: 
An autonomous teacher does not ignore the wishes and interests of others - 
parents, pupils, governments and employers - but such a teacher does 
reserve the right to consider such wishes and interests in the light of 
appropriate criteria. The wants and wishes cannot simply be taken as given 
starting points. An autonomous teacher does not necessarily refuse to 
submit to the judgment of others, but again such a teacher would need to 
satisfy himself concerning the criteria ofjudgment and the procedures by 
which he is asked to accept thejudgments of others. In particular he might 
consider it proper to be subject in some matters to the judgment of his 
professional associates. 
(1980, p 99) 
Bailey offers three main justifications for linking accountability to professional 
autonomy. First, he argues that accountability necessarily involves autonomy and that 
accounts of moral and professional action only make sense where the agent - is 
considered to be autonomous (although he points out that autonomy is always a matter 
of degree: cf 1980, p 104; 1983, pp 11,15). If the agent is merely responsible to his 
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superiors in the sense of working strictly to their orders, then it is they, not he, who 
should provide the explanation and justification of his actions. The second argument is 
a refinement of the assumption held in some quarters that teachers' professional 
knowledge and expertise justifies them in holding themselves aloof from non-expert 
interference and criticism, or at least that if their actions are questioned by parents, for 
example, the appropriate response is for teachers to attempt to 'educate' the parents (cf 
Nias, 19 8 1, p 202) by patiently explaining what they are seeking to do and why. Bailey 
(1983, p 13-14) argues that teachers' professional expertise consists not in the 
possession of specialised packages of information and skills but in the capacity to apply 
broadly generalisable knowledge, skills and attitudes to whatever situations they find 
themselves in. The capacity to make autonomous decisions is thus a major part of 
teachers' expertise, and to instil that capacity in their pupils is one of their major goals; 
but it is because their decisions are autonomous ones that they have a duty to explain 
them or give an account of them to all interested parties. The third argument is that 
teachers in fact have to be accountable within considerably diverse contexts, and that the 
best way to help teachers to fulfil their role satisfactorily in these differing school 
conditions and arrangements is to encourage them to develop the capacity to reflect 
critically on the possible ways of applying general educational principles to specific 
situations and to act on the basis of this rational reflection. Only if teachers are 
professionally autonomous will there be a system of decision-making flexible enough to 
take into account the needs of individual children and the requirements of specific 
contexts: a centrally imposed system could not be sufficiently adaptable. 
The first of these arguments is broadly acceptable, so long as it is acknowledged 
that accountability involves at least a minimal degree of autonomy and a minimal sense 
of responding to, or being constrained by the legitimate claims of, interested parties. 
Indeed, it is this very tension between autonomous action and legitimate constraint that 
is picked out by the term 'accountability'. 
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Bailey's second argument, which defines teachers' professional expertise in terms 
of the ability to make autonomous decisions about what and how to teach children, is 
more problematic. Clearly teachers cannot exercise their professional autonomy in total 
isolation and independence from their professional colleagues. But as soon as Bailey 
concedes that professional autonomy includes 'the right to participate in the formation 
of policy to be collectively implemented! (1980, p 107), we are forced to ask why this 
right to participate is restricted to professional educators. If the parents (or politicians, 
employers, trade unionists, social workers or other interested parties) share the 
fundamental knowledge and commitment to autonomy which in Bailey's view form the 
basis of teachers' professional expertise, on what grounds are they to be excluded from 
participation in decisions affecting the future generation? Even if parents do not share 
this knowledge and commitment, to exclude them from the decision-making process 
has every appearance of oppression and a lack of respect for the rights and opinions of 
others. 
If the second argument relates primarily to questions of practical detail requiring 
immediate resolution, then few would dispute that these are best dealt with by the 
person on the spot; and much educational decision-making belongs to this category. But 
Bailey appears to argue that more fundamental decisions, such as educational aims and 
priorities, should also be the exclusive domain of the professionally autonomous 
teacher. This does not mean that the wishes and requirements of interested parties 
would be ignored, but simply that they would be put through the filter of the teacher's 
own rationality, expertise and professional judgment. On Bailey's view, the teacher, 
who has an informed and rational conception of what education is and where it should 
be leading, fights for education as he sees it and tries to stop it being domesticated to 
other ends. The resulting decisions and actions would thus inevitably be dependent on 
the teacher's perception and understanding of the situation. It is clear that if a system of 
autonomous decision-making by professional teachers is to be found acceptable, there 
has to be a high level of trust in the teacher's perception and understanding of the 
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situation and an agreement over the basic criteria according to which the autonomous 
decisions should be made. Our contemporary multi-cultural context underlines the 
difficulties in achieving either of these conditions. Teachers' perceptions, 
preconceptions and tacit cultural assumptions are no longer universally shared (if they 
ever ývere), and teachers themselves are in any case notoriously divided on many 
issues, including the aims of education. It is doubtful if there is a sufficient agreement 
over 'values which are basic to our shared form of life' (Bonnett, 1979, p 166) to 
provide a framework of basic educational criteria. This point is fundamental to the 
argument of the present thesis, and will be discussed in much more detail in subsequent 
chapters. 
Teachers can count on public and parental support most readily when they are 
perceived to be doing their best to achieve educational goals which are shared by all 
interested parties. Such trust is clearly much more readily achieved in a mono-cultural 
than in a multi-cultural context. Nias comes to more or less the same conclusion in an 
intuitive article of considerable insight (198 1, p 211 ff), where she argues that trust, at 
least in an educational context, involves (a) predictability of personal and institutional 
behaviour and (b) agreement over ends. Where these two conditions prevail, parents 
and the general public appear happy to leave educational decision-making to the 
autonomous professional, confident 
both that the school was doing what they would broadly wish it to do and 
that it could apparently be trusted to get on with the job. 
(Bridges, 1982b, p 14) 
In the absence of such predictability and agreement, however, the claim of teachers to 
professional autonomy is likely to be seen as a barrier to, rather than as a way of 
facilitating, accountability. A common educational system in a pluralist context is bound 
to produce conflict over the aims of the education provided, and thus over educational 
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practice, and there will be increasing dissatisfaction with the policy of leaving the 
decisions to the teachers. 
To sum up, it seems almost impossible to have (a) the professional autonomy of 
teachers, (b) the common school, and (c) a pluralist society at the same time: any two 
of these conditions precludes the third. (a) and (b) may perhaps be compatible only in a 
homogeneous, mono-cultural society where there is a broadly shared framework of 
educational assumptions; they are thus likely to be able to continue in those parts of the 
U. K. which have so far been untouched by cultural and ethnical diversity. (a) and (c) 
can exist together only when two conditions prevail: first, that'virtually everyone in 
the school knows what (its educational) assumptions are before joining it and has some 
fair measure of sympathy with thed (Scrimshaw, 1980, p 52 f); and secondly, that 
parents have some measure of free choice between schools so that they can in fact find a 
school with whose goals they are in sympathy. Athough parental choice has become a 
slogan of Conservative educational policy in recent years, it seems very doubtful that 
Muslims in the U. K. as yet have the freedom to choose a school for their children 
which is in harmony with their own educational beliefs and values. Whether this forms 
an argument for the establishment of Muslim voluntary-aided schools will be 
considered later in the thesis. If (b) and (c) are to be combined, however, Nias (198 1) 
suggests that the professional autonomy of teachers will have to be tempered with what 
she calls Yorrrial procedures' of accountability, by which she appears to mean forms of 
organisation which structuralise relationships, responsibilities and roles within the 
school -and which make explicit the criteria according to which decisions are made. 
This is because in a pluralist society, groups such as the Muslims are likely not to share 
all the tacit assumptions or stated educational goals of the common school, and 
therefore parental rights may be invoked which are ignored when there is a consensus 
of values, and teachers' actions are likely to come under much closer scrutiny. 'Formal 
procedures' may well involve increased central control, but may also open up greater 
participation in decision-making by all the parties involved. The Chain of 
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Responsibility Model is an approach to accountability which takes account of the need 
for 'formal procedures' and which perhaps has more potential for coping with the 
fundamentally conflicting educational values, goals and assumptions held by different 
groups in our society than does the Professional Model. Indeed, in so far as he 
acknowledges the need for 'a structural framework for policy-forming discussion', 
Bailey (1980, p 107) concedes the existence of constraints on teachers! professional 
autonomy. 
Two main arguments can be marshalled in support of the Chain of Responsibility 
Model of Accountability. The first is that it is a workable and bureaucratically efficient 
model which succeeds in balancing the rival claims of a number of different parties with 
an interest in educational decision-making. Of all the models under discussion, it 
comes the nearest to current practice in the U. K. It seeks to maximise efficiency by 
opting for central planning where this would avoid overlapping or duplication in 
educational decision-making (the National Curriculum is an example of this), but a 
balance is sought between public, national interests and the interests of the individuaL 
There are clear-cut channels for parents and other'interested parties to make their 
influence felt. It even allows for a certain amount of jockeying for position among the 
various groups. The case study of Bradford outlined in the previous chapter shows an 
LEA taking the initiative in planning special educational provision for its Muslim pupils. 
On the other hand, the state also has some trump cards; it has the financial clout, for 
example, to impose some decisions (such as the introduction of TVEI) which have been 
reached with the minimum of consultation. However, teachers can sometimes 
command a virtual veto over some state policies by refusing to co-operate in their 
implementation; at the time of writing this seems to be the likely outcome in many 
schools of the requirement of the 1988 Education Act for a mainly Christian daily act of 
worship. The Chain of Responsibility Model thus allows both for centralising 
tendencies and for the inevitable opposition to them. 
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Ile second main argument in support of the Chain of Responsibility Model is that 
there is greater legitimation for the decisions being made since they are made not by 
autonomous professsionals but by democratically elected representatives (MPs, local 
councillors, some governors) or by their employees who are directly answerable to 
them. Bridges (1979, p 161 f) and White (1980, p 27 f) take this point further and 
argue that decisions about what to teach in school are dependent on conceptions of the 
good life and the good society, and that teachers cannot claim any special expertise 
which would justify leaving such decisions in their hands. The Chain of Responsibility 
Model seems to be capable of taldng into account a wider variety of conceptions of the 
good life and is more amenable to the principles of distributive justice and to the values 
of our contemporary pluralist society than the Professional Model. 
Some of the disadvantages of the Chain of Responsibility Model have already 
been mentioned earlier in the present chapter. its tendency to encourage bureaucracy and 
to increase power struggles between groups and the implicit hierarchy of interests 
which it entails. The argument that greater legitimation is given to the educational 
decisions according to this model because some of those making the decisions have 
been elected democratically depends on one's understanding of representation. On one 
view, representatives are elected to carry out the wishes of the electorate; but in practice 
there is rarely, if ever, any clear electoral mandate on educational matters from the 
electorate as a whole. As Becher et aL (1981, p 15 1) point out, 
It is seldom given to education ministers to be able to quote the backing of 
electoral authorityfor what they do, because education rarely - perhaps more 
rarely than other areas of government - gives rise to any clear mandatefor 
reform. 
On another view, representatives are elected, not to carry out the specific wishes 
of the electorate, but because they broadly share the same framework of values and can 
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therefore be trusted on the whole to make decisions that are in the best interests of those 
they represent. But the particular form that parliamentary democracy takes in this 
country currently ensures that no-one is elected to parliament who shares the fi-amework 
of values of the country's one-and-a-half million Muslims. This does not mean that 
their interests are not represented in the sense of being taken into account in the 
decision-making process at the national level; but it does mean that the terms of 
reference by which those interests are expressed and judged are defined by people who 
do not share their framework of values and who may indeed hold incompatible beliefs 
and assumptions. The problem is that the agreement of the majority is all that is needed 
to make the Chain of Responsibility Model workable, but in pluralist context, simple 
majoritarianism is likely to leave some minority groups dissatisfied and anxious to opt 
out of the current system. All this is clearly in need of much more detailed examination; 
the question of the rights of minority groups will be picked up in Chapter Six, and the 
possibility of the construction of a framework of values which would be acceptable 
both to the Muslims and the non-Muslim majority in the U. K. will be discussed in Part 
Three. But one solution to the problem of the apparent oppression of minority groups 
would appear to be to encourage greater participation in actual decision-making by all 
the parties affected by the decisions, as allowed for in the Partnership Model. 
The arguments in support of the Partnership Model fall into two main sections: 
those relating to the rights of individuals to protect their own interests, and those 
relating to the intrinsic value of collective decision-making. The first set of arguments 
sees the primary aim of the partnership as giving an interested party, either individually 
or in alliance with others, the opportunity to protect or defend his own interests, values, 
wishes and points of view against competing claims which are put forward by others. 
NEU (1972c, p 186 f) justifies democracy in such terms: 
The rights and interests of every or any person are only securefrom being 
disregarded when the person interested is himself able, and habitually 
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disposed, to stand up for them ... Human beings are only securefrom evil 
at the hands of others in proportion as they have the power of being, and 
are, sey-protecting. 
Free and fair discussion between the partners would give each the chance to put 
forward his case and would set in motion negotiations about the best way to 
accommodate the different interests. The final decision would ideally represent some 
kind of balance of individual interests, settled amicably if possible by mutual consent 
after free and open discussion, but settled by a vote if disagreements remain too strong 
to do otherwise. This argument is clearly based on the fundamental liberal values of 
justice, equality and rationality. The second set of arguments have been developed 
recently by Bridges (1979), White (1987) and Haydon (1987), who emphasise the 
value of the democratic process per se, according to which all interested parties have a 
share in the actual decision-making. Drawing heavily on Mill (1972c), Bridges argues 
that co-operation in a common cause is a value in itself (1980, p 67) and that 
participatory democracy enhances the quality of life (1979, p 164) both for the 
community as a whole and for the individual participants (1978, pp 118-121). 
There are a number of practical difficulties with this Partnership Model, however: 
how to decide whose interests in educational decision-making are legitimate; how to 
balance the partnership between numerically uneven parties such as parents, teachers, 
the general public, LEAs and industry; how to justify the extensive demands 
participation makes on the time, effort and commitment of those involved-, how to avoid 
conflict and divisiveness as groups realise that their chances of gaining concessions 
increase with the intensity of feeling with which they express their views; and how to 
ensure that the decisions reached through democratic participation are actually good 
ones. There is a danger that democratic participation may become more of a power 
struggle between rival factions than an impartial way of resolving disagreements in a 
spirit of co-operation. Dunlop (1979, p 48) juxtaposes a different type of co-operation 
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in which identity with the community is achieved through the sharing of customs, 
traditions, values and tacit assumptions, and sees this identity with the community as 
taking the sting out of any disagreements that might arise and enabling a common mind 
to emerge. Within a homogeneous, mono-cultural society, such a spirit of co-operation 
is quite compatible with the autonomy associated with the Professional Model. In a 
multi-cultural society, however, it is only likely to be achieved within separate cultural 
groups, or else under a system whereby parents are genuinely free to choose schools 
which share their own fundamental values and beliefs. How far this provides a 
justification for the establishment of separate Muslim voluntary-aided schools will be 
considered later in the thesis. 
Bonnett (1979, p 166) reminds us that there is a danger in what I have called the 
Partnership Model of losing sight of the fact that there are objective criteria that provide 
'a firm and limiting frarnework' within which democratic decisions can be made. He 
points out that 'consistency with the values upon which the idea of democracy rests 
would seem to demand set limits upon the content! of decisions reached by participatory 
democracy. If Parliament were to push through a law requiring boys to have two years 
more compulsory schooling than girls, this would be unjust whatever democratic 
procedures were involved in passing the legislation. It would be unjust because it did 
not meet certain criteria of justice, and these criteria of justice are a matter of rational 
appraisal rather than democratic decision (cf Gutmann, 1980, p 176). A corollary of 
this (and here I am extending Bonnetf s argument) is that a dissenting minority need not 
consider itself bound by a democratic decision unless that decision satisfies such 
objective criteria as the demands of justice; otherwise, as Bridges (1980, p 69) 
concedes, corporate decision-making would be oppressive of individual freedom and 
smack of totalitarianism. This highlights the need, before democratic decision-making 
can even start, to endeavour to establish the criteria according to which those decisions 
can be made, criteria which are consistent with our fundamental shared beliefs and 
values. Bonnett goes on to suggest that establishing such criteria might resolve most of 
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the fundamental problems about educational provision, 'such that matters remaining to 
be resolved are predominantly technical and therefore more appropriately the domain of 
relevant experts'. If this is so it will be necessary, before any decisions can be made 
about educational provision for the Muslim community, to establish the criteria (such as 
the rights of parents and the rights of minority communities) by which those decisions 
will be made, and to set out the fundamental framework of values (such as freedom, 
equality and justice) according to which those criteria are established. 
All this, however, presupposes the acceptance of a liberal framework of values. 
Indeed, liberal values are the only thing which the three models of responsive 
accountability examined in the present chapter have in common. The Professional 
Model lays particular stress on autonomy, the Chain of Responsibility Model on 
distributive justice and the Partnership Model on democratic participation. The Swann 
Committee too has produced a basically liberal report (DES, 1985), basing its 
recommendations on what it sees as rationally justifiable axioms for a democratic 
pluralist society. But the values which underlie the educational recommendations of the 
Swann Report are far from generally accepted by the Muslim community (cf Ashraf, 
1986a; Khan-Cheema et al., 1986). The question therefore arises whether liberal 
values can actually provide a framework within which the question of educational 
provision for the Muslim community can be resolved to the satisfaction of the Muslims 
themselves. Part Two thus examines liberal values and the criteria by which liberalism 
would seek to resolve the problem of educating Muslim children. Chapter Four 
sketches a framework of liberal values and their educational implications, and Chapters 
Five and Six explore the rights of Muslim parents and the Muslim community 
respectively from a liberal perspective. 
The arguments of the present chapter have suggested that all forms of responsive 
accountability work best in situations where such accountability is least likely to be 
called for, i. e. situations of trust where there is a broad agreement over fundamental 
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values. Part Three pushes the discussion one stage further back by comparing the 
fundamental values of liberalism with those of Islam, to see whether there is in fact a 
sufficient basis of shared values (or if not, whether one could be agreed) to enable 
both world views to work together within a common educational system. 
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THE RIGHTS OF MUSLIMS :A LIBERAL PERSPECTIVE 
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THE LIBERAL FRAMEWORK OF VALUES 
Towards the end of Chapter Three it was argued that the concept of responsive 
accountability takes for granted a liberal framework of values. The aim of the present 
chapter is to examine this framework briefly. The chapter has the limited intention of 
providing a basis for the consideration of the rights of Muslims as parents in Chapter 
Five and as a minority community in Chapter Six. The aim of Part Two as a whole is 
to explore whether liberal principles and values can provide a means to resolve the 
problem of educational provision for Muslims which is acceptable to Muslims 
themselves. The present chapter also provides a basis for the comparison of liberal and 
Islamic values in Part Three. 
Although it is of course acknowledged that many different versions of liberalism 
exist, it is not relevant to the purposes of the present thesis to discuss the arguments 
between these different versions in any detail. On the contrary, my main focus of 
attention will be the inter-relationships of liberal values, particularly different types of 
rights. The understanding of liberalism which I shall adopt will be as broad as 
possible, though it will be necessary to establish the boundaries of liberalism, by 
contrasting it with non-liberal world views such as totalitarianism. The chapter is 
written in the belief that liberalism provides the theoretical framework of values that 
comes closest to the actual political, economic and educational circumstances that 
prevail in our particular society, and that liberal values are to be found in a wide range 
of political perspectives from conservatism (in spite of attempts by Scruton, 1984, pp 
192 ff, Dworkin, 1978, pp 136 ff, and others to drive a wedge between liberalism and 
conservatism) to certain forms of socialism (cf Freeden, 1978, pp 25 ff, Siedentop, 
1979, p 153). Where it is necessary to concentrate on one typical form of liberalism in 
ChapterFour 
the course of the chapter, I shall focus on the particular strand which can be traced from 
Kant to contemporary philosophers like Rawls, Dworkin, Hart, Williams, Ackerman, 
Gutmann and Gaus, and in the area of education to liberal philosophers such as Hirst 
and Peters (pace Enslin, 1985), because this seems to me to be the most influential 
strand in contemporary liberal thought. 
Liberalism is generally considered to have its origin in conflict, but this conflict is 
variously depicted. Gaus (1983, p2 f) depicts it as being between individuality and 
sociability, while others have seen it as a conflict between liberty and equality 
(Gutmann, 1980, p8 f), or self-fulfilment and social justice. Ackerman (1980, p 3) 
fixes the point of origin for liberal values in the conflict between one individual's 
control over resources and another individual's challenge to that claim. I shall argue in 
this chapter that there are three fundamental liberal values. The first is respect for the 
freedom of the individual, and the second is the equal right of all other individuals to 
similar freedom (cf Hart, 1984, p 77 f). There is a tension that exists between these 
two values (cf Norman, 1982; Ackerman, 1980, pp 374 ff). In fact, some liberals have 
argued strongly that the first value is the more fundamental (Hayek, 1980; Berlin, 
1969) and others have made out an equal strong case for the second (Dworkin, 1978). 
However, I want to argue that it is precisely the tension between the first two values 
which gives rise to the need for the third fundamental liberal value, that of consistent 
rationality. By this I mean the willingness to articulate logically consistent rational 
justifications for decisions and actions. It is with these three fundamental liberal values 
and their inter-relationships that I shall be mainly concerned in the present chapter. 
lbough they may be understood in a variety of ways (see below), there seems to 
be fairly widespread agreement among liberals that these are the most fundamental 
values, and that liberal ethical theory is based on them. Thus the principle of respect for 
persons is grounded on the second and third values, and the principle of personal 
autonomy on the first and third. The interaction between all three values provides the 
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basis for the just resolution of conflict. It is when we proceed beyond the three 
fundamental values that the different versions of liberalism part company. The first 
parting of the ways comes between those who believe that'good is of prior importance 
and therefore justify actions and decisions in terms of their consequences, and those 
who believe that 'right' is of prior importance and therefore justify actions and 
decisions in terms of a set of moral duties. The dominant view in the former category is 
utilitarianism, which maintains that the justice of institutions may be measured by their 
capacity to promote the greatest happiness of the greatest number, classical exponents of 
utilitarianism include Bentham (1948) and Mill (1972a), and it has found a modem 
upholder in J. C. C. Smart -(Smart and Williams, 1973). The latter category has 
produced a range of different views, depending on how the moral duties are conceived. 
An initial distinction may be made between intuitionism (which involves the attempt to 
fit a set of unrelated low-level maxims of conduct together into a consistent whole, and 
thus may be considered the nearest philosophically respectable approximation to 
'common sense'; cf Raphael, 1981, p 44 f, Benditt, 1982, pp 81 ff) and distributive 
justice (which involves the claim that the plurality of moral duties must be conceived 
hierarchically). Libertarians such as Hayek, Friedman and Nozick would give priority 
to the following maxims of distributive justice: 
To each according to his merit; 
To each according to his work. 
Egalitarians such as Rawls, Dworkin and Gutmann, on the other hand, prefer to see 
distributive justice in terms ofi. 
To each according to his need, 
To each according to his worth. 
(cf Vlastos, 1984, p 44) 
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These maxims can be seen, for example, in Rawls' principles of justice: 
First Principle. Each person is to have an equal right to the most 
extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar 
system of libertyfor all. 
Second Principle. Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so 
that they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, 
consistent with the just savings principle, and (b) attached to offices and 
positions open to all under the conditions offair equality of opportunity. 
(1972, p 302) 
To pursue the differences between these conceptions of liberalism, however, 
would take me beyond the very limited brief of the present chapter, and I want now to 
return to a consideration of the three fundamental liberal values. 
The framework of values can be classified initially by considering what is 
excluded by the three fundamental values. The first value, that of respect for the 
freedom of the individual, clearly excludes a totalitarian emphasis on communal unity to 
the extent that it endangers individuality. Thus liberalism is broadly incompatible with 
Marxism (cf Gaus, 1983, p 6). The second value, that of the equal right of all other 
individuals to similar freedom, excludes the hierarchical ranking of individuals 
according to which some have a greater claim to freedom than others. Thus liberalism 
rejects slavery, for example, or Nazi claims to superiority over Jews (cf Ackerman, 
1980, p 6). The third value, that of consistent rationality, excludes arbitrariness, 
inconsistency and the failure to take account of relevant factors (cf Taylor, 1982). It 
rules out the uncritical acceptance of dogma, whether based on authority or revelation, 
and equally it refuses to drift into the sort of relativism which insists that cultures for 
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example, can only be understood from within and on their own terms (cf Hollis and 
Lukes, 1982). 
There is considerable scope, however, for different understandings of the three 
fundamental liberal values. The freedom of the individual, for example, may involve 
freedom to satisfy one! s desires (as in Benthamite utilitarianism: cf Bentham, 1948) or 
to realise one's rationally determined interests (as in Kant, 1948), or simply to be 
oneself by being free from constraint. It may, but need not, involve the construction of 
a life-plan (cf Rawls, 1972, p 407 ff, Gaus, 1983, p 32 ff). The equal right of all other 
individuals to similar freedom may be understood in a fairly minimal way by some 
libertarians, but is usually expanded (especially by modem liberals) into some form of 
group membership or collectivism, which may be seen in such diverse institutions as 
the nation state, the trade union or the common school; Gaus (1983) in particular talks 
of a'new liberalism! in terms of social life and human potential to co-operate. Finally, 
consistent rationality may, on a utilitarian view, involve no more than the rational 
appraisal of utility (i. e. what will promote happiness and reduce happiness), which is 
taken to provide the basis for the just resolution of conflict. A Kantian view of 
consistent rationality, on the other hand, is much richer, as it not only provides the 
basis for the just resolution of conflict, but also is an end in itself (the 'search for truth') 
and enriches our understanding of the first two liberal values: thus the freedom of the 
individual is understood in terms of rational autonomy and the will (which itself may 
provide the basis for certain supererogatory virtues such as generosity and humility), 
and the equal right of all other individuals to similar freedom provides the basis for an 
ethical system which includes respect for persons, promise keeping, refraining from 
deceit, tolerance, openness, fairness and freedom from envy. Even those who argue 
that liberalism is grounded in agnosticism about moral issues (e. g. P White, 1983) are 
committed to the principle of consistent rationality, in that they insist on remaining 




Typically, no one conception of the good life is favoured in liberalism, and a vast 
range of life-styles, commitments, occupational roles and life-plans are possible within 
the liberal framework (cf Popper, 1966). Certain forms of human behaviour, however, 
are ruled out in principle by reference to the three fundamental liberal values; these 
include prejudice, intolerance, injustice and repression. Other forms of human 
behaviour are necessary in principle on a liberal view in certain contexts (such as 
equality of opportunity), though ways of putting them into practice or even 
conceptualising them may still be hotly debated. In contexts where certain forms of 
behaviour are considered essential to a liberal perspective, a liberal theory can be 
developed. The liberal framework of values has produced in particular a political 
theory, an economic theory and a theory of education. 
Liberal political theory supports democracy as the most rational safeguard against 
tyranny, and clarifies the role of the state and the law (Benn and Peters, 1959; Duncan, 
1983). The state is not an end in itself but 'exists to regulate the competition among 
individuals for their private ends' (Strike, 1982b, p 5). It provides the means of 
protecting the public interest and ensuring social justice (Nuller, 1976). The law exists 
to maintain order in society, by protecting persons and property (Jenkins, 1980) and to 
prevent harm (Mill, 1972b; Hart, 1963). Some major debates within liberal political 
theory include the extent to which democracy should entail representation, which may 
satisfy the protection of interests, or participation, which may contribute also to human 
development (cf Pateman, 1970,1979; Lucas, 1976); the balancing of state power with 
civil liberties (cf Dworkin, 1977, p 206 ff; Strike, 1982a); and the conflict between the 
right-wing emphasis on stability, non-interference, free enterprise, initiative and merit, 
and the left-wing emphasis on egalitarianism and the combatting of social injustice. 
Liberal theory accepts the holding of private property as legitimate and supports 
the notion of the free market economy in which free markets provide the goods and 
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services which consumers choose to buy, though the state may intervene to regulate the 
economy if necessary, to ensure free and fair competition and to prevent harm to others. 
Liberalism does not, however, require a particular stance with regard to any of the 
following debates: the debate between those like Hayek who continue to support the 
old liberal principle of laissez-faire and more modem liberals who emphasise the need 
for tighter government control, for example, in monetary policy or welfare distribution; 
the debate between the supporters of capitalist free enterprise like Friedman (1962) and 
those who wish to see a significant redistribution of wealth and income, for example, 
by providing a minimum wage; and the debate between those who emphasise the need 
for free enterprise and efficiency, and those who argue for an increase in industrial 
democracy. 
A liberal theory of education rules out certain processes such as indoctrination and 
brainwashing, and rules in the development of the rational self (Hirst, 1974, p 30 ff-, 
Strike, 1982b, p 12) and social competences and the provision of the breadth of 
knowledge and understanding and the dispositional qualities needed to facilitate the 
development of personal autonomy (Dearden, 1972; White, 1982). It leaves open to 
debate the question how far the interests of children should be protected by their parents 
or the state and how far they can be viewed as rationally autonomous individuals before 
they achieve adult status (i. e. free to develop their own idea of the good, and free from 
the constraints of authority). Within limits, it also leaves open the debate between the 
common school and differentiated schooling. 
There can be no liberal theory of religion because no elements of religion are 
required by the three fundamental liberal values. On the contrary, what is required of 
the liberal state is a degree of neutrality on religious matters, together with a respect 
for individual freedom of conscience. Fishkin (1984, p 154) points out that 
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The state could not enshrine the religious convictions of any particular 
groups by public commitments and avoid the charge that it was biasing the 
marketplace of ideas by giving certain metaphysical and religious claims, 
certain ultimate convictions, the starnp of state authority and legitimacy. 
Religion is seen as a private and voluntary matter for the individual, and it is here that a 
gulf opens up most clearly between the liberal and the Islamic framework of values, for 
on an Islamic perspective religion provides a complete way of life which encompasses 
public domains like politics and education as well as the private domain of personal 
faith. The question whether Islamic beliefs can be held in a way which does not 
conflict with fundamental liberal values occupies much of the remainder of the thesis. 
Two crucial questions now arise in connection with the freedom of individuals to 
pursue their own religious interests: 
To what extent does this freedom include the right to bring up one's children in 
one's own religion? This question, which involves liberal concepts of the child 
and the family as well as the liberal values already mentioned, forms the topic of 
Chapter Five. 
(b) To what extent does a minority religious community have the right to preserve, 
maintain and transmit its beliefs to the next generation? This question involves 
liberal concepts of pluralism and minority rights as well as the values already 
mentioned, and forms the topic of Chapter Six. 
Both questions touch on the concept of rights, and it is with a brief sketch of the 
liberal concept of rights that the present chapter concludes. Rights have been analysed 
by content, by status, by origin, by context, and by the grounds on which they are 
justified. They are usually prefixed by some sort of defining adjective: moral, political, 
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legal, social, natural, human, constitutional, civil, individual, religious, women! s, and 
so on. For the purposes of the present discussion, however, I shall distinguish only 
two types of rights, which I shall call moral rights and social rights. By moral rights I 
mean those rights without which the three fundamental liberal values cannot be 
achieved. Examples of these are the right to life itself, the right not to be enslaved, the 
right not to be brainwashed. These come closest to the status of absolute rights, though 
there has always been a debate among liberals as to whether there really are any 
absolute rights (Gewirth, 1984), for it is not difficult to imagine situations where one 
set of primafacie rights may be in direct conflict with another (McCloskey, 1985, p 133 
ff). By social rights I mean those rights which are established by rational debate as the 
most appropriate means of ensuring the just resolution of conflict and general human 
well-being. These rights are open to negotiation even among liberals, and may have to 
be fought for, even though they involve claims based on liberal ethics and the liberal 
theories of politics, economics and education. They are often defined by law; examples 
include the right to education, the right to low cost housing, the right to free medical 
care or to a minimum income. Often these rights are to do with the definition of roles 
and relationships and the distribution of power (for example, women's rights, parents' 
rights). Sometimes the rights are little more than a rhetorical expression of desires and 
needs, or a preference for particular social goals, such as students' rights and animal 
rights (cf Jenkins, 1980, p 2411). A right is only a claim or a demand unless it is built 
into the social structure and there is an apparatus for implementing it. As Jenkins points 
out, rights are not usually invoked except to redress injustice (ibid., p 243). On a liberal 
view, rational deliberation and/or negotiation is always needed to resolve a situation of 
conflicting rights. 
On this analysis, the right of an individual Muslim to practise his religion is a 
moral right based on the fundamental liberal value of respect for the freedom of the 
individual. It has a near-absolute status. The right of Muslims to bring up their children 
in the faith of Islam, however, is a social right which is much more open to debate. 
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Liberals may have doubts about the rights of Muslim parents in this case because they 
see them as potentially in conflict with the rights of the children to be liberated from the 
constraints of their cultural environment and to grow up into personally autonomous 
adults. I shall examine this argument much more closely in Chapter Five, together with 
the Muslim rejoinder that the liberal view fails to take adequate account of the 
cohesiveness of the family unit and the emotional bonds which will normally provide a 
stable, secure context within which the children can thrive. 
A liberal understanding of rights tends to be in terms of the individual or of 
society as a whole. It appears to be part of the logic of liberalism to reduce the rights of 
minorities to individual rights. In Chapter Six I shall examine the right of the Muslim 
community to use education to preserve its distinctive beliefs and values and transmit 
these to the next generation. Once again, on a liberal view, this is a social right which 
has to be weighed against other considerations. From a Muslim perspective, the 
question is whether too high a price in terms of acceptance of fundamental liberal values 
is being demanded in return for the conceding of the rights of Muslims to transmit their 
faith. In Dworkin's famous image of the trump card (1984, p 153 ff), he argues that an 
individual has a right when there is a reason for assigning some resource, liberty or 
opportunity to him even though normally decisive considerations of the general interest 
would militate against that assignment. Fishkin (1983, p 188f), however, reminds us 
through the story of the monkey's paw that a trump card may sometimes be used to 
fulfil certain wishes but at too high a price to a general state of well-being. The 
underlying question with which I am concerned in the remainder of Part Two is 
whether, if Muslims accept the right to educate their children in accordance with their 
own beliefs on liberal terms, they will find themselves committed to a framework of 
values which is fundamentally at odds with their own deeply held beliefs. 
Tle present chapter has inevitably been somewhat schematic, but it will have 
served its purpose if it makes clear as precisely as possible what is meant by 
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'liberalisrif whenever the term is used in the course of the thesis and if it provides an 
adequate foundation for the discussion of Muslim rights in the next two chapters. 
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A LIBERAL VIEW OF MUSLIM PARENTS' RIGHTS 
In Chapter Four I presented a sketch of liberal values and located a liberal 
approach to education, religion and rights within that sketch. In the present chapter I 
will narrow the focus of attention to a liberal view of the rights of Muslim parents to 
bring up their children in their own religion. This will involve an examination of 
parents' rights and childrens' rights. I shall argue that on a liberal view parents can 
claim certain paternalistic rights in connection with their children, but that these rights 
are constrained by considerations of (i) the public interest and (ii) the need to promote 
the personal autonomy of children. The effect of these constraints is that although 
parents may be justified in bringing up young children in an environment of religious 
belief, they are not justified in taking steps to ensure that their children cross the 
threshold to adulthood as unquestioning religious believers. 
In the course of the chapter I shall criticise this liberal view on three main 
grounds. The first is that it has no clear concept of childhood or of the distinction 
between childhood and adulthood. Ibis creates difficulties when it comes to justifying 
the common liberal demand for equal respect between children and adults. Liberals 
tend to depict adulthood in terms of freedom, autonomy and rationality and childhood in 
terms of the absence of these, yet refuse to define the transition between childhood and 
adulthood in terms of some minimum attainment of freedom, autonomy and rationality. 
The refusal follows inevitably from the fact that such a definition would sit rather 
uneasily with the second fundamental liberal value - the equal right of all individuals to 
the same freedoms - because some children would attain the minimum level before 
others; but in any case autonomy is notoriously difficult to quantify. 
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The second main criticism of the liberal view is that since liberalism is grounded 
in the conflict between individuals, it tends to see the family in terms of the conflicting 
rights and interests of parents and children (cf Ackerman, 1980, p 151-4). This is an 
inadequate conceptualisation of family relationships however, since the family may 
produce bonds of loyalty and inspire altruistic feelings which (even though liberals may 
acknowledge them), do not fit easily into an account of liberal values. 
Finally, on a liberal view the family is often seen as a means to an end, for 
example, as a training ground where children develop communal feelings and social 
attitudes which they later extend to their broader social milieu (Gaus, 1983, p 96-8). 
The preferred end on a liberal view is the development of personal autonomy, and the 
autonomy of the family is suppressed where necessary for the sake of this end. I shall 
argue later in the thesis that the development of personal autonomy is only one of a 
variety of goals that parents may legitimately have for their children, and that a strong 
emphasis on the development of personal autonomy can in fact be counter-productive. 
If the chilSs present freedom is constrained in order to make future choice more real, 
and the parent! s present freedom is constrained in order to protect the interests of the 
child, this would appear to put some strain on the first fundamental liberal value of 
respect for the freedom of the individual. 
I shall now turn directly to the question whether Muslim parents have the right on 
a liberal view to bring up their children in their own religion. To produce a negative 
answer to this question, it would have to be established that at least one of the following 
statements can be justified on a liberal view: 
either 
(a) that parents have no right in principle to make any fundamental decisions 




(b) that it would conflict with the public interest for different children to be brought 
up as unreflective religious believers, and that in this respect considerations of 
public interest are paramount; 
or 
(c) that such an upbringing or education would infringe the best interests of the 
children, and that such an infiingement is unjustifiable. 
An examination of these three propositions provides the framework for the 
present chapter. 
**** 
Let us consider the first proposition, that parents have no right in principle to 
make any fundamental decisions about the education or upbringing of their own 
children. P White (1983) argues that 
there are no, so to speak, setf-standing parental rights. That is, there are no 
rights possessed by parents qua parents which permit them to direct their 
children's lives along certain tracks. 
159 f) 
She goes on to concede that parents do have two types of rights. (The first is to enable 
them to carry out their parental responsibilities - though it is not clear precisely what 
would be licensed by such a right - and the second, held in common with all citizens of 
a democratic society, allows them to try to interest others, including children, in their 
owninterests). But her claim offends widely held 'commonsense' assumptions about 
parental rights. Parents have traditionally been considered to have the right to develop 
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particular talents in their children, to buy superior education, to withdraw their children 
from RE lessons, to send them to a religious school, and so on. White's view shows 
liberal educational theory at its furthest from current educational practice, although she 
does represent her proposals as a basis for practice. In spite of the fact that the view 
seems counter-intuitive, however, in the sense that it denies parents a freedom that they 
have traditionally held, it can be seen as a practical way of resolving a problem that 
liberal philosophers (such as Fishkin, 1983) have been becoming increasingly aware 
of, that the autonomy of the family sits uneasily with other liberal values, such as the 
equality of life chances and the principle of personal autonomy. Fishkin sees what he 
calls a'trilemma of equal opportunity' in these conflicting values, which can only be 
resolved by'systematic intrusions into the family' (1983, p 6). 
But what precisely is meant by the autonomy of the family? First, parents (and 
others) have their own interests which can sometimes only be achieved through the co- 
operation of other members of their family. There is therefore a need to balance the 
rights of children against the rights of their parents, and there is no need to assume that 
the rights of the children will always be paramount. A family consensus may be 
sought. Secondly, since parents are most affected by what happens to their children, 
they are surely entitled to the biggest say in crucial decisions affecting their future. The 
good of the parent is tied up with what happens to the child. 
It must not be assumed that family ties necessarily conflict with children! s 
interests. On the contrary, they may help children to learn communal feelings and 
social attitudes (cf Gaus, 1983, p 93-6). 1bus Fishkin (ibid p 35-6,42) claims that the 
autonomy of the family requires that so long as no-one is severely harmed, intimate 
consensual relations within a given family governing the development of its children 
should be immune from external coercive interference (cf Geach, 1983, p 4,15-16). In 
this statement, however, both the concept of 'severe harm' and the concept of 
'consensual relations! are problematic. Children are vulnerable to oppression, open to 
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manipulation and exploitation and generally in need of protection. And consensus 
within the family may suggest no more than that children have been indoctrinated or 
their affections manipulated and their desires shaped by their parents (cf McLaughlin, 
1984; Lukes, 1974). Thus a particular form of upbringing cannot be justified simply 
by the retrospective approval of the child, but must be justified on more objective 
grounds, such as whether it satisfies the conditions of equal opportunity and aims at the 
personal autonomy of the child. 
This leads to the question of paternalism and parents' rights. Whatever 
disagreement there may be about the nature of childhood and the status of the child (see 
below), it is clear that children are physically, psychologically and morally immature, 
and that they lack the rational capacity to exercise the responsibilities of citizenship. 
'Mis is taken to justify paternalism (the right to interfere in the life of another person for 
his or her own good), although the extent to which paternalism should be applied 
towards children is a matter of much debate (cf Harris, 1982b). Strike (1982a) argues 
that the present freedom of the child may be infringed to prevent her from harming 
herself, to develop her rational capacities, to expand her future opportunities, to 
maximise her future happiness and to prevent her from making immature, uninformed 
decisions. 
The main question is whether the parents or the state should be the primary 
paternalistic agent in respect of children (cf Henley, 1979, p 255). The teacher may 
also have some paternalistic authority, though her relations with children are likely to 
show more of the authority of the expert over the novice (Strike, 1982a, p 134 ff); it 
has fi-equently been argued that the teacher is an expert in means rather than an arbiter of 
ends, though this view may be too simplistic (cf Sockett, 1975,53 ff). It is clear, 
however, that the state! s general control over the child in the last century has been 
extended at the expense of the family (Peters, 1959, p 41-44). For example, the 
requirement that all children go to school may be justified at least partially on 
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paternalistic grounds (cf Raphael, 1983, p 14) though it is also of great utility to adults 
(Harris, 1982b, p 45). This requirement has been extended in the last century from a 
few years' instruction in basic skills to institutionalisation for a substantial part of 
childreres lives (Strike, 1982b, p 89). This extension of state control has been viewed 
with concern in some quarters (cf Geach and Szwed, 1983, p 1-2), though Hamm 
(1982, p 75 ff) argues that society at large (i. e. the democratic state) is more competent 
than an individual parent to fulfil the paternalistic duty of providing an education. 
Gutmann (1980) suggests that the best paternalistic agency will be the one that can best 
satisfy the interests of the child and thus leaves open the possibility that it may not be 
the parent. Friedman (1962, p 85) claims that there are two grounds for governmental 
involvement in education: when the consequences of education affect the public interest 
(which will be discussed below), and involvement for paternalistic reasons. But the 
state cannot take over all the responsibilities of parenthood, from parents without 
becoming a kind of Big Brother-, children can only learn what it is to be a person and 
develop an understanding of private values (cf Strike, 1982b, p 87 ff) from other 
individuals, not from the state. Thus although the state has a legitimate claim to 
paternalistic intervention in the public development of the child (i. e. as a future citizen) 
it must acknowledge that that involves only one element in the upbringing of the child; it 
therefore delegates (if that is not too strong a word) responsibility for the development 
of personhood and private values to those who have the strongest sense of duty and 
commitment to the child, who know the child and its needs most intimately and who are 
tied most closely to it by bonds of affection. Thus the weight of the argument about 
who should be the primary paternalistic agent seems to favour the parent (or someone 
acting in loco parends). 
This relationship between child, parent and state can perhaps be expressed most 
clearly in terms of a hypothetical social contract made between the parents and the state 
at the birth of a child. The biological parents are appointed trustees of the child; the 
trusteeship demands that they make decisions in the best interests of the child and that 
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those decisions are not against the public interest; in return, they are allowed to 
determine the course of their family life without undue interference from the state, 
except in so far as such interference may be required to prepare the children for 
citizenship. The state remains the final arbiter when the terms of the trusteeship are 
abused by natural parents, and thus has the right to find substitute parents or to take 
over the trusteeship itself if the natural parents are clearly either not acting in the 
interests of the child, as in the case of child abuse, or acting in conflict with the public 
interest, for example, by allowing the child to commit crimes. The need for such 
interference may be much less, however, when there is an extended family (as typically 
occurs in the Middle East) than in the Western nuclear family. State involvement in the 
upbringing of children otherwise is limited to situations where the state has an interest 
in what happens, such as the increase of industrial performance, the development of 
social competencies, and the preparation of children for democratic citizenship. On this 
view, the state can only insist, for example, that all children learn a modem language in 
school if it can be demonstrated that this is in the public interest; otherwise the decision 
is the parents% and they must decide whether it is in the interests of their own particular 
child to learn a modem language. In the same way, parents are free to send their 
children to the school of their choice unless it can be shown that it is against either their 
children's interests or the public interest for them to do so. Thus parents are not barred 
in principle from making fundamental decisions about the education or upbringing of 
their own children, unless those decisions conflict with either their children! s own 
interests or the public interest. 
This same conclusion can be reached by a shorter route suggested by McLaughlin 
(1984). If it is accepted that there is more than one path to the goals of a liberal 
education (as Ackerman, 1980, argues), then so long as parents agree to confine their 
decisions to a liberal framework of values and to avoid decisions that conflict with their 
children's interests or the public interest, there can be no grounds for denying parents 
the right to make fundamental decisions about the upbringing of their children. 
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Whether or not it could be enforced in practice, such a denial could only be justified if 
parents did not keep their part of the bargain. To deny them the right in advance would 
amount to unjustifiable state constraint or interference in the legitimate freedom of the 
individual. 
Therefore the statement that parents have no rights in principle to make 
fundamental decisions about the education or upbringing of their children cannot be 
justified. We must now turn to questions of public interest and the interests of the 
child. 
**** 
In this section I want to consider whether it would necessarily conflict with the 
public interest for children to be brought up in the religion of their parents. There are 
three conditions under which an action may be considered to conflict with the public 
interest in a democracy: 
(i) if it promotes purely sectional interest at the expense of the society as a whole; 
(ii) if it fails to weigh all relevant interests fairly and impartially and with due 
respect to the fundamental liberal values of justice, equality and freedom; 
(iii) if it fails to take account of the interests of people generally as members of the 
public. By 'interests' I mean what is beneficial to them (cf P White, 1973, p, 
220) and what increases their opportunities to get what they want (cf Barry, 
1967, p 115). 
The general public has a twofold interest in education, the first positive and the 
other negative. The positive dimension involves the development in children of 
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competencies which will help to create a stable and democratic society. Friedman 
(1962, p 86) says that such a society is 'impossible without a minimum degree of 
literacy and knowledge on the part of most citizens and without widespread acceptance 
of some common set of values'. Since all citizens share the same laws, the same 
political rights, and the same economic system, it is important that they should be able 
to 'interact harmoniously and communicate intelligibly' and'function properly in a just 
society' (Strike, 1982a, p 159). It is in the public interest that individuals should 
become good citizens or become economically productive, and where there is such a 
public interest, education becomes a1egitimate object of public concern! (ibid). 'Mis is 
the justification for compulsory education, public financing of schooling and for public 
regulation of private education. The negative dimension involves the protection of the 
public interest from harm. For example, if parents sought to bring up their children in a 
way that was seen to 'fuel intolerance and undermine social co-operation' (Coons and 
Sugarman, 197 8, p9 1), the state has a right to overrule the parents to prevent the public 
interest from being harmed. 
If religious upbringing necessarily either prevented children's preparation for 
citizenship or damaged the public interest (by fuelling intolerance, for example), then 
the state would be justified in principle in forbidding it. It is easy to think of 
hypothetical examples of religious upbringing where such an eventuality might occur. 
All I am concerned to establish now is that it does not necessarily occur in all cases of 
religious upbringing. If being a liberal citizen is not incompatible with holding religious 
belief (as liberals commonly point out), then training a child for liberal citizenship 
(liberal education) cannot be incompatible in principle with bringing that child up in a 
given religion; all we can say is that it may be incompatible in practice if the religious 
upbringing conflicts with the public interest or with the chiUs interests. I shall argue 
later that the religious upbringing of some children may actually be in the public 
interest. So what justification do the many contemporary liberal educationalists who 
oppose the religious upbringing of children offer for their views? T'he justification 
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appears to be based on the protection of the public interest from potential rather than 
actual danger. However, interfering with the liberty of individuals to protect the public 
interest from potential danger is generally considered totalitarian. There may be a few 
borderline cases where such legislation is justifiable (e. g. seat belts and crash helmets) 
but only in cases where private interests (avoiding unnecessary risks to life and limb) 
and public interests (avoiding unnecessary medical expense) clearly coincide, and 
where the public benefit (saving of public funds) is not potential but real and 
quantifiable. These conditions do not hold in the attempt to deny parents the right to 
bring up their children in their own religious beliefs. 
There is no way of claiming that education should or can be provided entirely on 
the basis of the public interest. Although schools are publicly financed and 
administered, they invariably provide instruction in excess of what is required by the 
public interest; Strike suggests that in providing this additional education schools are 
acting on behalf of the parents (in their role as paternalist agents), not the state: 
It is inappropriatefor the state to use thefact that it supports or administers 
schools that serve the public interest in order to extend its authority over the 
private components of education. 
(1982a, p 160-1) 
The argument is that education involves the transmission of both public and private 
values (religion belonging to the latter category); if the state tries to promote private 
values, this would have to be done from a neutral standpoint as far as the good of 
pupils was concerned; but'public schools cannot be effective in allowing individuals to 
develop their own view of the good while remaining neutral concerning the good! 
(Strike, 1982b, p 13). 1 shall discuss the distinction between private and public values 
later in the chapter (and more fully in Chapter Nine), but it is clearly a hopeless task to 
search for a common framework of private values within society at large. However, in 
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view of the justification of parental paternalism given above, it is enough that the private 
values promoted within any given school should be ones approved by the individual 
parents or trustees concerned. The implications of this argument will be explored in 
more detail later in the thesis; it has already been developed further than needed to 
establish the point at issue here, that if it is accepted that education involves the 
transmission of both public and private values, then it cannot be argued that a religious 
upbringing necessarily conflicts with the public interest. 
Finally, if the public interest requires that all relevant interests should be weighed 
fairly and impartially and that sectional interests should not be promoted at the expense 
of society as a whole (Benn and Peters, 1959, p 271-3), then it may be in the public 
interest for the children of religious believers to be brought up in their parents! faith. 
The alternative - that all children irrespective of parents' beliefs should be given a 
religiously neutral, secular education - might give an unfair advantage to those whose 
parents have brought them up in a secular humanist tradition and might discriminate 
unjustly against the children of believers whose emotional and social stability might be 
put under greater strain as they find themselves pulled in two directions at once. It 
would be hard to justify such discrimination in terms of the public interest; whether it 
could be justified in term of the interests of the child must now be explored. 
**** 
Before we can ask whether bringing children up in the religion of their parents 
would infringe the best interests of those children, we must consider in what sense the 
children have interests. There is no clear liberal perspective on this as there is no clear 
liberal perspective on childhood, though Kleinig (1982, p 197 ff) attempts some 
clarification of the problems. There are a number of debates within liberalism relating 
to children and their rights and interests. The first concerns the extent to which children 
can be considered free. P White (1983, p 139-41) insists on talking of the autonomy 
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(not potential autonomy) of the child, while JS Mill excludes children along with 
barbarians, slaves and the delirious from his principles of liberty (1972b, ch 1), saying 
that they cannot be the best judges of their own interests. The second debate is between 
those who hold that each individual child has his own unique nature and requires 
freedom to find or create the life that best suits his nature, and those who hold that all 
children are born the same but achieve individuality by the differential organisation of 
this common endowment; on the latter view, children's individuality is initially 
constructed for them and later developed by themselves (cf Gaus, 1983, p 33 f). The 
third debate is the one between paternalism and children! s rights. Assumptions about 
the justifiability of parental paternalism are questioned by child liberationists such as 
Holt (1975), who have argued that children should have the right to decide for 
themselves matters which affect them most directly. Partly as a result of the influence 
of the liberationists the dividing line between childhood and adulthood is gradually 
being eroded (cf Harris, 1982b; Postman, 1983). The recent emphasis on children's 
rights (Wald 1979; Houlgate, 19 80; Wringe, 198 1) has led to family relationships being 
increasingly discussed in terms of the conflicting rights and interests of parents and 
children (Ackerman, 1980, pp 151-4). This is because, as pointed out in Chapter Four, 
rights are not usually invoked except to redress injustice, and the injustice suffered by 
children is usually at the hands of those who make decisions on their behalf (i. e. the 
parents). Since children have no power to support their own rights, the state intervenes 
on their behalf when it sees fit. State paternalism is typically seen in the child-saving 
movement (Freeman, 1983, p 29-35; Goldstein et al, 1973,1979,1986), with its 
emphasis on the protection of children from inadequate care. However, the debate 
comes a full circle with Goodman's claim (1971) that talk of children's 'rights' 
obscures their more fundamental needs for love and security. The unhappy situation of 
children, he says, 
is not something to cope with polemically or to understand in terms of 
Ireedom', 'democracy, 'rights'and 'power, like bringing lawyers into a 
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family quarrel. It has to be solved by wise traditions in organic communities 
with considerable stability, with equity instead of law and compassion more 
than either. 
A middle-of-the-road liberal view considers children to be persons, objects of 
respect, and ends in themselves, but sees them as autonomous, rational, moral agents 
only in the sense of belonging to the class of beings who share those characteristics: 
their capacity in this respect is 'unactualised potential' (Strike, 1982a, p 126). 
However, they are not 'adults in miniature! (Goldstein et al, 1973, p 13), and their 
growth to autonomous, rational moral agency is not in a straight line. 11eir immaturity 
may show itself in an inability to judge the consequences of their acts, to apply 
appropriate standards when judging action or to apply self-control - and also in 
irrational appraisals of situations and in changing psychological states, including 
distorted emotional responses, inability to postpone gratification and changing 
developmental needs. It is the fact that they are objects of respect and that they are 
potential autonomous rational moral agents that justifies us in talking of the interests of 
the child. It is the fact that children are immature and only potentially rational and 
autonomous that makes them dependent on adults for the early years of their life. It is 
this combination of interests and dependence that provides the justification for 
paternalisnL 
The interests of children are, of course, not necessarily paramount in decision- 
making which affects them. In matters in which the public interest is involved (for 
example, the financing of education), the interests of an individual child must be 
weighed against those of other children and other interested parties such as the state and 
the broader society. Within the family, the child! s interests are weighed against those 
of other members of the family. But in those situations where the parent is acting 
paternalistically (i. e. as trustee of the child! s interests), she is bound to seek the best 
interests of the child. There may be some situations in which a parent finds herself 
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wearing three hats simultaneously in a context of family decision-making: 
representative of her own interests, trustee of the interests of her child, and objective 
arbiter of these perhaps conflicting interests. On a liberal view, this is a major problem, 
resolvable only by the appointment of an eagle-eyed state as referee ready to blow the 
whistle on the slightest suspicion of a foul. The problem may recede, however, if we 
acknowledge the existence of values which are supernumerary to the liberal framework 
described in Chapter Four-, for in a wider moral context of love, care and concern (cf 
Kleinig, 1982, p 207), parents may, for example, make sacrifices for their children and 
seek a better future for them than they had themselves. I shall argue later in the thesis 
that a liberalism which failed to take account of such possibilities would provide an 
impoverished view of society. 
If we concede, however, that children have rights as potentially autonomous 
agents, and that parents, at least when they are wearing their trustee hat, are bound to 
take into account the interests of the child, there is still a difficulty in establishing 
where, exactly, the interests of the child lie. Coons and Sugarman (1978, ch 3) have 
shown that there is no general consensus about the best interests of the child. Bridges 
(1984, p 56-7) extends their argument by suggesting that the liberal attempt to establish 
criteria by which the pursuit of autonomy, and thus the neutral presentation of 
alternative conceptions of the good life to children, can be objectively justified, may be 
seen as just one more challengeable version of what is good for children. If liberals 
claim that those who oppose their views are simply wrong, their opponents (religious 
fundamentalists or Marxists, for example) will claim the same about the liberal view and 
will present alternative justifications for their own. Bridges (ibid, p 57) concludes, 
We are faced then with a conflict of world view which cannot be resolved 
except within a framework of premises which constitute one such world 
view and therefore cannot (unless perhaps by a convenient coincidence of 
opinions) resolve conflicts between such views. 
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In Part Three and particularly in Chapter Nine, I shall explore whether there is any 
way of avoiding such strident defence of entrenched positions, whether there are values 
which Muslims and liberals actually share, and whether there is any possibility of real 
dialogue about education between those who hold a liberal perspective and those who 
hold an Islamic. But the present chapter and the next are concerned with exploring 
whether the educational demands of religious fundamentalists such as the Muslims can 
be met to their own satisfaction within a liberal world view. 
Many liberals would wish to argue with Coons and Sugarman's claim about the 
indeterminacy of children's interests, and would wish to claim that at least one thing, 
the development of personal and moral autonomy, is in the general interest of all 
children (Crittenden, 1978; McLaughlin, 1984). Of course, it is not sufficient to argue 
that children are potentially autonomous and that we have a duty to help them to achieve 
their potential, for they may be potentially racist or murderous; the decision to help them 
to achieve the particular potential of personal and moral autonomy requires a prior 
judgement about the value of this potential. This prior judgement may be based on the 
claim that children have a right to certain 'primary goods', among which would be an 
education designed to give them a knowledge of competing conceptions of the good life 
and to develop their capacity to choose freely and rationally between them (cf Bridges, 
1984, p 56; Gutmann, 1980). According to Rawls, paternalistic decisions, as far as 
these are justified, 
are to be guided by the individual's own settled preferences and interests in 
so far as they are not irrational, orfailing a knowledge of these (as in the 
case of children), by the theory of primary goods. As we know less and 
less about a person, we actfor him as we would actfor ourselvesfrom the 
standpoint of the original Position. 
(1972, pp 209,248-50) 
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A primary good is something rational people want whatever else they want - 
rights and liberties, opportunities and powers, income and wealth and self-respect (ibid, 
pp 62,92). This list of primary goods may thus be taken to provide the general criteria 
'according to which we can judge the interest of persons under paternalism! (Strike, 
1982b, p 135). This list also provides for many liberals the general criteria according to 
which a common curriculum can be built. Rights, liberties and self-respect all point in 
the direction of personal and moral autonomy: if one is to help children to be free to do 
something, they must be helped to develop the power and the means to do it. White 
(1973) and others have argued that people can make an informed choice between 
alternative activities and ways of life only if they have been introduced to the range of 
possibilities. A child can become a responsible citizen in a democratic society only by 
means of a basic general education of sufficient breadth and openness. Similarly, 
certain fundamental skills and knowledge are necessary if individuals are to prosper 
economically in our society (cf Crittenden, 1982, p 7). 
Liberalism can thus produce a framework of both public and personal values 
which can elucidate the interests of the child and thereby provide a basis for educational 
decision-making. 7be public values involve preparation for citizenship in a democratic 
society; the child is to come to understand, and develop a commitment to, those values 
in the broader society which can justifiably be claimed as universally appropriate. The 
personal values involve the development of personal and moral autonomy, based on 
rationality combined with the child's right to freedom and self-respect: the child needs 
to become aware of the diversity of beliefs and lifestyles that exist in the world and to 
develop the capacity to make rational, informed choices between alternatives. 
The main question now is whether this is an adequate characterisation of 
education, whether all that is important in the educational process can be characterised 
within this framework of public and personal values. I shall argue that at least on an 
Islamic perspective, the framework is incomplete, and that education involves a third set 
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of values which I shall call community values. These values are not (completely) open 
to rational analysis, but are linked to the 'private' values mentioned earlier in the 
chapter. They tend to be shared by groups of individuals such as families or the 
adherents of a particular religion. They are learnt - more often perhaps picked up rather 
than directly taught - by the younger members of the group from the older. This 
category of values includes most religions and some moral beliefs. I shall discuss the 
concept of community values much more fully in Chapter Nine, but for now two 
examples will help to clarify what I mean by the term. 
First, P White (1983, p 142) argues that parents should have the duty of the 
primary education of the child because 'as a matter of fact most people seem to like 
having children and bringing them up' and 
they enjoy family life and a great source of their sense of leading a 
worthwhile life comes from bringing up their children, teaching them all 
kinds of things, playing with them and so on. 
These seem hopelessly inadequate grounds for leaving the primary education of 
children to their parents; one would not leave children to the mercy of a child-molester 
or pervert simply because he enjoyed having children or playing with them. An 
adequate characterisation would have to include reference to the fact that parents 
generally have a greater commitment to the well-being of their own children than 
anyone else. Yet such a commitment (which I would call a community value) is 
inexplicable in terms of the liberal framework of values set out in Chapter Four. To put 
it another way, the random assignation of newborn babies to families at birth (cf 
Fishkin, 1983, p 57) would equalise life chances and be quite justifiable from the point 
of view of Rawls' original position. Our revulsion at the idea, whether it is natural or 
socially constructed, can only be explained in terms of community values. A second 
example can be seen in a situation in which one only has time to rescue from a blazing 
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house either one's aged mother or a medical professor at the height of his career. 
Utilitarianism would insist on rescuing the latter, egalitarianism would insist that both 
had an equal right to be saved and therefore favour random choice. Only community 
values would provide grounds in terms of ties of affection and loyalty that might justify 
what would otherwise merely be an instinctive reaction, to rescue one! s aged mother. 
Liberalism of course cannot totally ignore the fact that community values form 
part of the interest of the child, nor does it seek to. 'Me question is simply how much 
weight should be given to community values in education, compared to public and 
personal values. I shall distinguishthree answers to this, the first two being compatible 
with liberalism, the third not. 
First, community values may be conceived merely as a means to achieving the 
liberal ends of public and personal values. This appears to be Pat White! s position, but 
would also take in arguments about children needing a stable base to avoid 
disorientation, and about involvement in a tradition providing the best grounding from 
which autonomy might develop (cf McLaughlin, 1984). 
Secondly, community values may indeed be considered values in their own right, 
without which the life of individuals would be impoverished. Nevertheless, they are 
secondary to the public and pesonal values which liberalism proclaims, such as 
autonomy, and cannot be promoted in schools at the expense of the latter. Ibis appears 
to be McLaughlin's position: parents may'introduce their children to a substantive set 
of practices, beliefs and values' so long as they do not lose sight of the goal of their 
children's eventual autonomy (1984, p 78-9). 
Thirdly, community values may be considered of prior importance, so that other 
values can only be understood within the parameters that they legitimise. Religious 
values are paradigmatic here: a religion typically provides a comprehensive viewpoint 
113 
Chapter Five 
from which perspective on other areas of life is gained (Strike, 1982b, p 88). The 
autonomy of the subject or discipline can no longer be guaranteed on this third approach 
if there is a clash with fundamental religious values. The meaning of personal and 
moral autonomy may also have to be reassessed to ensure that it does not provide a 
means for undermining fundamental community values (cf Halstead, 1986, ch 4). Ilis 
third approach would not necessitate any rejection of public values, however. indeed 
religious believers may become model citizens, both in the sense of participation and in 
the sense of being law-abiding. From a religious point of view, there may be as much 
value in creating an ethos in which community values might be picked up as in the 
direct transmission of these values. Any such structured approach to the transmission 
of community values would be in contrast to contemporary state schools where such 
community values as are learned tend to be picked up from peers in age whose culture, 
according to Strike (1982b), is characterised by ignorance, lack of insight, shallowness 
of experience and rejection of adult sources of insight and experience; contemporary 
state schools thus 'seem ideal institutions for a society that wishes to commit cultural 
suicide' (p89). A much fuller examination of community values and of their 
relationship to rationality and education will be provided in Chapter Nine. 
However, it is hoped that enough has been said in this present chapter for an 
answer to be given to the question whether bringing children up in the religion of their 
parents would infringe the best interests of those children. On a liberal view, a 
religious upbringing along the lines of the first and second approaches outlined above 
would be acceptable, whereas one along the lines of the third would not. The centrality 
of autonomy to the liberal view denies the right of 'any power holder to inculcate an 
uncritical acceptance of any conception of the good life' (Ackerman, 1980, p 163). In 
so far as Islam is a fundamentalist religion which values the acceptance of a particular 
conception of the good more highly than autonomy or critical openness, we can say that 




Part Three will examine whether this is in fact an accurate characterisation of the 
Muslim position, and if it is, what the consequences are for dialogue between Muslims 
and liberals and for the education of Muslim children in a predominantly non-Muslim 
society. Finally, in Chapter Ten, I shall consider whether, even if Muslims do not have 
the moral right, on a liberal view, to seek to bring up their children as unreflective 
believers, they may nevertheless be allowed to do it, since the coercion needed to 
prevent a religious upbringing may be even more offensive to fundamental liberal 
principles. But first I want to look at the question whether on a liberal view the Muslim 
community has a right to seek to preserve, maintain and transmit its beliefs and values 
intact in a non-Muslim society. This forms the topic of Chapter Six. 
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A LIBERAL VIEW OF MUSLIM COMMUNITY RIGHTS 
The last chapter was concerned with a liberal view of the rights of Muslims as 
parents to bring up their children in their own religion. The present chapter is 
concerned with a liberal view of the rights of Muslims as members of a distinct 
religious group to educate the children born into that group in a way that is in keeping 
with, and helps to preserve, its own distinctive beliefs and values. Both parents and 
religious communities are 'social groups', but there is a significant difference between 
them. Perhaps this difference can be best illustrated by reference to a series of 
questions (for several of which I am indebted to Lustgarten, 1983, p 98-100): 
-Should local authorities provide facilities for single-sex swimming in, public 
swimming pools and baths in response to Muslim requests? 
-Should employees be allowed time off from work to perform the daily prayers or 
to attend mosque on Friday mornings in accordance with the requirements of the 
Muslim faith? 
-Should the physical mutilation of infants (such as the Muslim practice of 
circumcision) be permitted for religious reasons? 
-Should separate slaughter-houses be provided for Muslims so that halal meat 
may be produced locally for the Muslim community? 
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-Should the minarets on the new mosques now being built in British cities 
be 
allowed to broadcast the call to prayer five times daily in accordance with Muslim 
wadition? 
-Should Muslim personal law be applicable to Muslims in the U. K.? 
-Should Muslims be granted a voice in Parliament by allowing them 
representation in proportion to the size of the Muslim community in the U. K.? 
-Should the Muslim community be allowed to set up its own voluntary-aided 
schools in the U. K. along the lines of those already run by the Roman Catholic, 
Anglican and Jewish communities? 
Ilese questions have much in common. They all involve the question of the 
freedom of Muslims to act in accordance with their religious convictions and the 
established way of life of their community, and they all involve the question of the 
relationship between minority groups and the broader society, and what assistance the 
Muslim community can expect from the broader society as it strives to preserve its own 
beliefs and values and perpetuate its own existence. But the first four questions (Group 
A) can be distinguished from the last four (Group B). Justice requires that if the rights 
under demand in the first four questions are to be conceded at all, they should be 
conceded to Muslims as a group (and to anyone else with a similar interest in the right). 
But once the right has been conceded, the choice whether to exercise the right or not lies 
with the individual (though, of course, in practice the individual may be under pressure 
from the group to conform). The right claim in the former case can therefore be justified 
from the point of view of the state on the grounds of the fair treatment of individuals 
and the freedom of individuals to reject certain current social practices on conscientious 
grounds and to choose instead to act in accordance with their own beliefs. The rights 
under demand in the last four questions, on the other hand, cannot be justified in 
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individualistic terms, because they cannot coherently be exercised by individuals, since 
they affect the whole group willy-nilly. If permission is granted, for example, for the 
call to prayer to be made from a minaret, it will be heard in all the streets in the locality, 
whether or not each individual resident wishes to hear it. 
11is is exactly the distinction between the right of Muslim parents to bring up 
their children in their own religion and the right of the Muslim community to preserve 
its beliefs and values by transmitting these to the next generation through a system of 
education. In the former case Muslim parents are seeking the right to make an 
individual choice to bring their children up in the faith (or to delegate this task to 
approved teachers); the fact that this is expressed in terms of individual freedom of 
choice makes this a goal that liberals could be expected to have much sympathy with. 
The main hesitation that liberals would have in allowing this right, as was seen in 
Chapter Five, is that other human beings are involved in the decision as well as the 
parents - and the rights of those other persons (the children) must be protected as well. 
In the latter case, however, the Muslims are making a rights claim which can only be 
taken advantage of as a group. Liberals would have less sympathy with such a claim 
because of fears that the group might be oppressive of individual freedom. 'Mey would 
also be worried about the possible fragmentation of society and would wish to ensure 
that the group was not setting itself up as a rival to the state. 
Both liberalism and contemporary democratic practice are invariably more 
sympathetic to group rights of the former category than to those of the latter. It is no 
coincidence that the first four in the sample list of rights claimed by Muslims are coming 
to be allowed in some parts of the U. K. while the last four are consistently rejected. Of 
course, the right to circumcise males has historically been recognised much longer than 
the others - probably mainly because of non-liberal considerations such as long- 
standing biblical prejudice, the wide extent of the practice, arguments based on hygiene 
and the impossibility of enforcing legislation outlawing the practice. Otherwise, of the 
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four Group A-type rights, it is perhaps the one that liberals would accept most 
reluctantly (and female circumcision even more so), as it appears to be an assault on the 
privacy of the individual. A liberal case in support of male circumcision would 
presumably be developed in terms of personal identity. The other Group A rights may 
perhaps be conceded by liberals on the basis of the second-best principle (cf Ackerman, 
1980; Crittenden, 1982, p 45 ff); if Muslims are not prepared to participate fully in the 
life of the broader society, it may be better to grant them certain rights which will 
encourage partial participation than to see them withdraw into complete isolationism. 
The Group B rights, on the other hand, have more fundamental difficulties inherent in 
them from a liberal point of view, especially the application of Muslim personal law. 
Their rejection is not unexpected, for contemporary social legislation reflects an 
ideology of liberal individualism, and tends to be sympathetic towards any rights claims 
that can be understood in terms of individuals and wary of any which belong only to 
groups. For an explanation of this bias towards the individual, we need to look again at 
the framework of liberal values. 
Crittenden points out that 
In classical liberal theory there was no commitment to intermediate groups 
as essential constituents of a corporate society. Thefundamental units are 
individuals and the state. The former make up an aggregate whose 
collective will is expressed by the state. 
(1982, p 13) 
This explains the liberal tendency to talk of 'community' (i. e. the aggregate whose 
collective will is expressed by the state) rather than 'communities' (i. e. the intermediate 
groups). In so far as they are acknowledged, the intermediate groups are seen as 
formed in accordance with the will of individual participants. Their purpose is seen 
wholly in instrumental terms: to protect and advance the interests of individuals (for 
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example, trade unions). On this account, individuals co-operate only for the sake of 
pursuing their private goals, and as Rawls points out, 'each person assesses social 
arrangements solely as a means to his private aims' (1972, p 52 1). 
Contemporary liberalism, on the other hand, has come to place more value on 
groups and has moved away from the idea that 'individuality and sociability are 
lopposites' in tension! (Gaus, 1983, p 108). This has come about for a variety of 
reasons. First, groups have been recognised as an important contributor to an 
individual's identity and self-concept (cf Sandel, 1982, p 150; Swann Rel2ort, 1985, p 
3). Secondly, human beings need social contact, tend to value common institutions and 
activities, and do in fact have shared final ends (Rawls, 1972, pp 441,522). Rawls 
goes further (ibid, p 523) and argues that only through co-operation can humanity 
realise its potential, as individuals participate in the sum of the realised natural assets of 
the others (a point neatly illustrated by my reference to his work here). Rawls calls this 
process 'social union' and argues that a well-ordered society will contain countless 
social unions of many different kinds; he sees the state as 'a social union of social 
unions' (ibid, p 527). Thus we arrive at the idea of pluralism. 
The notion of pluralism fits well with contemporary liberalism in the sense that it 
follows naturally from the acceptance of freedom of thought and expression, freedom 
of conscience and religion and freedom of peaceful assembly as human rights. 
Pluralism is seen as a way of preserving freedom from oppression by a powerful 
central government or by crude majoritarianism. Pluralism involves the encouragement 
of diversity as good for the health of democracy, indeed, as the very essence of 
democracy. Such diversity, however, as we shall see, can only be celebrated (on a 
liberal view) under certain conditions: one obvious example, provided by Marcuse 
(1965, p 90), is that indiscriminate tolerance may become a license for intolerance by 
facilitating the existence of groups that deny fundamental liberal values such as 
freedom, justice and equality. Freedom therefore can be granted to groups, on a liberal 
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view, only if the groups satisfy certain conditions (cf Jenkins, 1980, pp 241,263). 
These conditions include respect for individual freedom (including freedom of action, 
freedom of conscience, freedom to leave the group); recognition that other groups have 
the right to enjoy the same freedoms and privileges that it enjoys for itself within the 
wider society; and respect for the interests of the wider society (which presupposes a 
commitment to certain social and moral values, such as justice and an acceptance of the 
rule of law). Any discussion of pluralism therefore involves the interplay between the 
freedom of the individual, the freedom of the group and the interests of the broader 
society; but even on a contemporary liberal view, it is the freedom of the group which 
most frequently has to give way in the face of constraints from the other two. 
Ile aim of the present chapter is to elucidate further the conditions which a group 
must satisfy on a liberal view, and to consider a Muslim response to these criteria of 
acceptability. The main question is whether the Muslim community in the U. K. would 
be prepared to submit to those conditions in exchange for being granted the right to 
preserve its own beliefs and values by transmitting these to the next generation through 
public education, or whether these conditions are fundamentally in conflict with the 
Muslim faith. In this case, the acceptance of the conditions would be incompatible with 
the preservation intact of the faith. 
The present chapter will be divided into four sections: first, an examination of the 
nature of pluralism, the rights of groups and the role of the state vis-a-vis groups; 
secondly, the conditions under which, on a liberal view, pluralism is justifiable; thirdly, 
an examination of the Swann ReRort' s response to the issue of the rights of the Muslim 
community, as an example of a scheme of educational policy based on a liberal view of 
pluralism; and finally, a Muslim response to the views expressed in the Swann Re]Rort. 




It is clear that whether by birth, choice or chance all human beings are members of 
a variety of different groups, and that these groups have shared characteristics which 
distinguish them from other groups (cf Swann Rel2ort, 1985, p 3). Thus a person may 
be a teenager, a Northerner, a homosexual, a woman, black, a greengrocer, an 
Oxonian, middle class, an anorexic, a householder, a snooker-player, a Mensan, a 
Buddhist, married, a vegetarian, a Conservative, a criminal, and may Oust conceivably) 
be all of these at the same time. Only some of these groups, however, are universally 
considered educationally significant (for example, those based on age), though a case 
may also be made out for the educational significance of sex, of district, of race, of 
religion, of intelligence, of criminality, of medical condition, of artistic interests, of 
(future) occupation or even of social class. Further, only some of these groups gain 
sufficient cohesiveness from their common characteristic to be considered a 
community; for example, there is no community of householders or of married 
people. The concept of 'community' is a complex one, as will become clear in the 
course of the present chapter, but for now I shall consider a community to be a group 
distinguished by a common location, a common interest or a common physical attribute 
(cf Chattedee, 1983). Membership of an ethnic group on these terms involves 
belonging to a community. An ethnic group can be characterised by shared physical 
attributes (such as skin colour) and by a shared cultural way of life; in this sense it is 
possible to talk of a West Indian community. Membership of a world religion also 
involves belonging to a community; for although the group may be multi-racial and 
muld-cultural (cf Ashraf, 1986a), it is bound together by a common set of beliefs and 
values and a common way of life. 
These distinctions are important when we come to consider contemporary 
pluralism in the U. K., for there are many ways in which a society may be pluralist. 
Ile Swann ReRort associates pluralism with multi-racialism (DES, 1985, pp 5,8). 
Other writers (including Crittenden, 1982) have stressed cultural pluralism, that is, 
the acceptance within a society of differences in the beliefs, values, traditions and 
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practices to which members of that society have a commitment. Political pluralism is 
about the relations between different communities within a state and the degree of 
authority exercised over them by the state. Religious pluralism occurs when a 
number of groups with differing religious beliefs exist side by side in a (supposedly) 
secular state. Nonetheless, these different forms of pluralism 'share important 
theoretical ground and are closely related in practice' (Crittenden, 1982, p 15). This 
tendency of different forms of pluralism to overlap is seen in comments by Bullivant 
(1984, p 71) and Martin (1976) on structural pluralism. Structural p luralism, they 
argue, may be required to guarantee the continuation of cultural pluralism, but structural 
pluralism has institutional, socio-political implications. It is thus possible to discuss 
pluralism in general terms (as the Swann Rep= does), although it is sometimes 
necessary to specify exactly what type of pluralism is under discussion. 
Various attempts have been made by social and political theorists to justify the 
placing of greater stress on the group than liberalism allows, but, as we shall see, none 
of these attempts is directly related to the dominant form of pluralism in British society - 
the presence alongside the indigenous majority of ethnic minority groups with diverse 
and sometimes opposed cultural values and ways of life. Nicholls (1974,1975) has 
distinguished three types of social and political pluralism which stress the importance of 
the group. For the sake of simplicity I shall call these the English model, the American 
model and the colonial model. Each model is concerned to explain the type of unity 
which exists, or which ought to exist, within given states, and with the relationship 
between unity and diversity within a state. 
Ile English Model of pluralism is based on the work of a group of English 
political thinkers in the early years of the present century, particularly JN Figgis, FW 
Maitland, the early Harold Laski and GDH Cole. Their ideas can be traced back to 
Aristotle's arguments against Plato's conviction that the state should be a'totally unified 
entity' (Barker, 1962, pp 40,51). Aristotle saw the state as an aggregation of 
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communities of different kinds. Their ideas can also be seen in the structure of 
medieval society, where cities, universities, guilds and monasteries enjoyed a high 
degree of independence from centralised authority. Crittenden points out that most of 
the ideas of the English pluralists had already been set out some three hundred years 
earlier by Althusius (1557-1638) in his 'Politics', although his work was not 
immediately influential. In particular he claimed that'the existence of many types of 
association within the society encourages a rich and envigorating diversity' (Crittenden, 
1982, p 12). Perhaps the more recent ancestry of the English pluralists should also take 
in Hegel (cf Singer, 1983). 
The English pluralists were primarily opposed to what I earlier called the'classical 
liberal theory', i. e. the belief that the only significant entities were the individual and the 
state. Groups, they maintained, had an existence which did not derive from the state 
but which equally could not be understood fully in terms of the lives of their individual 
members. They saw these groups - whether cultural, religious, economic, civic or 
other - as voluntary associations which the individual could freely join or withdraw 
from. The assumption was that most people would belong to a number of different 
groups, with cross-cutting membership; thus people of different races might belong to 
the same trade unions, and people of differing religious persuasions might share the 
same leisure interests. Ile pluralists argued that such groups are part of the healthy 
existence of a state, and that without them liberty was unlikely to be meaningful. Ile 
three basic principles of English pluralism thus are: 
that liberty is the most important political value, and that it is best preserved by 
power being dispersed among many groups in the state; 




(iii) that ideas of state sovereignty should be rejected (Nicholls, 1974, p 5). 
According to Figgis, the state is best seen as a communitas communitatum, a term 
which had earlier been used by TH Green (Nicholls, 1975, p 77) and which, as we 
have already seen, was later picked up by Rawls. But Figgis goes further and suggests 
that 'men are members of the state only through their membership of societies like the 
church, the trade union or the family' (Nicholls, 1975, p 79). The authority of the state 
to regulate and control group activities was not denied, but the pluralists insisted that the 
state had a corresponding duty to protect the freedom of individuals to 'pursue 
substantive goals through groups' (Nicholls, 1974, p 3), and to respect the internal 
development and functioning of the group (Figgis, 1913, pp 121-4). Finally, they 
believed that the state was not infallible, and that there might be times when groups are 
justified in resisting the state (Nicholls, 1974, p 14). 
Turning to the American Model of pluralism, we find that the work of Bentley, 
Truman, Dahl and other theorists appears to be mainly concerned to explain and justify 
the political system actually in operation in the United States. Political decisions are 
reached by competing groups attempting to influence the policy of government at 
different levels in the interests of their own members, for example, by expensive 
electioneering or by civil rights campaigns (Nicholls, 1974). The state is seen as 'a 
regulator and adjustor among them; defining the limits of their actions, preventing and 
settling conflicts! (Dewey, 1920, p 203), though sometimes the state may get 'caught 
up into active participation' in the struggle between groups (Nicholls, 1974, p 2). Even 
more than in the English model, the state is considered as made up of a cross-cutting 
web of politically significant groups. Thus Kornhauser (1960) denies that medieval 
states were pluralist, because groups such as the monasteries and colleges had little or 
no cross-cutting membership with other groups. American critics of pluralism (such as 
Wolff, 1968, and Marcuse, 1968) do not oppose pluralism as an ideal, but deny that in 
practice the U. S. political system, though depicted as pluralist, actually works in the 
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best interests of the whole population or protects the rights of all groups impartially. 
Indeed, Marcuse sees the 'harmonising pluralisrif of the United States as a 
manifestation of a new totalitarianism (ibid, p 61). 
I'he Colonial Model of Pluralism is less clear cut. Although Nicholls talks of the 
'theorists of the plural society' (1974, p 3), this term is misleading because the social 
anthropologists and sociologists who make up this group (e. g. JS Furnivall, JH 
Boeke, MG Smith and L Despres) are more concerned to describe a pluralist situation 
than justify it. Indeed, when they move beyond description, it seems to be in the 
direction of suggesting ways in which countries can 'depluralise'. Moreover, they are 
not concerned with what are thought of as pluralist societies in the contemporary West 
(industrial societies with disadvantaged ethnic minority groups) but mainly with 
colonial or post-colonial territories such as Burma or the Dutch East Indies, which 
contain different racial or ethnic groups. 
On this model, group affiliations do not form a cross-cutting network or web, but 
reinforce one another so that the state is made up of different segments, separated from 
each other by social, cultural, religious and racial factors. Consequently, the members 
of the groups live almost all their lives within their own group, meeting members of 
other groups only 'in the market place'. The whole state is kept together by two 
factors: by a common economic system, and by force. Ibis type of group afffliation is 
generally considered most likely to manifest intense and violent conflicts (cf 
Dahrendorf, 1959). 
None of the three models directly captures the nature of the pluralism which (in 
the words of Lustgarten, 1983, p 98) 'has become the dominant characteristic of 
twentieth century states: ethnic pluralism within the framework of a united polity'. 
And none of the three models can provide an answer to what has become one of the 
most pressing contemporary issues (to use Lustgarten's words again): 'how, within 
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the overarching political unity, are conflicts engendered by the co-existence of diverse, 
and at times opposed, cultural values and ways of life to be resolvedT On the other 
hand, all of the models help to shed light on the difficulties faced as a result of the 
existence of sizable ethnic minorities in the U. K. (as in other states). Where ethnic 
identity is paralleled by corresponding patterns of dwelling, occupation, language, 
religion, dress and recreation, the group is set apart from outsiders as having a 
distinctive cultural identity and way of life. Crittenden (1982, p3 1) presents a fuller 
picture of this 'insular pluralisrd. Such segmentalisation of society along ethnic 
divisions has much in common with the Colonial Model, except that we do not expect a 
democratic society to use force to hold the state together, unless in exceptional 
circumstances, as the use of force in such a context would offend fundamental 
democratic values. But what options other than force are open to a liberal state? The 
American Model is unlikely to provide the solution if Wolff s criticism of it is valid; he 
claims (1968, p 149,152) that the American system of pluralism favours well 
established groups which subscribe to uniform cultural patterns. The new ethnic 
minorities often lack the power, skill and resources to urge their cause against 
entrenched interests; and if the government attempts to redress the balance by positive 
discrimination and compensatory programmes, these may be resented by the ethnic 
majority, and in any case the justification of such actions is open to question. As Van 
den Berghe (1967) points out, social pluralism in the United States in practice depends 
on a considerable degree of cultural uniformity - and it is precisely such uniformity 
which is lacking in the ghettos of the ethnic minorities. Indeed, - the most serious 
problem for the liberal state is that many of the ethnic minorities do not belong to a 
cross-cutting network of groups which would facilitate interaction with members of 
other ethnic communities. It is widely held (for example, by Nicholls, 1974, p 49; 
Dahrendorf, 1959, p 215) that the likelihood of political and social instability and 
conflict increases when there is a segmented society, and that it diminishes in the cross- 
cutting pluralism of the English or American Models. But the English Model is also not 
without its problems for contemporary pluralism: for it is hard to imagine a 
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contemporary state being prepared to allow minority groups total freedom with regard 
to their internal development and functioning. The state would inevitably seek to 
protect itself from the twin dangers of anarchy if the group refused to accept the state's 
authority, and of the suppression of individual rights within the group (Selznick, 1969, 
p 38). 
Is it possible in the present situation of ethnic pluralism in the U. K. to take on 
board the advantages of the English Model while avoiding its dangers? Nicholls (1974, 
p 61) draws attention to the difficulties. In his analysis, originally homogeneous states 
have virtually disappeared in the aftermath of imperialism and in attempts at 
modemisation. These states have moved towards one of three possibilities: 
segmentation (with its risk of instability and conflict); the 'mass society'. where group 
loyalties are minimal and individuals are isolated and impotent (which Nicholls sees as 
potentially totalitarian); or cross-cutting pluralism. But if there is no tradition of the last 
of these among the ethnic minority groups, what steps could the state take to achieve 
this ? One possibility is for the government of a country to adopt a policy of 
rehomogenisation, aiming at national integration through an extension of state- 
controlled institutions; these might include new welfare programmes, anti-racist 
policies, inner city redevelopment and particularly a common education for all - aiming 
at greater homogeneity and greater interdependence in the next generation. Another, 
more radical, possibility is to create a society in which everyone participates fully in the 
decisions. But both these solutions may be perceived by minority groups as 
constituting a threat to their existence or way of life by undermining their traditional 
identity (cf Taylor, 1984, p 194). The resulting alienation makes it harder to achieve 
the 'basic consensus, to bring everyone to the general will' which is necessary for 
participatory democracy. The participation of everybody in a decision is only possible 
if there is an adequate basis of common agreement, or an underlying shared goal. 
Otherwise democratic participation becomes merely a cover for majoritarianism, 
demanding excessive concessions from groups that lack the power to press their case. 
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Whether any such ground of agreement exists in the case of the Muslim community in 
the U. K. forms the subject of Part Three of the present thesis. 
The problem cannot be ignored, however, for the evidence suggests that the 
changes in the social fabric of modem states resulting from the arrival of immigrants 
and their families from other cultures are permanent and irreversible. A basis for policy 
has to be found, if decisions are not to be made on purely pragmatic considerations. 
The framework of liberal values outlined in Chapter Four provides one such basis. The 
next two sections of the present chapter attempt to outline, first, how liberalism would 
seek to resolve the problem of maintaining the unity of the state without threatening the 
existence of ethnic, cultural and religious minorities, and secondly, what specific 
educational consequences would result from such a liberal approach to pluralism. Ilie 
chapter concludes with a Muslim appraisal of such an approach. 
**** 
Liberalism does not prescribe one clear-cut approach to pluralism. An approach 
has to be worked out which takes into consideration the various fundamental liberal 
values, and it is not surprising that different liberals, giving different weight to the 
various values, come to a range of different conclusions. Thus we find one liberal 
taking a comparatively hard line with the ethnic minorities. He somewhat reluctantly 
supports the toleration of communities whose culture does not support autonomy, so 
long as they are 'viable communities!, but he hopes for their gradual transformation, 
while at the same time claiming that if the Iffe they offer their young is too impoverished 
and unrewarding, compulsory assimilation (by force if necessary) may be 'the only 
humane course' (Raz, 1986, p 423-4). On the other hand, we find another liberal 
arguing that ethnic minorities should be permitted 'unrestricted freedom to follow their 
own customs and religious practices, be governed by their personal law and receive 
education in their language and cultural tradition. 'Mis freedom would be subject to 
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just two limitations: any practice leading to severe physical abuse would be disallowed, 
and impracticable institutional accommodations to minority beliefs and values would not 
be required (Lustgarten, 1983, p 101 f). Ilie former of these views adopts an approach 
of negative freedom (reluctant non-interference) whereas the latter involves positive 
freedom, particularly in the sphere of education where the transmission of the cultural 
values of the minority community would be provided out of public resources. 
In this present section I want to explore a liberal view of pluralism which adopts a 
middle path between these two extremes. In particular I am concerned to establish what 
criteria must be met on a moderate liberal view, if minorities are to be allowed the 
freedom to preserve their distinctive beliefs and values by transmitting them through the 
public system of education to the next generation. The view of pluralism presented here 
is broadly in line with that presented by Crittenden (1982). 1 shall use the three 
fundamental liberal values outlined in Chapter Four as the main framework of analysis. 
A commitment to the first fundamental liberal value of respect for the freedom of 
the individual places certain restrictions on the freedom of the group to control its own 
internal development and functioning, and in particular rules out an oppressive 
relationship between the group and its individual members. It is frequently pointed out 
that the group can potentially be as tyrannous towards the individual as the state can 
(Selznick, 1969, p 38; Kerr, 1955, p 14), particularly if the state's right to interfere 
with groups to protect the interests of their members is rejected (as it is by most of the 
English pluralists). Three conditions are required by the liberal position. First, the 
individual should be not only formally free to leave the group but actually free to do so, 
that is, free from economic, social or other pressures which make it impossible for him 
or her to do so. Secondly, the legitimate exercise of authority within a group should be 
subject to the ultimate supremacy of the individual conscience. However, as Nicholls 
(1975, p 97) points out, this need not mean that the individual conscience becomes the 
ultimate authority in religion, for example, but that the conscience is the faculty for 
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discriminating between authorities and thus avoiding blind obedience. Thirdly, the 
individual's actual freedom and range of choice must not be foreclosed by the activities, 
beliefs, values and lifestyles of the particular group into which he is born. Clearly, in 
practice, some groups will merely pay lip service to these requirements, while others 
may completely disavow even the rhetoric. However, it is up to a liberal state to decide 
whether or not to tolerate groups which infringe the requirements; in some case 
toleration may be more acceptable than repression. 
A more difficult problem arises for the liberal state if the group's way of life or 
system of belief is cramping the potential of individuals within the group, without their 
apparently being aware of it. Has the state the right to interfere with the internal 
activities of the group under such conditions? It is here that the parting of the ways 
comes for liberals and the English pluralists. The latter believe that it is no more 
justifiable for the state to interfere with groups than with individuals for their own good; 
liberals on the other hand give priority to the freedom of the individual over the freedom 
of the (intermediate) group, and therefore may under certain conditions condone 
interference in the group in order to protect the individual. If the group's right to exist 
and remain free of intervention is based on liberty, then this has important 
consequences for the exercise of authority and power over individual group members 
(cf Lukes, 1974); if the group fails to respect the freedom and rights of its members, 
then it is undermining the basis on which its own existence is justified. 
A commitment to the second fundamental liberal value, the equal right of all other 
individuals to similar freedom, together with its consequences for social life in the 
broader community, establishes several preconditions for pluralism. Each group must 
recognise the right of other groups and individuals to enjoy the same freedoms and 
privileges that it enjoys for itself within the wider society. This presupposes a 
minimum set of common values and standards of behaviour within the wider society: 
first, a basic social morality without which any form of social life would not be possible 
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(in particular, a respect for justice and a recognition that other groups have as much 
right as one's own to avoid physical pain and death among their members); secondly, a 
commitment to values presupposed by the pluralist ideal (in particular, the toleration of 
groups with different ideals to one's own and the rejection of violence as a means of 
persuasion); thirdly, acceptance of a common system of law and government by all 
groups within the broader society (though the systems need not be the same for all 
'broader societies'), and a commitment to seek to change these only through democratic 
means. 
So far so good. But this minimum framework of common values is in no sense a 
complete scheme of social morality. It is in seeking to move beyond this minimal range 
of preconditions for pluralism that once again liberals part company with the English 
pluralists. Liberals seek to enlarge the minimum framework to include a more 
substantial range of values within the public area of common morality, leaving the rest 
(e. g. religious beliefs) to the personal sphere of life. The pluralists, on the other hand, 
would not wish to expand the common framework beyond the minimum set out above, 
but would recognise an area of substantive moral values which was the rightful domain 
of the group; this domain would encroach on both the area of public values and the area 
of personal values on- a liberal view. I shall discuss this domain, which I call 
community values, more fully in Chapter Nine. Pluralists see the purpose of the 
minimum framework as providing'an orderly context in which separate groups can live 
out their own virtually autonomous lives' (Crittenden, 1982); liberals would consider 
such an attitude as divisive, destroying the essential unity and coherent structure of the 
state. Ways in which liberals would seek to enlarge the minimum framework of values 
include, for example, expanding the requirement of tolerance of other groups to one of 
welcoming and celebrating diversity, and more generally include seeking to promote the 
common good and the public interest (i. e. the interest of the broader society). Current 
debate about negotiating a framework of shared values (Haydon, 1987; White, 1981) is 
an instance of this liberal approach. It is easy to see how the liberal approach lends 
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support to belief in a common system of education. Pluralists, on the other hand, are 
wary of anything labelled the'public interest' or the'common good. They see them as 
a disguise for the imposition of majority values on unwilling minorities. They are 
dubious about the possibility of creating any set of common values beyond the purely 
political framework necessary for the maintenance of order (Nicholls, 1974, p 46,62). 
In so far as they see any 'common good! worth considering, they see it as structural 
rather than substantive in nature (Nicholls, 1975, p 9-10). 
Crittenden (1982) presents the liberal response to this and a justification for 
seeking to expand the framework of common values. If a pluralist society is a society, 
there must be interaction between its constituent groups. Political and economic 
systems cannot exist in isolation from cultural factors (language is an example), and if 
the former characterise the society as a whole, then the latter cannot be left totally to the 
society's constituent groups. It is impossible for a political order to function 'without 
making at least some assumptions about the ingredients of a worthwhile human life' (p 
30). The liberal vision of pluralism involves 'a delicate balance ... between the 
development of a distinctive common culture and the protection of diverse cultural 
practices' (p 35). It rejects a policy of assimilating all groups to the culture of the 
dominant group. However, it 'need only tolerate, and is not required to encourage!, a 
sense of ethnic identity among minority groups (p 35). It requires all groups to 
participate 'in an evolving core of common culture' (p 35). It anticipates that sections 
of the population will increasingly 'identify with the common culture and its largely 
secular moral values rather than with particular cultural sub-groups' and that traditional 
ethnic, religious or class-based groups will correspondingly decline (p 37). Crittenden 
is aware of a tension between his depiction of diversity as desirable and the 
homogenising tendencies of the type of pluralism he supports (p 38), but nonetheless 
he believes that'open pluralism! with its high degree of interaction between groups is 
the only form of pluralism compatible with liberalism (p 36). 
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A commitment to the third fundamental liberal value, consistent rationality, is 
required as a means for the just resolution of conflict between groups, as a way of 
satisfying the requirement for a non-violent means of persuasion, and indeed as a way 
of facilitating any kind of dialogue between groups. The very intelligibility of the 
concept of liberal pluralism expounded so far depends on a commitment to rationality. 
There could be no basis for the search for an expanded framework of common values if 
there were no public criteria of rationality against which beliefs and values could be 
assessed. To the liberal, the value of rationality is self-evident; 'it cannot be seriously 
douted! says Crittenden (1982, p 42), 'that the practice of critical, reflective rationality 
is preferable to any that relies largely on the unquestioning acceptance of received 
beliefs and the pronouncements of established authority'. 
In the liberal pluralist society, critical rationality provides the common mode of 
thought and the means for debate about the shape of its common life. What critical 
rationality requires of members of the pluralist societ is an active willingness to review 
all beliefs and values in the light of the evidence of experience and to reject or modify 
them where the evidence becomes strongly weighted against them. What critical 
rationality does not require, as Crittenden (p 45 ff) is at pains to point out, is for 
individuals to be constantly calling everything into question, or to refuse to 
acknowledge the possibility of areas of experience that surpass rational understanding, 
or to deny the importance of feeling in human experience, or to assume that there must 
always be a single best answer to complex moral problems. In view of this last point, a 
liberal pluralist society is bound to 'tolerate any moral system or way of life that is 
rationally defensible% Indeed, since persuasion by force is ruled out, it is likely that a 
liberal pluralist society will tolerate ways of life that are not rationally defensible so long 
as these are not in conflict with fundamental liberal values such as justice and freedom, 
because if members of groups committed to such ways of life cannot be persuaded by 
rational means to give them up, it may be the lesser of two evils merely to tolerate them 
rather than attempting to remove them by force. On the other hand, groups to whose 
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way of life critical rationality is central are bound to find liberal pluralism more 
congenial than groups based on 'commitment to a "sacred" order of authority that 
dominates every aspect of human life% To use Crittenden's words once again, 'the 
price the latter must pay for general toleration in a pluralist society is the acceptance of a 
public order at odds with its fundamental ideals' (p 50 ). 
A commitment to liberalpluralism thus has profound consequences for education. 
In particular it rules out the uncritical presentation of any concept of the good or of any 
understanding of the world and human life. Children of all groups need to be taught to 
question their assumptions, to grapple with conflicting world views, to engage in 
rational debate, and to value diversity of tastes, interests and non-fundamental values. 
In this sense, the needs of children do not vary according to the commitments of their 
parents, and thus education can become a common enterprise for the children of all 
groups and communities in a pluralist society. We can now therefore turn to the Swann 
Report which applies the above principles of liberal pluralism to the educational 
problems arising as a result of the presence of ethnic and religious minority 
communities in the U. K., and which develops from these principles a scheme of 
educational policy which it entitles 'Education for All'. 
**** 
The Swann Report (DES, 1985) had among its terms of reference to 'review in 
relation to schools the educational needs and attainments of children from ethnic 
minority groups ... ' (p vii). It starts by attempting to reflect upon the relationship 
between the ethnic majority community and ethnic minority communities in the context 
of the kind of society for which in its view the educational system should seek to 
prepare all youngsters. Tle view that emerges is very much in line with the concept of 
liberal pluralism outlined in the previous section of this chapter. 
135 
Chapter Six 
The ethnic community in a truly pluralist society cannot expect to remain 
untouched and unchanged by the presence of ethnic minority groups - 
indeed the concept of pluralism implies seeing the very diversity of such a 
society, in terms for example of the range of religious experience and the 
variety of languages and languageforms, as an enrichment of the experience 
of all those within it. Similarly, however, the ethnic minority communities 
cannot in practice preserve all elements of their cultures and lifestyles 
unchanged and in their entirety - indeed if they were to wish to do so it 
would in many cases by impossiblefor them to take on the shared values of 
the widerpluralist society. In order to retain their identities whenfaced with 
the pervasive influences of the lifestyle of the majority community, ethnic 
minority groups must nevertheless befree within the democraticframework 
to maintain those elements which they themselves consider to be the most 
essential to their sense of ethnic identity - whether these take the form of 
adherence to a particular religious faith or the maintenance of their own 
languagefor use within the home and their ethnic community - withoutfear 
of prejudice or persecution by other groups. It is important to emphasise 
here free choice for individuals, so that all may move and develop as they 
wish within the structure of the pluralist society. We would thus regard a 
democratic pluralist society as seeking to achieve a balance between, on the 
one hand, the maintenance and active support of the essential elements of the 
cultures and lifestyles of all the ethnic groups within it, and, on the other, 
the acceptance by all groups of a set of shared values distinctive of society 
as a whole. This then is our view of a genuinely pluralist society, as both 
socially cohesive and culturally diverse. 
(pp 5-6) 
This passage appears to suggest that in a pluralist society there should be freedom 
for the members of minority groups to maintain their distinctive cultures and lifestyles, 
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since assimilation unjustly seeks to deny, the fundamental freedom of individuals to 
differ in areas 'where no single way can justifiably be presented as universally 
appropriate' (p 4); but this freedom is subject to two major constraints: first, priority 
must be given to taking on'the shared values of the wider pluralist society', for without 
these there would be the danger that society would fragment along ethnic lines, and this 
would 'seriously threaten the stability and cohesion of society as a whole' (p 7); and 
secondly, the group's authority and control over the individual is constrained by the 
requirement of 'free choice for individuals'. These constraints suggest that in spite of 
the claim in the last two sentences of the passage, the goal of social cohesion is taken 
more seriously than that of cultural diversity. Indeed, the tentative vision of society at 
the end of the Report's first chapter confirms this impression: 
We are perhaps looking for the 'assimilation' of all groups within a 
redefined concept of what it means to live in British society today. 
(p8) 
These two constraints on the freedom of the group are very much in evidence in 
the Report' s educational recommendations. Stress is placed on the role of education in 
laying the foundations of, and helping to shape, a'genuinely pluralist society' (p 316). 
Three goals are mentioned for education: first, educating all children to an 
understanding of the shared values of our society; secondly, helping children to 
appreciate the diversity of lifestyles and backgrounds which make up our society; and 
thirdly, meeting the individual educational needs of all pupils (pp 316-7). The firsi of 
these aims is based on the first constraint mentioned earlier, the avoidance of social 
fragmentation. Ile second aim again seeks to avoid fragmentation by encouraging the 
celebration of diversity, while at the same time opening the door to genuine individual 
choice between alternative ways of life. The third aim raises the question of how the 
'individual educational needs' of the pupils are to be assessed, and by whom. The 
Report appears to suggest that the danger which Harris (1982a, p 227) draws attention 
137 
Chapter Six 
to, that any selection is bound to reflect the cultural values of the selector (he writes of 
'our judgements as to the worth of elements of their culture'), is to be avoided by 
assessing such needs according to rational, educational criteria. The third aim therefore 
inevitably involves the right of all children to decide for themselves their future way of 
life. There seems to be an unresolved tension in the Swann Rel2ort between its claim 
that education should at least partly be concerned to enable and assist ethnic minorities 
'to maintain what they regard as the essential elements of their cultural identities' (p 
465-6) and its approval of a statement by Banks to the effect that if schools were to 
reinforce the values and beliefs that students bring with them from home, such an 
approach would be too'culturally encapsulating' (p 322). Presumably it is the need for 
education to promote the shared values of the broader society and to respect the rights 
of the individual pupil which leads the report to conclude that 
the role of education cannot be and cannot be expected to be to reinforce the 
values, beliefs and cultural identity which each child brings to the school. 
(p 321) 
Schools do not have a responsibility for cultural preservation, for culture is anyway 
something fluid and dynamic (p 323). 
Exactly the same approach is adopted when the focus of concern is narrowed 
down to religious education in Chapter Eight of the Report. The starting point is that 
education should aim to 
broaden the horizons of all pupils to a greater understanding and 
appreciation of the diversity of value systems and lifestyles which are now 
present in our society while also enabling and assisting ethnic 
minorities to maintain, what they regard as the essential 
elements of their cultural identities (my emphasis). It is clear from 
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the evidence we have received thatfor many ethnic minority communities, 
especially thoseftom the variousfaiths within the Asian community, respect 
and recognitionjor their religious beliefs is seen as one of the, and, in some 
cases, the central factor in maintaining their community's strength and 
cohesiveness. 
(p 465-6) 
It becomes clear as we read on, however, that the first goal mentioned here is to take 
priority in religious education as elsewhere: a phenomenological approach to religious 
education is considered the most suitable way of developing pupils! understanding and 
appreciating the diversity of beliefs and life-stances which exist. The second goal of 
education, that of enabling and assisting ethnic communities to maintain what they 
regard as the essential elements of their cultural identities (p 466), is reduced to a few 
superficial pastoral concessions, mainly on food, clothing and physical education (p 
343) and the retention of single-sex schools. Religious education should focus on the 
nature of religious belief generally, we are told, and on the religious dimension of 
human experience; the maintenance of specific religious beliefs, even if they are'the 
central factor in maintaining (a particular community's) strength and cohesiveness' (p 
466) has nothing to do with education. This is instruction, and can only be 
provided by the individual faith communities (p 496-7). 
The call for separate voluntary-aided schools for ethnic minority communities is 
opposed by the Report on similar grounds. Such schools would be pulling in the 
opposite direction from the Reporf s underlying principle of 'Education for All'; they 
might make it more Micult for their pupils to take on the shared values of the pluralist 
society (including the appreciation of diversity), and they might restrict the freedom of 
children to decide for themselves their own future way of life. 
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The Swann Report provides a long and detailed discussion of a great many issues 
involving ethnic minorities in England and has already become the subject itself of 
many articles and commentaries (NAME, 1985; CRE, 1985; Islamic Academy, 1985; 
Khan-Cheema et al, 1986). 1 have here merely isolated one strand of thought running 
through the Report, a strand that is particularly relevant to the claim of the Muslim 
community to the right to educate its children in a way that is in keeping with, and helps 
to preserve, its own distinctive beliefs and values. Rather than developing the ideas in 
the Report itself in more detail, I shall now turn to a Muslim response to the Report, 
starting with some detailed criticisms and moving on to what appears to be a serious 
clash of fundamental values. 
**** 
'Me Muslim response to the Swann Report (DES, 1985), with which the present 
chapter concludes, will include a discussion of the way the Report categorises groups 
and communities, and of the relationship between religion and culture and a sketch of 
Muslims! fundamental disagreements with the Report over shared values and the aims 
of education. 
First, many Muslims resent being called an 'ethnic community' (Ashraf, 1986a, p 
z 
v; Khan-Cheema. et A 1986, pp i, 4; Islamic Academy, 1985, p 3); even if the majority 
of the Muslims in this country do as a matýer of fact have a common racial and 
cultural background, as the Swann Report pýints out (1985, p 503, footnote), it is not 
primarily their common ethnicity but theirýreligion that binds them together into a 
community. Therefore to talk about'the moves by certain ethni*7*nonty communities, 
motivated primarily by religious concerns, to establish-their own "separate" schools' 
(ibid, p 498) is misleading. The moves, in the case of the Muslims at least, are by a 
religious community which happens to be drawn largely (but certainly not exclusively) 
from a particular ethnic minority. Two main problems arise from implying that 
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Muslims are an 'ethnic community'. The first is that we are never quite sure whether 
what is said about ethnic communities is meant to apply to the Muslims or not. When 
we read of thegrowing concern of many Asian parents ... at their children losing touch 
with their cultural heritages through the absence of any form of 'suppore for their home 
languages and the risk of their children's ethnic identity being 'submerged' by the 
influence of English' (ibid, p 202), this sounds as if it is meant to refer to Muslims, as 
they form the largest section of 'Asian parents'. However, such concern, although it 
may be felt by some individual Muslim parents, is not fundamental to Islamic belief. 
Ashraf (1986a, p vi) makes this clear as he presents his vision of the future: 
In two or three generations a group of Muslims will emerge who will be 
British in their use of English, in some of their customs and conventions, 
even in their love of English literature, but they will be Muslim ... in 
positive absolute values. 
This leads to the second main problem with calling the Muslims an 'ethnic 
community', that the situation is being defined in terms that the Muslims would not 
themselves use and that consequently their own perspective on the problems being 
faced by the Muslim community is constantly lost sight of or distorted. For example, 
the maintenance of minority languages, which may be expected to be of primary 
concern to an ethnic minority group, is likely to be of very secondary importance to a 
group whose primary concern is the preservation of religious beliefs and values. 
'Ethnic community' implies quite a different set of values fromreligious community. 
Even worse, however, is the constantly recurring use of the phrase 'the Asian 
community' Ubid, pp 202,466,500,501). There is no such community, and the 
various groups included under this heading are in fact diverse in religious beliefs and 
values, in cultural matters such as food and dress and in social behaviour and lifestyle; 
the only factor they have in common is racial origin. The 'Asian community' is thus 
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identified solely on the basis of racial characteristics, and to identify a community on 
those grounds is to encourage the very prejudice that the Report is committed to rooting 
out. There is a frequent failure in the Report to distinguish between Muslim and non- 
Muslim'Asians', and this means that what appears to be internal disagreement within 
the Muslim community often turns out to be disagreement within the so-called'Asian 
community'. For example, one does not know if the criticisms of separate Muslim 
schools made by the President of the National Association of Asian Youth (Swann 
Report, p 510) are being made by a Muslim or, not; one suspects not. Much more 
seriously, the continued use of the term 'Asian community' implies that Asian 
Muslims have more in common with other Asians than they do with indigenous 
Christians. This is not so (for the Quean acknowledges the close relationship between 
Islam, Judaism and Christianity), and to imply otherwise is to create a gulf where one 
did not exist before. It may indeed turn out to be the most serious mistake in the Swann 
Rel2ort - and I shall return to this topic in Chapter Ten - that instead of emphasising 
points of agreement and common values between Muslims and those sections of the 
indigenous population that are religious believers, it chooses to emphasise the racial and 
ethnic separateness of the Muslim community and then to look for ways of resolving 
the resulting problems that are hardly compatible with a Muslim world view. Thus we 
find the Swann Re= recommending on the basis of educational arguments and in the 
name of pluralism that the law requiring a daily act of collective worship in schools 
should be re-examined with a view to amending or repealing it. But, as I shall show in 
Chapter Eight, Muslims do not accept the educational arguments, and it is ironical that 
the arguments advanced by the Swann Report in the name of pluralism have more in 
common with the views of the National Secular Society (cf letters to The Guardian, 9th 
July 1986,22nd July 1986) than they do with either the Muslims (cf Islamic Academy, 
1985, p 7) or with large numbers of British citizens of West Indian origin. What 
Muslims are seeking for their children is a school atmosphere where religious beliefs 
and values can be respected and nourished; compared to this, all the other 
preoccupations of the liberal pluralist society which the &wann Re]2ort supports, such 
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as anti-racist strategies and the preservation of minority community languages and 
cultural traditions, are of very secondary importance in Muslim eyes. Many Muslims 
would be less resistant to the idea of the common school if they did not see the 
traditional religious values which have for centuries underpinned education in this 
country being so rapidly undermined. 
It may be argued that I am making too much of the constant references to Muslims 
in the Swann Re]2ort in terms of 'ethnic minorities! and the 'Asian community, and that 
these terms are only used as a neutral and intentionally vague way of defining certain 
groups - the vagueness masking what would otherwise become a fierce dispute over 
religious, cultural, national, racial and ethnic boundaries. My point is that even these 
vague terms contain a value judgement - the decision not to treat religious 
categorisations as the most fundamental ones in our society - and that the effect is to 
relegate religious beliefs and commitment to a low status, at the same level as other 
cultural differences. Religion is considered as one among several possible forms of 
cultural identity (Swann Report, 1985, p 466); cultural identity is seen as one of the 
elements in ethnic identity (p 3); ethnic groups are one of a number of groups of which 
individuals are normally members (p 3); and all these groups, as we saw in the previous 
section, are allowed on a liberal pluralist perspective to influence individual 
development only subject to certain conditions, viz. that individual freedom of choice 
is respected (p 323) and that priority is given to the 'shared values of the broader 
pluralist society' (p 5). On a Muslim view, on the other hand 'the stability and 
cohesion of society as a whole' (p 7) is not a primary value; society itself holds value 
only in so far as it satisfies certain prior conditions. On the political level, the concept of 
the Islamic state takes priority over any man-made political institutions or divisions, and 
on the personal level, religious identity takes priority over nationality or ethnicity or 
culture or any other framework of categorisation. This will be discussed more fully in 
Chapter Seven below. Muslim acceptance of the ideal liberal pluralist society which the 
Swann Rel2ort commends and of the particular educational policies which it proposes 
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depends entirely on the degree of compatibility between those proposals and the Islamic 
world view. This therefore becomes the topic of Part Three of the present thesis. But 
first there are some more fundamental problems with the Swann Report from a Muslim 
point of view which must be sketched out. 
From what has been said so far, it is clear that many Muslims would wish to 
distinguish religion from the other elements of culture, at least as the latter term is 
conceived in sociological circles (i. e., including all the customs, patterns of behaviour, 
institutions and lifestyles of a society), which is the sense in which the Swann Rel2ort 
generally uses the term. I have pointed out elsewhere (Halstead, 1986, p 9) that the 
sociological sense of culture does not imply any essential difference between devotion 
to one's ferrets, devotion to one's regiment or devotion to one's God and does not 
therefore provide us with essentially different means for evaluating such diverse 
devotions. But the distinction between 'culture' and 'religion' is clear from an Islamic 
point of view. Culture, within which Muslims would include dress, occupation, leisure 
activities, types of residence and lifestyles, is seen, as in the Swann Reml, as 
something fluid and constantly subject to change, and in this sense the Muslims have 
been described as a multi-cultural community (Ashraf, 1986a, p v). If this is what is 
meant by culture, then Muslims would certainly agree that seeking to preserve a culture 
may be 'self-defeating since all cultures are dynamic and are continually changing and 
being changedý (Swann Repgn, 1985, p 323) and that an education which sought 
merely to reinforce existing cultural values would be 'far too limiting and culturally 
encapsulating' (p 322). But a religion which is based on revelation must have a 
fixedness which is quite alien to 'culture!. This is not to deny that a religion needs the 
capacity to take on board modem scientific discoveries and new moral problems which 
they sometimes raise; but they must be taken on board in a way which is compatible 
with the essential truths of the religion. The religion itself is not negotiable. This is 
why the Muslims will part company with the Swann ReRort when it insists on treating 
religion as one of a possible range of cultural options open to the individual child. It is 
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a misrepresentation of the Muslim position to write of their desire 'to give their children 
the opportunity to learn about (my emphasis) the religious traditions of their own faith 
communities in a positive and accurate manner' (p 50 1). This is the language of social 
anthropology rather than religion, and reduces religion to the status of an optional extra 
for the individual rather than the basis for the unity, indeed the very existence, of the 
community of which, by birth and upbringing, Muslim children are becoming a parL 
The concept of 'shared values' is central to the Swann ReI20rt, but it is not always 
clear how the concept is to be understood. Certainly it is not to be equated with 
traditional British values. Sometimes, when the Report discusses 'the common ... 
values which we all share' (p 7), it seems to refer to an HCF of values, that is, to a set 
of values which is shared as a matter of empirical fact by all the major cultural groups 
that make up contemporary British society. Such a view, as I have pointed out 
elsewhere (Halstead, 1986, pp 7,17) would be quite acceptable to Muslims and other 
minority groups in the UK. At other times, however, for example when it discusses 
the need for the minority groups to 'take on the shared values of the wider pluralist 
society' (p 5, my emphasis), the Report appears no longer to have in mind an HCF of 
values but to be pointing, as White (1987, p 17) suggests, in the direction of what our 
shared values should be, even if they are not in practice shared by all the groups in our 
society. References to what can 'justifiably be presented as universally appropriate' (p 
4) suggest that the Swann Report accepts that there are criteria of rationality which 
'shared values' must satisfy if their acceptance as universal principles is to be justified. 
The view of the task of education which emerges from this is a fundamentally liberal 
one. First, education should encourage a commitment to the framework of shared 
values and an understanding of the rational principles on which they are based. 
Secondly, education should provide children with objective information about, and 
insight into, a wide range of non-shared cultural values; encourage them to respond 
sympathetically to, and indeed to value, diversity in this area; and leave them to 
determine their own individual identities and develop into autonomous individuals. 
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Many Muslims may be much less happy with this second account of 'shared 
values', since it is based on liberal assumptions which they do not necessarily share, 
yet their freedom to opt out of the educational system to which it gives rise would be 
very limited. Particularly problematic from an Islamic point of view is the notion that 
there are criteria of rationality by which all values can be judged. While such criteria 
may be accepted as appropriate for judging cultural values on an Islamic view, they 
are not appropriate for religious beliefs and values that are based on divine revelation, 
for the human intellect cannot set itself above what they believe to be revealed truth (cf 
Khan-Cheema et al, 198 6, p 5). Muslims' acceptance of a divine order of authority that 
affects every area of their lives places significant limits on their ability to accept the 
liberal understanding of shared values and education. First, although Muslims can 
clearly value cultural diversity, their commitments (as the protests against Salman 
Rushdie show) may prevent them from celebrating, as opposed to tolerating, a 
diversity which includes groups totally antipathetic to their own beliefs and values. 
Secondly, there will be limitations on the degree of personal autonomy which children 
will be encouraged to develop; this will be discussed more fully in Chapter Eight. 
Thirdly, Muslims will be very wary of proposals to negotiate a framework of 
commonly accepted values (White, 1987: Haydon, 1987), because there are many 
values which they consider to be non-negotiable, because they are afraid that alien, 
secular values will be agreed by the non-Muslim majority and because the process of 
negotiation itself presupposes certain values which Muslims do not necessarily accept. 
Above all, Muslims fear a further decline in religiously based values, which White 
himself (1987, p 22) anticipates will be an outcome of his proposals; the proposal to 
phase out worship from the maintained school, which has already been mentioned, 
illustrates this secularising tendency (cf Halstead and Khan-Cheema, 1987). 
Put thus baldly, the Muslim reaction to the Swann Report is unlikely to gain a 
sympathetic response in many quarters. Clearly what is needed before the debate can 
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proceed is a more detailed analysis of Islamic values and an Islamic approach to 
education, presented as sympathetically as possible. Only then can a critical response to 
the Islamic position be developed. Part Three therefore seeks to re-express the terms of 
the debate about the education of Muslim children from an Islamic perspective. 
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AN ISLAMIC FRAMEWORK OF VALUES 
In Part Two the question was considered whether liberal values could provide a 
framework within which the problem of educational provision for Muslim children 
could be resolved to the satisfaction of the Muslims themselves. This involved an 
examination of a liberal view of the rights of Muslim parents to bring up their children 
in their own religion, and the rights of the Muslim community to educate its young in a 
way which is in keeping with, and helps to preserve, its own distinctive beliefs and 
values. In both cases it was seen that, on a liberal view, these rights exist for Muslims 
only subject to certain conditions. In the former case, the rights of Muslim parents to 
bring up their children in their own religion are constrained by considerations of the 
public interest, and by the need to ensure that the children's personal autonomy is not 
lost sight of as an ultimate goal. In the latter case, the rights of the Muslim community 
to preserve, maintain and transmit its own distinctive beliefs and values are constrained 
by the need to avoid foreclosing the child! s ultimate freedom and range of choice by 
inculcating the uncritical acceptance of a particular conception of the good life. Although 
in the eyes of liberals these conditions are fully justified on the basis of the framework 
of values set out in Chapter Four, there is no reason to expect that the conditions will 
necessarily be acceptable to individuals or groups who do not share that liberal 
framework of values. This is indeed the case with many Muslims, whose view of the 
nature and aims of education differs significantly from the liberals', because it starts 
from different premises. 
The aim of the present chapter, therefore, is to provide a brief sketch of Islamic 
values and the grounds on which they are based and to draw attention to some of the 
main differences between the Islamic and the liberal framework of values. In a single 
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short chapter, the approach will inevitably be schematic, but it is hoped that enough will 
be said to provide an adequate basis for a more detailed account of an Islamic view of 
education in Chapter Eight and a discussion of the possibility of a reconciliation 
between the liberal and Islamic views of education in Chapter Nine. 
**** 
Islam is both a civilisation and a religion. In the former sense, Islam is an 
historical phenomenon, and the term refers to everything that has been said or done by 
numerous generations of people calling themselves Muslims. In the latter, more 
fundamental, sense, Islam is the religion of the submission (islam) of the human will to 
the divine, based on the message received in the form of the Quran by the Prophet 
Muhammad, and incorporated in a series of institutions of which Islamic law (sharia) 
is perhaps the most important. In the present and subsequent chapters, I shall reserve 
the term 'Islamic' for those institutions that are based directly on the principles of the 
religion of Islam, and shall use the term'Muslim! for those institutions infused with the 
spirit of Islam but also subject to a greater or less extent to other influences. Thus, I 
wish to call al-Kindi, al-Farabi, Ibn Sina (Avicenna) and Ibn Rushd (Averroes) Muslim 
philosophers, but al-Ash'ari and al-Ghazali Islamic theologians. Similarly, it will be 
possible to speak of the Islamic tradition of tolerance while acknowledging that 
historically some Muslims have shown a high level of intolerance. No civilisation in 
practice can be completely shaped by a religion to the exclusion of all other influences, 
though one of the aims of the much publicised Islamic resurgence in recent years has 
been to bring the civilisation of the Muslim world more into line with Islamic principles, 
for example, by purging their institutions of remnants from the colonial era. It is the 
religious principles of Islam, however, that give the Muslim world its strong sense of 
unity, for however much civilisation and culture may differ from one region to another, 
these remain constant. Indeed, these principles are taken by Muslims to be unchanging 
across time as well as space, though it is acknowledged that they may need to be re- 
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expressed in modern idiom if they are to be comprehensible to the present-day 
generation (cf Nasr, 198 1, p 2). 
It is with Islam as a religion that I am concerned in the present chapter, and in 
particular with the fundamental Islamic values which are shared throughout the Muslim 
world simply because they are fundamental to the religion of Islam. This is not to deny 
that there are differences of perspective between different Muslim groups. Just as the 
fundamental liberal values discussed in Chapter Four provide a framework equally for 
utilitarianism, libertarianism and egalitarianism, so the Islamic principles discussed in 
this chapter have manifested themselves in a variety of sects and tendencies. But these 
differences should not be overemphasised; they do not usually extend to the 
fundamental values. Insofar as I have to take account of the differences at all in the 
present chapter, I shall follow the most orthodox and traditional viewpoint. This is in 
recognition of the worldwide strength and influence of resurgent Islamic 
fundamentalism, but also because it enables the points I make to be seen in their 
clearest, most unambiguous form. Thus I shall focus on the Sunni sect, rather than the 
Shfite, and the Ash'arite school of theology rather than the Mu'tazilite. In parallel to 
my identification of a major strand of liberalism in Chapter Four, running from Kant to 
Rawls, so I shall draw heavily on a strand of Islamic thought which can be. traced from 
the mediaeval thinker, al-Ghazali, to the contemporary scholar, S. H. Nasr. 
The Islamic framework of values discussed here can, like the liberal, Produce its 
own distinctive political theory, ethical theory, economic theory and theory of 
education. Indeed, much work has been done in recent years on Islamic political theory 
(cf Brohi, 1982a; Enayat, 1982), Islamic ethics (cf Hourani, 1985; Hovannisian, 
1985), Islamic economic theory (cf al-Mahdi, 1982; Choudhury, 1986; Mannan, 1986) 
and Islamic education (which is discussed in Chapter Eight). Islam provides a more 
comprehensive world view than liberalism, however, for it also encompasses areas 
where liberalism has no distinctive perspective, such as the aesthetic (cf L. L. al-Faruqi, 
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1982) and the spiritual (cf Nasr, 1987a)). Islam is a religion, but far more than that term 
usually implies in the West; it is a din, a whole way of life. As Montgomery Watt points 
out, 
it is not a private matterfor individuals, touching only the perip hery of their 
lives, but something which is both private and public, something which 
permeates the wholefabric of society in a way of which men are conscious. 
It is - all in one - theological dogma, forms. of worship, political theory and 
a detailed code of conduct. 
(1979, p 3) 
In Chapter Four it was argued that liberalism has its origin in the tension between 
two conflicting values - individual freedom and the drive to self-fulfilment on the one 
hand, and the equality of all individuals on the other - and that it is the application of 
rationality to this tension that produces the distinctively liberal world view. In contrast, 
what underpins the Islamic framework of values is a profound sense of unity (tawhid), 
according to which all the elements in the universe and all aspects of life contribute to a 
harmonious whole. This doctine of unity is not unique to Islam; for example, 
Rademacher (1961) has written a detailed exposition of it from a Christian perspective. 
But undoubtedly it occupies a much more central place in Islamic than in Christian 
beliefs and values. The Islamic principle of unity draws attention initially to the oneness 
of God, the creator and sustainer of life, whose will and authority are supreme and 
encompass the whole universe. Secondly, it draws attention to the unity of mankind; 
human beings are equal in God! s eyes, and are bound together in an interdependent 
community of life and work, and have a common destiny. Thirdly, it emphasises the 
harmony between humanity and the created natural world, which are complementary in 
God's scheme of creation. Fourthly, it provides an integrated and comprehensive 
outlook on life, where familiar Western tensions disappear, as between the spiritual and 
the material, the religious and the secular, or the law and personal morality. 'Me pursuit 
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of knowledge, according to this doctrine, ceases to be a fragmentary and 
compartmentalised activity, for all knowledge ultimately contributes to our knowledge 
of God. The whole fabric of life is thus governed by a single law: the realisation of the 
divine will. 
On an Islamic view, people are guided to an understanding and experience of this 
unity through the revelation (wahy) by which God has made himself known. This 
revelation was brought to the Prophet Muhammad in the Quran and interpreted by him 
in his sayings and traditions (sunna). Together, the Quran and the sunna form what 
Sardar (1979, p 24) calls the 'absolute reference frame' of Islam. They contain 
essentially the same message as that revealed to earlier prophets including Adam, 
Abraham, Moses and Jesus, but whereas earlier messages are seen as corrupted, the 
Qur'an is considered to be the word of God in its final form. An acceptance of 
revelation in this sense thus lies at the very heart of Islam. The tenn'revelation' usually 
implies one of two antitheses: it suggests either a contrast between 'natural religion' and 
'revealed religion! , or an opposition of some kind between 'reason' and 'revelation'. 
The Islamic position with regard to the former of these is clear: God cannot be descibed 
or symbolised or understood by reference to anything in the natural realm, at least 
without prior account being taken of revealed truth. The Islamic view of the relation 
between reason and revelation, however, is more complicated. The Quran constantly 
stresses the importance of reason or the 'intellece (aql), and in fact describes those 
who go astray from religion as those who cannot use their intellect Qa yaqilun). The 
intellect here is conceived as the means by which people come to understand the signs 
(ayat) of God, and come to recognise and accept God-given truths. The Islamic 
theologian al-Ghazali, however, has a much broader concept of the intellect. Like 
Aquinas, he shows great respect for Aristotelian logic and analytical thinking, which he 
considers to be neutral with regard to religious truth and therefore capable of being 
harnessed in support of Islam and appropriate for inclusion in the curriculum of Islamic 
learning (Watt, 1983, p 78). On the other hand, there is in his view no way that 
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independent human rationality can take precedence in Islam over revealed religion. As 
Nasr (1981, p 26) points out, the use of the intellect is considered valid only when that 
intellect is in a wholesome state (salim), and wholesomeness is to be judged in terms of 
following the divine law (sharia), which is itself based on revelation. Hourani (1985, p 
149) asserts that 
from an early time Muslims who understood the overwhelming power of 
God as the chief message of the Quran could not admit that man could ever 
work out by his own intellect, without aidfrom scripture, what was right 
and what was wrong in the world. 
Al-Ghazali and other Islamic theologians maintain that ethical knowledge is 
derivable entirely from revelation, and that it is only under the umbrella of revealed 
religion that reason comes into play, to carry out the functions of interpretation and 
application and to refute opponents. Critical appraisal thus can never be applied to the 
foundation of religious commitment. Reason stands independent of revelation only for 
the very first step in Islamic apologetics (since, of course, revelation cannot authenticate 
its own authority: cf Flew, 1966, p 19), as al-Ghazali himself makes clear: 
In sum, prophets are the doctors of heart ailments. The only beneficial 
function of intellect is to teach us thatfact, bearing witness to the veracity 
and its own incompetence to grasp what can be grasped by the eye of 
prophecy; it takes us by the hand and delivers us to prophecy as the blind 
are delivered to guides and confused patients to compassionate doctors. 
Thusfar is the progress and advance of intellect; beyond that it is dismissed, 
exceptfor understanding what the doctor iniparts to it. 
(quoted in Hourani, 1985, p 165f) 
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On al-Ghazali's view, human beings' awareness of their own weakness and 
uncertain state, plus their natural inclination to avoid harm and to seek their own good, 
should lead them to a state where they can recognise the authority of the teaching of 
Islam. God has given them everything they need to make an intelligent decision: a 
prophet to warn them, miracles or signs in support of his authority (such as the miracle 
of the Qur'an), their intellect to help them to understand the warnings and see the 
significance of the signs, and their natural concern for their own interest. The purpose 
of both the warnings and the signs is to help people to recognise their'contingency and 
dependence upon an omnipotent God (Leaman, 1985, p 135). If they fail to do so, 
then the teaching about the Last Judgment reminds them that they are ultimately 
accountable to God for their beliefs and actions. 
**** 
Once revelation is accepted as the source of truth, no value system can be 
postulated which ignores it. Revelation is primarily concerned with three things - with 
God himself, with the mutual relations of God and human beings, and with the 
principles of human conduct - and from an Islamic point of view each of these has 
profound consequences for the construction of a framework of values. Rahman (1982, 
p 14) points out that: 
Just as in Kantian terms no ideal knowledge is possible without the, 
regulative ideas of reason (likefirst cause), so in Quranic terms no real 
morality is possible without the regulative ideas of God and the last 
judgment. 
The dependence of all human beings on the divine guidance contained in the 
scriptures as the basis of their moral knowledge is a recurrent theme of the Quran. To 
forestall man's natural tendency to go astray, God provides guidance (huda), and the 
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appropriate response to that guidance is for the Muslim to surrender his own personal 
moral judgment to the guidance of God and the Prophet (as contained in the Quean, the 
sunna and their derivatives). The Qdan says, 
It is not for any believer, man or woman, when God and His Messenger 
have decreed a matter, to have the choice in the affair. Whoever disobeys 
God and His Messenger has gone astray into manifest error. 
(Sura 33, verse 36, Arberry's translation) 
It is clearly implied here and elsewhere in the Quean that revelation is to be taken by 
Muslims as providing an exclusive guide to moral knowledge for human beings. The 
separation of morality from religion is seen as a modem aberration. 
Two questions now arise which were the subject of much debate in the 8th to 12th 
centuries A. D., when Islamic civilisation met, and learned to respond to, Greek 
philosophy. The first is whether on an Islamic view ethical knowledge can sometimes 
be arrived at by independent reason or whether it can be drawn only from revelation 
and derived sources. The former view was held by the Mu'tazilites, though they, unlike 
some Muslim philosophers, saw reason and revelation in ethics as complementary, 
never in opposition; but most Islamic theologians accepted the latter view, restricting the 
role of reason to matters of interpretation, the use of analogy, and so on. Clearly they 
felt that if human beings could judge right and wrong without reference to God, this 
would somehow undermine Gods omnipotence (at least, unless God had willed it so), 
since they would be in a position to judge God's actions themselves and form an 
independent verdict on his moral pronouncements. The second question is whether 
ethical value terms such as 'good! and 'righe have an independent meaning that can be 
derived rationally, or whether they simply mean what God approves or commands or 
decides is good and right, a position which I shall call ethical voluntarism. Once again, 
the former view was held by the Mu'tazilites and all Muslim philosophers, the latter by 
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al-Ash'ari and almost all Sunnite jurists and theologians. Theologians like al-Ash'ari 
and al-Gazali did not shy away from accepting the more extreme consequences of their 
doctrine of ethical voluntarism, that if God had commanded theft and murder, then it 
would be right for man to commit them. Some modem scholars, such as Albert 
Hourani, however, are more sympathetic to the standpoint of the Muslim philosopher 
Ibn Rushd, who notes that'such a position potentially undermines both faith in God 
and belief in ordinary morality' (Hourani, 1985, p 59). 
Undoubtedly the view that values are in essence whatever God commands and 
that they can only be known ultimately through revelation has been prevalent in Islam 
for many centuries. But this view does not necessarily provide the best foundation for 
constructing a framework of Islamic values. The problem is that the debate about the 
ontological status of values, which was eventually won as far as Islam was concerned 
by the ethical voluntarists, was conducted in terms drawn not from the Qu: ean but from 
Greek philosophy. In the Qur'an itself, reason and revelation are never set in 
opposition, for'reason' (aqo is understood in the more limited sense of the use of the 
intellect rather than in the sense used by later Islamic thinkers of reasoning that proceeds 
without any help from revelation. Thus, according to the Quran, it is reason (aql) 
which enables people to interpret God's signs (ayat), and the Quran urges people to 
make the fullest use of their intellect (aqo which is given them by God, to understand 
his will and to follow his guidance. On a Qur'anic view, the only alternative to 
following this path is to follow one's untutored passions. 
The Islamic framework of values is grounded ultimately not on what God 
commands, but on what he is. Islamic tradition states that there are ninety-nine names 
of God, each expressing some quality, such as the Merciful, the Oft-Forgiving, the 
Trustworthy, the Just, the Righteous (Stade, 1970; Doi, 1981, p 20). According to 
Ashraf (1987, p 15), the divine names 
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are the archetypes of all values manifested in contingent circwnstances to be 
realised through action in the hwnan world. 
In other words, God's names enshrine in a perfect form certain universal 
unchanging norms which are capable of being known and realised even in this 
imperfect world, and these therefore provide the basis for an Islamic value system. As 
Rahman (1982, p 14) puts it, 
God is the transcendent anchoring point of attributes such as life, creativity, 
power, mercy and justice (including retribution) and of moral values to 
which a human society must be subject if it is to survive and prosper -a 
ceaseless strugglefor the cause of the good. This constant struggle is the 
keynote of man's normative existence and constitutes the service ('ibada) to 
God with which the Quran squarely and inexorably charges him. 
In al-Ghazalf s view, the purpose of individual existence from a human point of 
view is the attainment of happiness, and happiness is to be found overwhelmingly in 
the next life (cf Hourani, 1985, p 147). There are two means to this end: first, 
obedience to the rules of conduct set out in revealed scripture (which implies belief in 
them), and secondly, the cultivation of the virtues of the soul. AI-Ghazali maintains that 
while external acts of obedience are important, the cultivation of the virtues is valued 
more highly in Gcd! s eyes because the virtues are a reflection of God! s own names and 
attributes. The principal virtues taught in the Quean are honesty, trustfulness, justice, 
perseverance, piety, benevolence, gratitude, tolerance, f: irmness of purpose, wisdom, 
courage, kindness, trustworthiness, chastity, generosity, hard work, charity, 
temperance and forgiveness (Sarwar, 1980, p 191ff). A detailed interpretation and 




According to the Quran, human beings are God's chef doeuvre (Sura 15, verse 
29; Sura 38, verse 72), because they alone are able to understand and take on board, of 
their own free will, the divine attributes. For this reason, God has given them a position 
of stewardship in the world and to them falls the responsibility of sustaining 
themselves and the rest of creation in accordance with the divine attributes. He has 
equipped them with everything they need for this task, including the capacity to 
perceive, to reason, to learn, to understand, to remember, to communicate and to act; 
guidance in the form of revelation; and the predisposition to love the good and to 
recognise Gods commands as universal and unchanging norms. Though prone at times 
to make mistakes of judgment, to act selfishly or to commit acts of aggression or 
injustice, human beings are not, on an Islamic view, tainted by original sin (cf Al- 
Faruqi, 1982, p 154f); on the contrary, the moral struggle that Muslims are charged to 
sustain against such failings is not blighted by any sense that the task is an impossible 
one without direct divine intervention. Nor is the Muslim discouraged from enjoying 
this present life to some legitimate extent. As Gods deputy (khalifa), he is free to use 
his God-given faculties to the utmost, whether in the pursuit of knowledge, the 
harnessing of the created world to his own purposes, the enjoyment of possessions and 
pleasures in this world, or in individual creativity of any kind. Ile only restriction is 
that all of these activities should be carried out in accordance with Islamic principles and 
laws. Excessive indulgence in material pleasures would be likely to make people 
unmindful of their creator, and the pursuit of profit in a way which does not respect the 
right of every creature to draw sustenance from the earth would be likely to diminish 
people's chances of fulfilling their role as Gods deputy. To act in accordance with 
Islamic principles, and faithfully to carry out the stewardship to which one has been 
assigned is in fact the true nature of worship (ibada) in Islam. 
Worship, the Quran tells us, is the sole purpose behind the creation of mankind 
(Sura 51, verse 56). But worship is not to be conceived narrowly in terms merely of 
observing the five pillars of Islam: making the declaration of faith (shahada), ritual 
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prayer (salat), wealth sharing (zakah), fasting (sawm), and pilgrimage (hajj). As Qutb 
(1982, p 27) points out, God 
has made all the natural activities of the body, mind and soul, if devoted and 
committed to God, forms of true worship. 
Thus tilling the earth, begetting and bringing up children, eating and drinking, 
searching for knowledge and truth, striving to establish social, political and economic 
justice, making culture and civilisation, are all forms of worship. Unlike other 
religions, Islam sees ethical value not as indifferent or opposed to the processes of life 
on earth, but as their very affirmation and promotion under the divinely appointed moral 
law (cf I Al-Faruqi, 1982, p 156). Perhaps the greatest act of worship is the continuous 
struggle to make operational the moral values which constitute the divine will. 
In brief, to worship is to accept God! s will as supreme. God's will is embedded 
in the structure of the whole of creation, including man! s physical nature, which is 
evidenced by the necessary constraints or laws of nature which exist in the created 
world. Man's moral nature, however, is not subject to the same kind of constraint. He 
is free to obey or disobey the divine commandments which are the embodiment of 
God! s will, to accept or reject its norms and values. To accept God's will as supreme is 
consciously to submit oneself to the highest reality one is capable of apprehending; as 
already noted, the primary meaning of Islam is 'submission'. It is to live with a vision 
of God! s constant involvement in the world. It is to bind oneself to live in harmony 
with God's creative purposes. 
It has already been stated that in Islam the divine will is embodied in concrete 
form in the sharia (revealed law), which governs every aspect of the Muslirn! s 
relationship with God and with his fellow-men. It guides him equally in legal matters 
(such as the conduct of divorce), moral matters (such as the commendation of 
hospitality) and religious matters (such as the obligation to fast, pray, give alms and 
perform the pilgrimage to Mecca). The sharia is a systematic codification of laws based 
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on the Qu: ean and the traditions of the Prophet (sunna), especially his sayings (hadith) 
though these two sources have been supplemented by the use of analogy (qiyas) and 
consensus Qjma) to take account of contingencies not covered directly by revelation or 
prophetic tradition. The formulation and interpretation of the sharid has always been 
the task of the professional Islamic scholars ('ulamaý, whose authority has been 
accepted by the community (umma) because of their wisdom, reliAus insight, 
intellectual expertise and knowledge of the Quran and the Prophet. The sharid is the 
'core and kernel of Islarn' (Schacht, 1974, p 392) and is viewed by Muslims as 'a 
transcendent reality which is eternal and immutable' (Nasr, 198 1, p 24). It is the way 
by which God! s justice and other goals are realised. It provides divine guidance for 
men's actions, and is the model by which their actions, individually and collectively, 
are judged. Obedience to the sharl'a constitutes the basis of true religion in Islam, and 
guarantees believers their reward on the day of judgment. But 'obedience' (which 
implies a degree of compulsion or bondage) is only the first stage in a person's 
response to the law. As Brohi (1982b, p 232f) points out, the Muslim may reach the 
stage where 
what at one time compelled obedience on his part is progressively replaced 
by his love and longing to do the deed in conformity with the law. 
When the individual enters the path of spiritual growth (tariqa), however, he does not 
turn his back on the sharila, but simply develops a new attitude towards it. The sharid 
literally means the broad highway; it provides the direction in which the whole 
community of believers (umma) should walk, and indeed is what binds them together 
into a community in the first place. 
Religion, as O'Hear (1984, p 4f) reminds us, is never a purely individual affair. 
The religious community offers its members a sense of belonging, guidance, support, 
direction and purpose and helps them to see themselves as playing a part in an overall 
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scheme of affairs. The community can elicit strong feelings of loyalty from its 
members, and on MacIntyre's (1981) view can help to ground moral values in a 
coherently structured and socially oriented narrative or quest. This sense of community 
is rarely found in a stronger form than in Islam. Social integration is considered 
important at all levels, from the family, the mosque and the local community to the 
worldwide community of believers (umma) who are bound together, irrespective of 
race, in a genuine sense of brotherhood. In the Islamic community, every member is 
equal, except in the piety and righteousness of his actions, and no-one has immunity 
from the operation of the law. Montgomery Watt (1979) comments that 
the basis of this integration of communal life and the sense of brotherhood is 
the deeply rooted belief of Muslims that their community or umma is a 
charismatic one, in virtue of its being divinely founded and having a 
divinely given law - or in more modern terms, in virtue of its being a bearer 
of values. 
Social morality is central to Islam, and the community plays a vital part in the 
realisation of the divine will. Within the Islamic community, relations between 
individuals are highly important, and are based on the principles of mutual protection 
and support. It is recognised that coercion cannot be used in moral matters, since for 
action to be moral it must result from the free and deliberate exercise of the subjeces 
faculties of decision; thus all that the Muslim can do for his fellow citizen is to educate, 
convince and persuade. This consideration, says I Al-Faruqi (1982, p 167) 
makes of the Islamic state a college on a very grand scale, a college for 




On an Islamic view, the goal of social existence is exactly the same as the goal of 
individual existence: the realisation on earth of divinely ordained moral imperatives. 
This is why, as al-Faruqi (ibid., p 165) points out, 'Islam does not countenance any 
separation of religion and state. The state is viewed as 'society's political arm! , which 
is subject to the same moral imperatives as the individual or the group. Between the 
state and the citizen, as between any social institutions and the individual, there is only a 
division of labour, a distinction as to function. All are bound by the same goal, just as 
all are subject to the same divine law. Thus Islam is just as relevant to economic, 
political, social and international affairs as it is to the individual conscience. 
**** 
It has become clear that there are many points of contact between Islamic and 
liberal values. Several of the ethical values which are essential to a liberal world view, 
such as truth-telling and promise-keeping (cf Raphael, 198 1, p 44), also feature on any 
Islamic list of basic virtues and qualities (e. g. Sarwar, 1980, pp 191ff). In the social 
and political domain, Islam, just as much as liberalism, has stood for freedom of 
religion and conscience (Brohi, 1982b, p 248), the toleration of minorities (Khadduri, 
1984, p 144), racial integration and harmony (Montgomery Watt, 1979, p 233) and 
equality before the law, irrespective of race, colour or class (Khadduri, 1984, p 237). 
For Muslims, the reason for the large degree of overlap between the two value systems 
is that liberal values are derived from religious ones, and all religious values originate 
ultimately from the same divine source, through revelation. For liberals, the reason for 
the overlap is simply that the values held in common are rationally justifiable, and that it 
would be impossible to have a rational system which ignored them. 
The more fundamental the values are, however, the wider appears to be the 
divergence between the two frameworks. For example, when Khomeini (1981) says 
that 'Islam is committed to truth and justice', it is clear that his conceptualisation of 
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these two values is widely divergent from any liberal's; 'truth' to him is the truth of the 
revelation, and 'justice! is conceived along the lines of ShafiTs stark definition 
Justice is that one should act in obedience to God. 
(quoted in Hourani, 1985, p 33) 
Of course, Khomeini represents one extreme of Islamic thinking, and Khadduri 
(1984) has shown just how much debate there has been within Islam on the political, 
theological, philosophical, ethical, legal and social aspects of justice. Nevertheless, 
Khomeinfs call to Islamic scholars to unite against secular, tyrannical, unjust and 
materialistic Westernised rulers in the name of truth and justice, has been viewed with 
considerable sympathy both in Iran and beyond. 
The divergence between Islamic and liberal values may perhaps be described most 
clearly by providing an Islamic response to the three fundamental liberal values that 
were discussed in Chapter Four. It is now therefore proposed to examine rather more 
closely the Islamic view of individual freedom, equal rights and objective rationality. 
The notion of individual freedom has never been a dominant one in Islam, and 
indeed Muslims have always been strongly aware of the existence of constraints upon 
human action. In the Quran and early Muslim thinkers, the term'freedore is primarily 
used to distinguish between the slave and the free man (Rosenthal, 1960). Within 
Muslim philosophy, the term refers to the human capacity to create one's own actions 
and to exercise free choice (ikhtiyar) -a concept which appears to be in conflict with the 
Islamic doctrine that all human actions are created by God. Insofar as people are totally 
dependent on God's will in every aspect of their lives, there is little room left for 
individual freedom in human affairs. This latter stance raises its own theological 
problems, however, for God! s justice would be in doubt if he rewarded and punished 
people for actions for which they were not themselves genuinely responsible. Al- 
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Ash'ari proposes as a solution to this problem that God creates a person! s actions but 
the person then 'appropriates' (kasaba) them; the actions can therefore be called his, 
and he can bear the responsibility for them. Contemporary Islamic scholars generally 
argue that a person! s responsibility for his actions is based on his freedom to choose 
(Ashraf, 1987, p 5) and that actions can only be considered moral when they result 
from the individual's free exercise of his capacity to make decisions (I Al-Faruqi, 1982, 
p 152; cf Quran, Sura 2, verse 256). But in liberal eyes, the Islamic concept of free 
will is a very unsophisticated one, involving little more than the choice to accept or 
reject the guidance contained in the revealed law. In Islam, there is no place for the 
liberal vision of the autonomous individual working out for himself his own religious 
faith and his own moral standpoint, for this would be in conflict with his status as slave 
('abd) with regard to God. Nasr makes it clear that 
there is no freedom possible through flightfirom and rebellion against the 
Principle which is the ontological source of human existence and which 
determines ourselves from on high. To rebel against our own ontological 
Principle in the name offireedom is to become enslaved to an ever greater 
degree in the world of multiplicity and limitation. 
(1981, p 17) 
The Western concept of freedom is thus dismissed by many Muslim scholars as 
aimlessness and license (Ali, 1984, p 53). True freedom can only be attained by those 
who live in accordance with the divine law, which imposes limitations on human 
freedom in one sense, but which makes possible a greater inner freedom, the liberation 
of the soul from its own tendency to go astray. Islamic mystics (suf1s) have frequently 
stressed the importance of freedom in this sense, as the complete detachment of the 
human soul from everything except God. This emphasis on the spiritual dimension of 
freedom is perhaps not incompatible with Hourani's call (1985, p 276) for greater 
social freedom in the Muslim world. In the past, some Muslim rulers may well have 
165 
Chapter Seven 
been unduly authoritarian under the guise that their acts were the expression of the 
divine will. 
The second fundamental liberal value, that of the equal right of all to individual 
freedom, is equally problematic on an Islamic perspective. Equality is certainly a basic 
concept in Islam, but it derives from God! s unwillingness to reckon any human being 
superior to others except on the grounds of piety (Quran, Sura 49, verse 13), not from 
specific rights which are a part of our humanity. From an Islamic perspective, as Brohi 
(1982b, p 233f) points out, human beings have no rights in relation to God, and their 
rights in relation to their fellow men are derived from their primary duty to God. 
Specific obligations towards God, other human beings and Nature are delineated in the 
shari'd, and human rights result from the fulfiment of these obligations, not vice versa. 
Since the sharid is the expression of God's will, and all human beings are equal in 
God! s eyes (except in terms of piety), it follows that there should be absolute equality 
in the eyes of the law, and that no-one should have immunity from the operation of the 
law for social or political reasons. Such equality in God! s eyes, however, does not 
preclude the possibility that different human beings may have different roles and 
functions in society in accordance with their divinely ordained nature and potential - 
hence the distinct lack of sympathy among many Muslims for movements concerned to 
equalise the role of the sexes in society (Nasr, 198 1, p 212f). 
Much has already been said in the present chapter about the Islamic view of the 
third fundamental liberal value, that of consistent rationality (however this is conceived: 
see Chapter Four). It has been shown that in Islam rationality cannot take precedence 
over revealed religion as a foundation of other values. This may be what is behind Karl 
Barth' s statement that'belief cannot argue with unbelief: it can only preach at ie, which 
Flew (1966, p 9) claims not to understand. For if believers were able to enter into 
rational debate about their beliefs with outsiders, this would make rationality a more 
fundamental value than anything within the domain of belief itself. As we have seen, al- 
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Ghazali does in fact concede that rationality is needed to establish the credentials of 
revelation as the primary source of all other values, though I have suggested elsewhere 
(Halstead, 1986, p 58) that what establishes the revelation as true in the minds of 
believers is more likely to be some form of spiritual experience or basic intuition. 
Within the framework provided by revelation, however, rationality ('aql) assumes a 
very high level of importance in Islam. Repeatedly, the Quran addresses itself to the 
understanding of its audience (e. g. Sum 3, verse 65; Sura 12, verse 2) and in numerous 
places it urges them to consider, reflect and understand through the use of their reason. 
Reason is used not only for interpreting the Q&an and traditions (sunna), determining 
the consensus of the community Qjma) and drawing conclusions by the method of 
analogy (qiyas), but also for independent judgment and striving after the truth Qjdhad). 
Ijtihad, however, is not intended to elevate the individual judgment over that of the 
group, any more than it raises independent reason over revelation; independent thought 
and creativity are encouraged only among those whose religious knowledge and 
understanding are well established, and in any case they are to be balanced by 
consultation and dialogue (shura) until consensus can be achieved among the whole 
community (umma). The use of God-given rational faculties in the pursuit of 
knowledge and truth is indeed viewed as a form of worship in Islam, so long as it is 
undertaken within the boundaries defined by revelation. On these terms, the antithesis 
between reason and revelation disappears; what reason discovers cannot be thought of 
as unrevealed, since it can only be discovered with God! s help, while the contents of 
revelation can only be recognised and understood through reason. 
Islamic values are grounded firmly on religion, which provides a comprehensive 
framework for human life. Their religion gives Muslims a profound sense of purpose 
and direction, and no aspect of their life is untouched. Islam makes no distinction 
between 'the good of this world and that of the world hereaftee(Khan, 1981, p 1) or 
between the sacred and the profane and the man who works to support his family and 
the scientist who pushes back the frontiers of knowledge may both be considered to be 
167 
Chapter Seven 
engaged in acts of worship as important as prayer itself (al-Attas, 1979, p vi; Nasr, 
1966, p 98). Indeed all branches of knowledge may be considered Islamic if they are 
pursued in accordance with Islamic principles. Within Islamic countries, culture is 
shaped largely by religion, beside which any ethnic differences seem of very minor 
significance, and religion ties the whole community of believers together with strong 
bonds of loyalty and helps to increase its stability and continuity (though al-Ghazali 
warns leaders against supporting religious and moral principles not for their divine 
nature but for their utility in maintaining union in the family and stability in the 
community: cf Khadduri, 1984, p 92f). The fact that Islam is a long-established 
religion means that its values have significant historical roots and its followers have a 
sense of belonging to something vaster and more permanent than themselves, though 
Nasr (1981, p 32) acknowledges the need for 'translating truths of Islam into a 
contemporary language without betraying them!. 
All this has a profound relevance to the education of Muslim children, for 
Muslims not surprisingly want their education to be shaped in the light of their own 
religious faith and experience. We are now in a position to look more closely at what 
view of education emerges from the Islamic framework of values which has been 
considered here, and the Islamic view of education thus forms the topic of Chapter 
Eight. 
It has not been my intention in the present chapter to enter into any kind of debate 
about the truth or falsehood of the Islamic belief in the existence of God and in the 
Qu: ean as the climax of all divine self-revelation, the fulfilment which partly completes 
and partly corrects the messages of earlier prophets. * My concern has been simply to 
examine the Islamic position and to compare it to the dominant liberal perspective in this 
country as a first step to establishing whether any form of educational provision is 
possible which does not conflict with the deep-seated convictions of Muslims who are 
commited to the framework of values outlined in this chapter. 
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AN ISLAMIC VIEW OF EDUCATION 
Islam has a long-standing tradition of education, and of respect for education. 
Evidence for this is seen in the frequent injunctions found in the Quran and the hadith 
to pursue knowledge (e. g. Quean 20: 114) and in the stress laid on wisdom and 
guidance rather than the blind acceptance of tradition (Quran 2: 170; 17: 36,6: 148). 
From the start, education in Islam was religious in nature and its unequivocal goal was 
to produce true believers. The earliest Muslim schools undoubtedly played an 
important part in the socialisation of the diverse ethnic groups conquered during the 
period of Muslim expansion, into the faith of Islam and its way of life. It also seems 
likely that the discouragement of independent thinking as liable to undermine orthodoxy 
or obedience to divine injunctions stems from this period. The responsibility for 
education lay with the 'ulama' (the 'learned'), and in the early centuries of Islam both 
the katatib (primary schools) and the madaris (schools for higher studies) were almost 
invariably attached to mosques. Even at the highest level, there was little attempt to 
extend the teaching beyond the Quran and the hadith, Arabic language and literature, 
and Islamic law, theology and philosophy. During the Middle Ages, education in 
Muslim countries gradually began to stagnate, partly because of the rigidity with which 
the subject matter was defined (cf Gibb, 1969, p 98-9) and partly because of a sterile 
pedagogy which put much emphasis on memorisation, made extensive use of physical 
punishment and required studies to be carried out in Arabic, a language which an 
increasing number of Muslims found hard to understand. The stagnation made it easier 
at the time of Western imperialist expansion for Western systems of education to be 
introduced into Muslim countries. Gauhar (1982) argues that such education 
intentionally or otherwise perpetuated Western domination and that the effects of this 
are still in evidence today. The countries were administered in accordance with Western 
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laws and values, and there was little chance for anyone who had not been educated in a 
Western language and in Western culture to gain any position of power in legal, 
political, commercial or professional institutions. Traditional Muslim education existed 
side by side, of course, with Western education in Muslim countries, but in the main it 
served only the poor and those without power. Tbus at the beginning of the twentieth 
century, Muslim countries typically had a powerful, Western-educated elite with a deep 
seated interest in retaining Western cultural traditions and institutions, and a massive 
majority whose education, though Muslim, was minimal in comparison, and served to 
reinforce their lower social and economic status. Muslim education seemed both 
unwilling and unable to respond to the rapid expansion of knowledge, particularly 
scientific and technological, that was taking place in the West and it came to be depicted 
in Western and Westem-educated circles as backward and obscurantist. A dictionary of 
Islam published in 1935 provides a common view of Muslim education at the time: 
the chief aim and object of education in Islam is to obtain a knowledge of the 
religion of Muhammad and anything beyond this is considered superfluous, 
and even dangerous. 
(Hughes, 1935) 
In the post-colonial period, no uniform pattern of education has emerged in 
Muslim countries. Some have retained and extended a Westernised system, others have 
attempted to bolster the status of a Muslim system so that it can exist side by side with, 
and as a viable alternative to, the Westernised system, yet others have attempted to 
Islamicise the system completely, but remain significantly dependent on Western 
expertise and Western ideas particularly in the areas of science and technology. Muslim 
immigrants to the West have generally welcomed the social and economic advantages 
achieved or anticipated through the education provided by their new home countries, yet 
have sought to supplement this with more specific religious and moral instruction at 
mosque schools outside normal school hours. Such supplementary schools, however, 
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are modelled on the traditional kuttab and madrasa with all their attendant faults (rote- 
learning, corporal punishment, unqualified teachers and so on); and the extra demands 
made on pupils' time, together with the lack of co-ordination between the maintained 
schools and the mosque schools in approach and methods have led to very widespread 
dissatisfaction with this combined system among Muslim parents. 
No system has so far emerged which seems totally satisfactory from a Muslim 
point of view. A modified Western system of education is likely to leave Muslim 
children exposed to an underlying set of secular values and assumptions which are alien 
to the spirit of Islam. Muslim schools of the old style, on the other hand, seem unable 
to prepare children adequately for the needs of the modem world or to help them to take 
advantage of modem scientific, technological and economic progress. Yet a combined 
system such as that currently operating for many Muslim children in the U. K., whereby 
they attend state schools in the daytime and supplementary schools at evenings and 
weekends, draws attention to a gulf between religious and non-religious learning which 
is in direct conflict with the Islamic doctrine of tawhid (unity), according to which all 
aspects of life should be integrated and contribute to a harmonious whole. What is now 
being sought by an increasing number of Muslim parents, intellectuals and leaders is a 
single, unified system of education which is based on Islamic principles yet which pays 
attention to the recent expansion of knowledge, the reality of socio-economic change 
and the multi-faceted needs of the individual in contemporary society. This aim lay 
behind the convening of the First World Conference on Muslim Education in Mecca in 
1977: to develop a genuinely Islamic system of education appropriate for students in 
the modem world at all levels (al-Attas, 1979; Husain and Ashraf, 1979). In 1980, a 
Universal Islamic Declaration was drawn up under the auspices of the Islamic Council 
of Europe, which had this to say about education: 
Education is an important corner-stone of the Islamic system. Pursuit of 
knowledge is obligatory for all Muslims, including knowledge of skills, 
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crafts and vocations. Some of the basic principles of Islamic educational 
policy are: 
(a) There shall be universal basic education for all men and women in 
society, and adequate national resources shall be made available for this 
purpose. 
(b) The purpose of education shall be to produce people who are imbued 
with Islamic learning and character and are capable of meeting all the 
economic, social, political, technological, physical, intellectual and aesthetic 
needs of society. 
(c) The two parallel streams of secular and religious education prevailing 
today in the Muslim World should be fused together so as to provide an 
Islamic vision for those engaged in education, and to enable them to 
reconstruct human thought, in all itsforms, on thefoundations of Islam. 
(Azzam, 1982, p 262-3) 
Islamic scholars and educationalists are currently working on the Islamisation of 
education in line with these principles in a number of countries, including Nigeria (cf S 
A Lemu, 1987; BA Lemu, 1988; Yusuf, 1989), Malaysia (cf Sidin, 1987; Sanusi, 
1989), Pakistan (cf Saad, 1987) and Bangladesh (cf Nagi, 1987), as well as in the UX 
(Ashraf, 1989a). The term 'Islamisation (or Islamification) of education, although in 
common usage among Islamic scholars, is somewhat misleading because it implies that 
the process starts with some concept of education, which is then shifted or adapted in 
some way to make it compatible with Islam. In fact, the reverse procedure is being 
adopted, the fundamental beliefs and values of Islam provide a fi-amework within which 
a genuinely Islamic approach to education can be worked out. 
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In the next section of the present Chapter I shall attempt to sketch an Islamic view 
of education in line with this process, based on four sources: first, the recent and 
substantial work carried out in the wake of the First World Conference on Muslim 
Education by Islamic scholars throughout the world; secondly, the practical experiments 
in the Islamisation of education carried out in a number of Muslim countries; thirdly, the 
traditional Muslim education provided over the centuries in the katatib and the nodaris; 
and finally, and most significantly, the Islamic framework of values set out in the 
previous chapter. From these sources it is hoped that there will emerge a consistent yet 
distinctively Islamic perspective on educational aims, teaching methods, the context of 
schooling and the curriculum. 'Me Chapter will conclude with a brief liberal critique of 
the Islamic view of education that has been presented, and a Muslim response to that 
critique. 
**** 
The three Arabic words for'education' emphasise three different dimensions in 
the educational process and thus provide a useful starting point for an analysis of the 
aims of education on an Islamic view. Tarbiya comes from the root raba (to grow, 
increase) and it refers to the goal-oriented process of rearing or bringing a child up to a 
state of completeness or maturity. Tadib comes from the root aduba (to be refined, 
disciplined, cultured) and refers to the process of learning a sound basis for social 
behaviour within the community and society at large. It includes coming to understand 
and accept the most fundamental social principles such as justice (cf al-Attas, 1979, pp 
2-4). The third term, ta'lim, comes from the root 'alima (to know, be informed, 
perceive, discern) and refers to the imparting and receiving of knowledge, usually 
through training, instruction or other form of teaching. To analyse education in terms 
of (i) aiding individual development, (ii) increasing understanding of the society of 
which the individual is part, and its laws and values and (iii) transmitting knowledge, is 
by no means exclusive to Islamic thinking. What creates a distinctively Islamic view of 
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education is the application to these three dimensions of the principle that no aspect of a 
MuslinYs life can remain untouched by religion. Thus whereas the liberal educationalist 
will discuss individual development in terms of the development of personal and moral 
autonomy, in Islam it will be discussed in terms of the balanced growth of all sides of 
the individual's personality, including the spiritual and moral, leading to a higher level 
of religious understanding and commitment in all areas of life. The liberal 
educationalist will see the most justifiable form of society as an open, pluralist, 
democratic one, whereas in Islam the best society is one organised in accordance with 
divine law. The liberal will argue that no one set of religious beliefs can be shown to be 
objectively true, and that critical openness and free debate provide the most rational 
means for advancing the pursuit of faith. Islamic educationalists, on the other hand, 
though they as much as liberals claim to be engaged in the quest for truth in all things 
(which they see as an act of worship in itself: cf I Al-Faruqi, 1982 p 152), do not 
accept that there can be any discrepancy between revealed (mukashlfa) or transmitted 
(naqh) knowledge and intellectual (aqli) or attained (husuh) knowledge, and therefore 
see a place for both equally in any kind of educational provision. On an Islamic view, 
education cannot ignore 
the whole content of reality, both material and spiritual, which plays a 
dominant role in determining the nature and destiny of non and society. 
(Husain and Ashraf, 1979, p ix) 
'Mese three dimensions provide the three basic objectives of Islamic education. 
Khan (1987) summarises them as follows : the 'intellectual, moral and spiritual 
development of man'; the'Muslim. requirements of a good life in the service of Allah'; 




First, individual development. A fundamental aim of Islamic education is to 
provide children with positive guidance which will help them to grow into good adults 
who will lead happy and fruitful lives in this world and aspire to achieve the reward of 
the faithful in the world to come. What precisely is meant by good adults has been 
spelled out already in Chapter Seven, where the Islamic concept of the human being is 
considered. Briefly, the goodness of human beings on an Islamic view lies in their 
willingness to recognise their position of divine stewardship (Khalifat-allah) and accept 
the obligations which this position entails; to seek to take on the divine attributes such 
as hikma (wisdom) and 'adl Oustice) which have been clarified through divine 
revelation; to strive for the balanced growth of the integrated personality, made up of 
the heart, the spirit, the intellect, the feelings and the bodily senses; to develop their 
potential to become insan kamil (the perfect human being); and to allow the whole of 
their lives to be governed by Islamic principles, so that whatever they do, however 
mundane, becomes an act of worship. The purpose of education is to guide children 
towards these goals. People do not achieve their potential automatically, for by nature 
they are forgetful and open to the influence of injustice and ignorance; it is through 
education that they develop the wisdom (hikrna) and faith (iman) which help them to 
take pleasure in doing good and never to lose sight of their relationship with God. This 
view of individual development has profound consequences for what is to be taught in 
schools and how it is to be taught, as will shortly become clear. 
Secondly, education, like religion, can never be a purely individual affair, this is 
because individual development cannot take place without regard for the social 
environment in which it occurs, but more profoundly because education, in that it 
serves many individuals, is a means for making society what it is. Education may thus 
be a vehicle for preserving, extending and transmitting a community's or society's 
cultural heritage and traditional values, but can also be a tool for social change and 
innovation. The strong sense of community in Islam, from the local level of the 
extended family and the mosque to the worldwide community of believers (wnma), has 
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already been emphasised in Chapter Seven. What binds the community together is the 
sense of equality in the eyes of the sharia (divine law) and it is acceptance of the sharl'a 
that makes a person a Muslim. In Islam, social existence has exactly the same goal as 
individual existence: the realisation on earth of divinely ordained moral imperatives. 
Indeed, the spiritual growth of the individual (tariqa) can take place only within the 
shari'a. Both sharid and tariqa are metaphors, the former carrying the literal meaning 
of a broad highway, the latter a narrow path. The Muslim community walk together 
along the broad highway of the divine law, which sets out Gcds will for people in both 
their private and their social life and helps them to live harmonious lives in this world 
and prepare themselves for the life to come. The social dimension of education in Islam 
is therefore eventually a matter of coming to understand and learning to follow the 
divine law, which contains not only universal moral principles (such as equality among 
people, justice and charity), but also detailed instructions relating to every aspect of 
human life. The sharia integrates political, social and economic life as well as 
individual life into a single religious world view. In Islam therefore there is no question 
of individuals being encouraged through education to work out for themselves their 
own religious faith, or to subject it to detached rational investigation at a fundamental 
level; the divine revelation contained in the sharl'a provides them with the requisite 
knowledge of truth and falsehood, right and wrong, and the task of individuals is to 
come to understand this knowledge and exercise their free will to choose which path to 
follow. The notion of free will in Islam, as we saw in Chapter Seven, is a very 
unsophisticated one, involving simply the choice to accept or reject the complete 
package of beliefs, and contracts sharply with the liberal notion of personal autonomy. 
The Islamic ideal, according to which there is no separation of religion and state, 
can of course only be a reality in a Muslim country. Where Muslims are in the 
minority, as in the U. K., their consciousness of being a community bound together by 
a shared faith 
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is coupled in the large majority of cases with an equally strong desire to be 
truly British, full members of the wider community, enjoying equal rights 
and sharing similar responsibilities as all other citizens. 
(Islamic Academy, 1987) 
The social dimension of education for British Muslims would therefore seem 
necessarily to involve an understanding of the principles and values which lie behind 
the notion of British citizenship. However, if Muslim children are to learn the values 
on which British citizenship is based in total isolation from the religious values which 
underpin their membership of the worldwide Islamic community, then a fragmentation 
begins to enter into the educational process which is totally alien to the fundamental 
Islamic principle of tawhid (unity). A liberal approach involving a commitment to free 
critical debate and the presentation of religious values from an open, detached 
perspective would achieve the necessary integration, but at the cost of displacing 
religion from its pivotal position in every dimension of life, including education. 'Me 
only approach to social education which would appear to be compatible with Islamic 
principles is to put the religious values at the heart of the educational process for 
Muslim children, but then to build into the process whatever else they need in order to 
learn to live as full British citizens. As al-Attas (1979, p 32) points out, it is more 
fundamental in Islarn to produce a good man than a good citizen, for the good man will 
also no doubt be a good citizen, but the good citizen will not necessarily also be a good 
man. The consequences of such an approach for the curriculum and the context of 
schooling will be discussed shortly. 
The third dimension of education involves the transmission of knowledge, and 
particularly the selection of what knowledge is to be transmitted. Much work remains 
to be done on Islamic epistemology, though the Islamic theologian al-Ghazali, the social 
theorist Ibn Khaldun and the various Muslim philosophers have all made significant 
contributions. As far as the nature of knowledge goes, one point on which all are 
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united is that knowledge cannot be divided into two classes, one secular and the other 
religious. All knowledge comes from God, and serves ultimately to make people aware 
of God and of their relationship with God. In his Kitab al-71m, the ninth-century 
mystic Al-Muhasibi classifies knowledge into three types: 
first, knowledge of what is lawful and unlawful, which is knowledge of 
what concerns this world and is outward knowledge; second, knowledge of 
what concerns the next world, which is inward knowledge; third, 
knowledge of God and His laws concerning His creatures in the two 
worlds, and this is a fathomless sea, and only the most learned of the 
faithfid attain to it. 
(Smith, 1935, p 57) 
More normally in Islam, however, knowledge is categorised not according to its 
scope but according to its derivation. The First World Conference on Muslim 
Education based its classification of knowledge on the distinction between that which is 
derived from divine revelation and that which is derived frorn'the human intellect and 
its tools which are in constant interaction with the physical universe on the levels of 
observation, contemplation, experimentation and application' (al-Attas, 1979, pp vii, 
159). Ibn Khaldun (1958) subdivides the latter category into knowledge which is 
based on sense experience and knowledge which is based on logic and rational 
thinking. In Islam, the knowledge which is derived from divine revelation is the 
highest knowledge, not only because it relates most directly to God himself and his 
attributes, but also because it provides an essential foundation for all other knowledge. 
As was pointed out in Chapter Seven, people are free to do as they please so long as 
they remain loyal to the divine injunctions contained in the Qu'ran and the sharid. 
Indeed, any pursuit of knowledge may be viewed as a form of worship in Islam so long 
as it is undertaken within the boundaries defined by revelation. The educational 
consequences of this are clear. whatever other knowledge is to be transmitted through 
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education, the knowledge which is derived fi-om divine revelation is obligatory. Ashraf 
(1988b, pp 13-17) provides a rather more sophisticated hierarchical ranking of 
knowledge, involving a five-fold categorisation based on the derivation, nature and 
value of knowledge: 
(i) spiritual knowledge, i. e. knowledge of God and his attributes; 
(ii) moral knowledge, based on universal values linked to divine attributes; 
(iii) intellectual knowledge, i. e. that acquired through the application of reason and 
logic; 
(iv) knowledge which is derived from and helps to discipline the imagination; 
(v) knowledge that grows from and helps to discipline sense-experience. 
Since (i) and (ii) are the most important, they have to be'instilled into a child from 
the earliest stages' (Ashraf, 1985, p 5), though the understanding of spiritual 
knowledge is likely to be achieved last, after an adequate training of the bodily sense, 
the imagination and the rational powers: 
Intellectual discipline will help a child to proceedfrom the concrete to the 
abstract, from sense impression to ideation, and from matter-of-fact 
relationship to symbolisation. It is only when these abilities start growing 
that a child begins to appreciate the inter-relationship of disciplines and 
realises what he is emotionally conditioned to believe, that is, the presence 
of the Will of God in Nature and Man and how the entire creation is 
ayatullah, signs of God, manifestation of divine power, symbols of reality. 
(ibid., pp 5-6) 
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The imparting of knowledge is not an educational goal in itself in Islam, but 
merely a means to an end, as al-Ghazali points out (n. d., Vol L pp 83-9). The pursuit 
of knowledge is worthwhile only if it stimulates the moral and spiritual consciousness 
of the student and leads to 'iman (faith) and 'amal-i salih (virtuous action), which are 
constantly emphasised in the Qu: ean (e. g. Sura 103, v 3). 71m (knowledge), 'iman 
(faith) and 'amal (action) go hand in hand, and together they generate yaqin (certainty). 
Certainty may sometimes be obtained through an acceptance of what the 'ulama'(the 
learned) teach about the Quran and the PropheL Islam therefore encourages an attitude 
of respectful humility towards such legitimate authority, and trust in the truth of the 
knowledge which it hands down. What ties all knowledge together into a unity, 
however, is the concept of yaqin (certainty); the Qdan says 'And serve your Lord until 
certainty comes to you'. (Sum 15, v 99). Certainty is the conviction of al-Haqq (the 
truth), one of the names of God himself. 
The Islamic conception of knowledge is thus at variance with the Western 
conception in two key points: first, it includes matters of faith. and belief as if they were 
unproblematic; and secondly, it is not seen as valuable in itself or for, say, liberation, 
but is valuable only in so far as it serves to inculcate goodness in the individual and in 
the whole community. The implications for education are that the cultivation of faith is 
an essential part of education and that there is no justification for setting children free 
from their spiritual or moral moorings or creating doubt in their minds about revealed 
knowledge (Ashraf, 1988c, p 1). Ibis does not mean, as Badawi (1979, p 117) points 
out, that religion should be used 




He argues that so long as society is religious and so long as science does not 
impinge on the province of religion, students must be allowed to specialise and students 
of medicine or engineering or geography cannot be expected to devote as much time to 
religious issues as students working in Islamic studies. However, religious education 
needs to be harmonised with all other disciplines, so that the Islamic principle that the 
pursuit of knowledge, whether religious or scientific, is 'a form of worship by which 
man is brought into closer contact with Allah' (Jarnjoorn in al-Attas, 1979, p vi) 
becomes a reality for Muslim students. Education is thus not to be seen as an end in 
itself, but as a way of bringing children more into line with God's purposes. Faith in 
God is axiomatic and is a major factor in determining who is to do the teaching, how 
and where the teaching is to be carried out and what is to be taught. It is now time to 
turn to a closer examination of these issues and to consider an Islamic view of the 
teacher, the context of education and the curriculum. 
Traditional Muslim education in the kuttab and the madrasa provides us with a 
very different view of the role of the teacher from that currently held in Western society, 
but one which is much closer to fundamental Islan-dc principles. Teachers enjoyed very 
high status in the Muslim community, not least because of the emphasis the Quran and 
the hadith place on the pursuit of knowledge. But to be considered an Vim (a learned 
man) involved duties as well as privileges. Teaching was considered almost a religious 
obligation, and teachers were expected to show dedication and commitment in their task 
of consolidating the faith and spreading knowledge. Teachers had a special 
responsibility to nurture the young and develop their spiritual and moral awareness, and 
it was recognised that this was as likely to occur 'through imitation of a teacher and 
personal contact with hirrf (Ibn Khaldun, 1967, p 426) as through instruction. For this 
reason teachers were expected not only to be learned, but also to have a deep personal 
commitment to the faith and to be a living example of virtue and piety which students 
could unhesitatingly emulate. Ile teachers were accountable to the community not only 
for transmitting knowledge and for developing their students! potential as rational 
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beings, but also for initiating them into the moral, religious and spiritual values which 
the community cherished. Recent writers (e. g. Ashraf, 1988c, p 2) have drawn 
attention to the fact that the teacher's attitudes, characters, habits and beliefs will 
necessarily influence their students and have argued strongly that Muslim children 
should be taught by teachers, whatever their academic discipline, who are believers and 
whose lives are grounded on an unquestioned moral integrity. Ibis provides another 
point of strong contrast with the liberal view. 
As far as pedagogy is concerned, however, modem Islamic education cannot be 
considered bound by the traditions of Muslim education over the centuries. The use of 
corporal punishment, for example, which continues to be widespread in the katatib and 
the madaris, is grounded in tradition rather than in Islamic principles, and indeed al- 
Ghazali in his Ihya"Ulum ad-Din (n. d. ) and Ibn Khaldun (1958) both disagree with 
the harsh treatment of children as psychologically damaging and likely to distort their 
love of learning and their understanding of human dignity. Similarly, the traditional 
dependence on rote-leaming and memorisation is not intrinsic to Islamic education, as 
Ibn Khaldun (1958) recognised six hundred years ago when he defined education as'a 
special skill whose aim is to establish the faculty of knowledge in those who learn, 
rather than to force them to memorise the offshoots of knowledge'. Nevertheless, 
modem Islamic education is likely to find much that is of value in traditional Muslim 
education, and indeed, as Badawi (1979) has shown, the latter has a number of 
characteristics which would appear strikingly modem even to Western eyes. There is a 
natural integration of the curriculum, there is a close personal relationship between the 
teacher and the taught, elitism is discouraged, undue attention is not paid to 
examinations, pupil grouping is less rigid and students are comparatively free to pursue 
their own interests. Above all, traditional Muslim education is not an activity separated 
from other aspects of society; it is rooted in the community it serves, responding to its 
needs and aspirations and preserving its values and beliefs. 
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What is absolutely vital on an Islamic view of education is that the ethos of the 
school is in harmony with fundamental Islamic principles, so that children are not 
alienated from the community to which they belong but are encouraged to become 
aware of their roots in that community and to understand its values. Since education is 
considered in Islam to be a lifelong process, of which formal education in schools and 
colleges is only one part, it is important for the integrated development of the 
personality that formal education should not pull the individual in a totally different 
direction from the informal education that takes place through such social institutions as 
the family, the local community, the mosque, the social or youth centre or the place of 
work (cf Khan, 198 1, p 127). Muslim parents do not want schools to encourage a rift 
between children and parents or to cause conflict in children's minds. Children are 
immature and vulnerable to manipulation of various kinds, and need the stability and 
security that comes from being encouraged to conform at school to a coherent set of life 
principles which are consistent with the belief system of their home and community. If 
the ethos of the school is to be in harmony with fundamental principles, this means that 
schools should never put children in a position where they are required to act contrary 
to their faith. This has consequences for many aspects of school organisation, 
including uniform, school meals and co-education as well as several areas of the 
curriculum, which will be discussed shortly. It also means that children should not be 
encouraged to develop a questioning attitude to their own religion, or be forced into a 
position where they have to make a choice between a religious and a non-religious way 
of life, before they have developed the maturity of judgement, wisdom and breadth of 
knowledge and understanding which would make such a choice meaningful (Ashraf, 
1988c, p 2). Finally, it means that schools should not allow children to pick up 
messages through the hidden curriculum (for example, through peer group pressure or 
the way the school is organised) that are likely directly or indirectly to undermine their 
faith. Al-Taftazani (1986, p 73) argues that custom is an important way of establishing 




reinforcing the sense of inward attachment to Islam which, as we have seen, is one of 
the basic objectives of Islamic education. 
On the basis of what has been said so far, two principles can be set out according 
to which an Islamic curriculum must be constructed: 
Education must not be separated into two kinds - religious and secular. On the 
contrary, religion, which affects every aspect of life for the Muslim, must be at 
the very heart of all education as well as acting as the glue which holds together 
the entire curriculum into an integrated whole; 
(ii) Muslims are free to study exactly what they please, so long as they do it in the 
spirit of Islam. Equally, although in the past'learning' in Islam was associated 
with a balance and breadth of knowledge, Muslims must now be considered 
free to specialise in any branch of knowledge, subject only to the same proviso 
of remaining fully committed to the fundamental beliefs and values of Islam. 
A number of features emerge from these two basic principles, which must 
characterise the Islamic curriculum. First, it must contain specific teaching about God 
and the way he has revealed himself to human beings, and guidance about how to 
regulate life in accordance with the divine injunctions contained in the Quran and the 
shari'a. For otherwise, it would be impossible to know whether one! s pursuit of other 
knowledge was in the spirit of Islam or not. Secondly, the autonomy of the subject or 
discipline at least as understood in liberal thinking, is excluded, for all subjects and all 
knowledge need the guiding spirit of religion to give them purpose and direction; if 
religion is ignored, Muslims feel there is a danger that the pursuit of any domain of 
knowledge might lead to doubt, deception and constant searching and even to the 
corruption of faith and morals. Thirdly, it is clear that many subjects, perhaps all, 




(a) Some subjects need specific changes to be made to their typical syllabuses 
and/or organisation in the West if they are to avoid the contravention of 
particular Islamic injunctions. For example, the tasting or handling of any pig 
products must be completely avoided in Home Economics, and the organisation 
of physical education, games and swimming must be adapted so that Muslim 
children, especially girls, are not encouraged or required to contravene Islamic 
rules on modesty and decency. 
(b) Some subjects and topics that appear on Western curricula are best avoided 
altogether as likely to indulge, or encourage the improper use of, the bodily 
senses rather than disciplining them in the spirit of Islam. These subjects and 
topics include sex education, dancing, some aspects of art (e. g. nude drawing) 
and some aspects of music (especially modem popular music). 
(c) Some subjects need radical transformation to bring them into line with Islamic 
values. Religious education is itself a prime example. As I have pointed out 
elsewhere (Halstead and Kahn-Cheema, 1987, pp 24-30), Muslims are not 
happy with reducing the teaching of Islam as far as their own children are 
concerned to one element in a world religious course, and they find the 
secularisation of religious education virtually incomprehensible.. They believe 
that nurture in the faith is still central to religious education, which they consider 
to involve teaching about the value of religion generally and the provision of 
information about different religions as well as specific instruction in the child! s 
own religion. Because they place considerable emphasis on learning by 
example, they do not accept that RE could ever be taught by an atheist, and they 
cannot see any justification for forcing children to step outside their own faith in 
order critically to assess its most fundamental beliefs. 
185 
Chapter Eight 
Apart from RE, a considerable amount of work has already been done on ways to 
bring other subjects into line with Islamic beliefs and values; these include natural 
science (Naseef and Black, 1987; Mabud, 1988; Qutb, 1979; Nasr, 1982 1987b, 1988; 
Ashraf, 1986b; Bakr 1984); social science (I al-Faruqi, 1981; Majal, 1988; Sharifi, 
1985; Zaman, 1984; Ba-Yunus and Ahmad, 1985; Mutahhari, 1986); history (Qutb, 
1979); philosophy (Nasr, 1982); and literature (Ashraf and Medcalf, 1985; Ashraf 
1982). Although it is sometimes presented as such (e. g. Shalabi, 1980), the process of 
radical transformation of the curriculum consists of much more than merely grafting or 
transplanting into modem Western knowledge an Islamic component; similarly it 
consists of much more than merely expunging what is directly offensive to Islam, 
though that may be an important first step. What is required is the reconstruction of the 
entire discipline in accordance with Islamic principles. One example may be sufficient 
to illustrate how this process may work out in practice. 
Art clearly has a significant place in the Islamic world view, and such typical 
examples as Kufic calligraphy, mosque architecture and carpet weaving unambiguously 
reflect in both spirit and form their sources in Islamic revelation. Yet because of the 
absence of an Islamic philosophy of art, an Islamic theory of aesthetics or an Islamic art 
criticism, Western criteria tend to be applied not only by Western students of Islamic art 
but by Muslim students as well. Nasr (1989) argues strongly that art, whether Western 
or Islamic, must in future be taught to Muslims from an Islamic perspective, and that a 
satisfactory Islamic philosophy of art must be developed to provide the basis and 
framework of art education. This will involve an examination of the Qu'ran and the 
sunna, together with the works of Islamic theologians, philosophers, scientists and 
mystics and the codification of Islamic views of beauty, the origin of form, the concept 
of space, the nature of matter, the relation between unity and multiplicity, permanence 
and change, the fragility of the world, the sense of rhythm, symbolism and truth as well 
as the meaning, function, role and spiritual and social significance of art. It is likely to 
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involve a totally new hierarchical ranking of types of art, (cf L Al-Faruqi, 1982, p 201 
ff) with the high position of calligraphy, geometric and arabesque designs, architecture 
and crafts being reflected in the art curriculum of schools. The goal of art education 
would be to see Islamic art once again' with an eye illuminated by the vision of faith in 
the Islamic revelation! and to encourage the creation of works of art by Muslim artists 
and artisans 'which continue to praise the Creator and to reflect His beauty ... in 
accordance with the Islamic conception of Man as God! s vice regent (khalifat-Allah) on 
eartW (Nasr, 1989, p 10). 
In art, as in all aspects of Islamic education, the aim is clear. to involve religion at 
a fundamental level in everything that is to be studied, to help children to understand the 
importance of religion to every aspect of life, to encourage their commitment to a way 
of life lived in accordance with divine injunctions. We must now turn to a liberal 
critique of the Islamic view of education that has been expounded in this chapter. 
**** 
From a liberal perspective, the Islamic view of education set out above has deep 
flaws. First, it assumes the truth of a set of religious beliefs whose truth cannot be 
established objectively, and puts the transmission of these beliefs, without leaving them 
in any sense open to critical evaluation, at the heart of the educational experience. On 
this view, Islamic education is not really education at all, but a form of indoctrination. 
Secondly, the character of other kinds of knowledge is obscured, because the autonomy 
of the subject or discipline is not recognised. Thirdly, Islamic education offends the 
fundamental liberal value of the freedom of the individual, for instead of encouraging 
children to become personally and morally autonomous and to work out their own life 
plans for themselves free from external constraint, it unashamedly guides them, willy- 
nilly, into a pre-determined way of life. On a liberal view, education should liberate 
children, free them from the constraints of the present and the particular (Bailey, 1984); 
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it can never be the purpose of education merely to confirm any group in their own 
culture, as Phenix (1965, p 90 f) points out: 
The purpose of academic teaching is to increase understanding, not to 
advocate a particular religious position. The only proper advocacy in the 
scholarly community is that of truth, and truth may manifestly be served 
best by remaining open to the possibility of new and better understanding. 
These criticisms clearly strike at the very heart of the concept of Islamic education, 
and cannot be ignored by Islamic thinkers. In fact, liberal educationalists have not 
written very much about Islamic education directly, but most of what has been written 
in recent years in opposition to Christian education and the Church school system is 
based on principles which are equally relevant to the liberal case against Islamic 
education. Indeed, when dismissing'the whole idea of Christian education! as'a kind 
of nonsense', 11irst (1974b, p 7,77) makes it clear that what he says about the 
Christian religion is likely to apply just as much to other faiths. And when Flew (1972, 
p 106) describes the educational programme of the Roman Catholic Church as a model 
case of indoctrination, he would no doubt say the same about any system of schooling, 
(Islamic or other) which maintained its separate existence solely or primarily to inculcate 
its own distinctive doctrines in the young. 
The notion of indoctrination provides an appropriate starting point for a closer 
exanfination of the liberal case against Islamic education. Liberal educationalists would 
no doubt agree with Barrow (198 1, p 150) that schools which have 'the intention of 
committing children to a set of beliefs ... are guilty of indoctrination', particularly if the 
aim is to make the beliefs unshakeable ones (White, 1967, p 189; Flew, 1972, p 75) 
and if they are the beliefs of a restricted number of people where the restriction follows 
from their inability 'to provide publicly acceptable evidence for their truth! (Gribble, 
1969, p 34). Indoctrination, we are told, may even occur unintentionally, if teachers 
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take for granted certain beliefs in their teaching (White, 1967, p 189) or speak of their 
beliefs with a particular 'emotional warmth! (Cox, 1983, p 65). Indoctrination is both 
morally and intellectually objectionable. Morally, because it conflicts with the 
obligation to bring up children as morally autonomous people (White, 1982, p 166); it 
implies a lack of respect for persons by denying them 'independence and control over 
their lives' (Kleinig, 1982, p 65). Intellectually, because it subordinates a commitment 
to reason to a set of beliefs that cannot be shown objectively to be true, and fails to 
make plain to children the controversial or questionable status of those beliefs. 
Hirst in particular has expanded in the latter point in considerable detail. He 
distinguishes between a 'primitive' concept of education in which a group merely 
passes on what it holds to be true or valuable to the next generation (1974b, p 80), and 
a 'much more sophisticated view of education which stresses an open, rational, critical 
approach to all beliefs, designed so that pupils will develop 'commitment to justified 
beliefs on appropriate grounds'. (1983, p 3). It is acknowledged on this latter view 
that education must start with some system of beliefs, but the maintenance of that 
system is not an educational goal. Education aims instead 'at the development of the 
rational life of every individual' (1985, p 13). In cases where particular beliefs are 
contested (religious and moral beliefs are particularly relevant here, though Hirst (1985, 
p 2) argues that it is in the nature of every kind of belief to be challengeable) this is 
best dealt with precisely by presenting challengeable beliefs as challengeable, and by 
outlining the nature and extent of the challenge in any given area. The critical 
examination of different and rival belief systems should be encouraged, so that 
individuals may develop commitment to what they judge to be the most rationally 
justifiable beliefs and values in their particular circumstances. Education must be 
'open-ended in the outcome of particular beliefs which pupils might come to hold! 
(1983, p 3). Hirst questions whether the 'primitive' concept of education mentioned 
above is really education at all, since the aim of propagating any faith is 'something 
quite other than education' (1974b, p 89); but in the more sophisticated sense of open, 
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rational development, 'there can be no such thing as a Christian educatiore (1972, p 
11), because religious beliefs are a matter of private individual commitment, there is a 
lack of agreement not only about the status of religious beliefs but even about the 
criteria by which such beliefs could be judged (1967, p 33 1), and therefore religious 
beliefs must not be allowed to'determine public issues' such as education (1974b, p 3). 
According to Hirst, religion should be studied as part of education (1973, p 10), and 
such study should involve genuine empathy and an appropriate form of engagement, 
but the teaching must be accompanied by a clear indication of the status of the religious 
claims (1972, p 8), and 'it is necessary to education that no religious position be 
embraced! (1974b, p 89). Children must be left free to make their own decisions about 
what attitude to have towards religious beliefs. 
The position advanced by Hirst is so very far removed from the Islamic view of 
education set out in the present chapter, that there is a danger of a total lack of 
comprehension. Unless some way can be found of making one set of claims intelligible 
to the other side the disagreement will stay at the level of mere assertion and counter- 
assertion, with no real communication or dialogue taking place. I have already said that 
liberals have not so far engaged directly in any serious way with the Islamic view of 
education, but it is equally true that no serious attempt has been made by Muslim 
scholars to respond to the charges liberals have made against a religiously oriented 
education, at least in language which liberals can understand. So the first point that 
needs to be established is whether dialogue between liberals and Muslims is in fact 
possible, whether the language they speak has enough in common for some sort of 
debate to proceed. Can the Muslims, for example, respond to Hirst's charges in a way 
which accords with Islamic principles yet in language which is familiar, or at least 
comprehensible, to liberals? As a non-Muslim with a life-long experience of Islam, I 
have attempted elsewhere (Halstead, 1986) to sketch out a few possible starting points 
for an Islamic response which meets these conditions. The present chapter will 
conclude with a brief summary of these. 
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Possible Islamic rejoinders to the liberal critique of Islamic education faU into 
three main categories. The first focusses on the concept of indoctrination, and involves 
the claim that there is a significant difference between enforcing belief and encouraging 
it. The second relates to the nature of belief and proposes that religious beliefs are 
essentially different from other types of belief, such as scientific ones, and hence cannot 
be validated or dismissed by the same criteria. The third picks up the concept of 
autonomy and argues that there are limits to people's control over their own lives and 
that individuals can never make decisions in isolation from the community in which 
they live. Let us look at each of these in turn. 
There is an ambiguity in the concept of indoctrination, as indeed there is in the 
phrase 'inculcating belief which was used earlier. It can be understood in the strong 
sense of forcing children into the position where they come to accept the truth of a 
proposition or set of propositions 'in such a way that nothing will shake the belief' 
(White, 1967, p 181), or in the weaker sense of the presentation of a definite world 
view to children as part of a 'coherent primary culture! (Ackerman, 1980, p 141; cf 
McLaughlin, 1984, p 78), which provides them with a stable moral and religious 
foundation until they are old enough to make up their own minds about religion. The 
former is certainly as alien to the spirit of Islam as it is to liberalism. Islam has never 
supported compulsion in religion (cf Brohi, 1979, p 74) and has always accepted that 
individuals must make their own free choice when it comes to religious commitment 
(Ashraf, 1988b, p 2). Hulmes (1979, p 13) argues in any case that a remarkable 
number of people do in fact escape from the consequences of even the most rigorous 
indoctrination, and that it is perhaps more difficult to achieve indoctrination in the 
strong sense than has sometimes been claimed. The weaker sense of indoctrination is 
more problematic. Liberals commonly claim that religious values and beliefs must be 
taught in a way that does not prejudice the individual's right to choose between 
religions or between religious and non-religious world views or even to stand back 
from the whole debate (cf Kenny, 1983) and that this requires some sort of neutrality in 
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the presentation of religion in schools. But there are both logical and practical 
difficulties with any such neutral approach. Clearly, different religious positions cannot 
each be presented as 'true', as Hardy (1982, pI 11) points out, since accepting the truth 
of one tradition requires that other traditions be dismissed as mere truth claims; but if 
we present each tradition as a truth claim, then we have abandoned our neutrality and 
prejudged the question whether any tradition is in fact true. At least, the pupil is likely 
to pick up the hidden-curriculum message that neutrality is superior to commitment, or 
even that disbelief is superior to belief (cf Barrow, 1974, p 56). In practice, the neutral 
approach does not often extend beyond education about religion, and reduces the study 
of religion to history, literature, sociology or general knowledge. While this may go 
some way to encouraging a sympathetic attitude to different faiths, it can only promote a 
very limited religious understanding. Even to encourage children to enter imaginatively 
into the experiences of believers is unsatisfactory, for there is a world of different 
between acting a king in role play and actually being a king. The understanding which 
these approaches develop is incomplete because they miss the essential ingredient of 
commitment, which 'is, ultimately, what religion is about! (Hulmes, 1979, p 79). 
On the Islamic view, children are to be educated in a school whose ethos is consistent 
with the values and beliefs of their parents and local community, by teachers who serve 
as examples of reflective commitment to those values (cf Dunlop, 1984, p 110 f). 'Me 
aim of such education, however, is not to imprison children within a particular culture, 
and it is rather odd to call the process 'indoctrination', at least if the term is to retain its 
pedorative sense. For children's minds do not operate in a vacuum until they are 
mature enough to reflect on the nature of social or moral rules and it seems better to set 
them to work on what their parents and community believe to be of value than to leave 
them floundering, open to exploitation by the unscrupulous, or an easy prey to 
irrational pressures. Further justification for such a process is not hard to find. White 
(1982, p 93 f) talks of the need for individuals to learn to resolve conflicts for 
themselves, but the resolution of conflicts presupposes an acceptance of beliefs, for 
conflicts are real only if the rules in conflict are seen as binding. Logically, therefore, 
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the acceptance of rules, not just an awareness of them, must precede the capacity to 
resolve conflict (cf Peters, 198 1, p 169). Secondly, it is logically impossible to make a 
rational choice between moral rules without knowing what a rule is. Children need to 
be taught the nature of rules (cf Straughan, 1982), and the understanding involved is 
likely to come through practice and experience of rules. Thirdly, one cannot simply 
inform children of the options available, train them in rational decision-making and then 
leave it up to them. They need emotional stability, security and confidence if they are to 
grow into mature, responsible, reflective, authentic adults, and an education which 
provides them with a coherent, stable world view based on the beliefs and values they 
have met through their primary socialisation at home would appear to satisfy these 
conditions particularly well. 
The second Islamic response to the liberal critique involves a rejection of Hirst' s 
claim that all beliefs are the result of conceptual schemes that have been devised or 
constructed to 'capture' human experience, and that all beliefs are therefore essentially 
challengeable and should be presented as such to children (1983, p 3). Muslims would 
have no difficulty in accepting this claim with regard to scientific, political and all other 
beliefs that are the product of human activity, which Ashraf (1988, p 1) calls 
'conjectural' knowledge; but an Islamic perspective demands that religious beliefs be 
considered different from other beliefs in their origin, their object, their nature and their 
scope. For the Muslim, the religious beliefs of Islam are founded on divine revelation, 
and to suggest that they should be taught in a way that leaves them open to critical 
challenge would be to place the human intellect above the divine. The Quran is Gods 
final revelation to human beings, and thus religious belief is anchored in the absolute in 
a way that other beliefs (scientific or political) are not. In a passage already quoted, the 
Qu: ean says 
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When God and his messenger have decreed a matter, it is not for any 
believer, man or woman, to have the choice in the affair. Anyone who 
disobeys God and his messenger has gone astray into manifest error. 
(Sura 33, verse 36) 
Hirst (1983, p 3) argues that children must be encouraged to engage in 'critical 
reflection on beliefs in all areas in the interests of rational beliefs'. Islamic beliefs, 
however, are seen ultimately as a gift of God, in the form of inner illumination. Criteria 
of rationality, at least if starkly construed, cannot be all-pervasive in a discussion of 
appropriate grounds for assent to such religious beliefs. If, as is claimed, the beliefs 
are founded on divine revelation rather than on humanly constructed conceptual 
schemes, then a reflective investigation of them can only concern itself with the 
structure of beliefs that has been built upon this foundation of divine revelation, not 
with the revelation itself. This process might reasonably involve examining the socially 
constructed system of beliefs for internal coherence by measuring it against the 
fundamental claims made by the religion, but even this kind of 'measuring' is likely to 
be more productive if it is based on spiritual insight and wisdom rather than on narrow 
rationality. Indeed, such a process may not be called critical, rational reflection at all 
unless rationality is conceived in very broad terms as taking into account the 
development of the whole human personality: intuition, the conscience, the feelings, 
the will, the dispositions and the moral, social and spiritual dimensions of personality 
as well as the narrowly rational. 
I argue elsewhere (Halstead, 1986, ch 6) that there are two sides to faith in Islam: 
the private spiritual response to religion, and the public structure of beliefs. These 
correspond to two Arabic terms that have already been discussed: tariqa, (literally, a 
narrow path), which refers to the individual's spiritual growth towards certainty and 
perfection, and sharid (literally, a broad highway), which refers to the divinely 
ordained way of life for the whole community. The tariqa is a private individual matter 
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based on spiritual experience, and it is difficult to explain in terms that are open to 
objective rational evaluation and assessment, though the concept is by no means 
exclusive to Islam. Wittgenstein (1958) suggests that there can be a sudden moment 
when certainty comes to a person, though the ground will presumably have been 
already prepared by the process of socialisation. MacIntyre (1959, p 219) says that it is 
a matter of conversion. Others have seen its origin in the human will, or in a basic 
intuition about the existence of things. As already mentioned, Muslims see it as a gift 
from God. Haqq al-yaqin (the truth of spiritual certainty) arises from wahy (direct 
revelation from God) which speaks to the human heart, enabling people to perceive 
God and understand the meaning and purpose of existence. Individual spiritual 
experience, however, has to be attached in some way to the 'real' world (Sealey, 1985, 
p 11); otherwise it might be totally unintelligible to an outsider and capable of being 
dismissed as a complete illusion. In Islam, individual spiritual experience is attached to 
the'rear world by involving commitment to a publicly recognisable way of life. When 
sufficient people share the commitment, the way of life gains currency as a social 
structure. The Quran says, 
For each ofyou we have appointed a divine law and a way of life. 
(Sura 5, verse 52) 
The shari"a (divine law) is the public expression of Islam, and provides the 
unifying element in the wnnw (community of believers). Naturally, it is possible for an 
individual to consent to the outer form of Islam and follow the precepts of the sharid 
without understanding or experiencing spiritual certainty himself, just as it is possible 
for him to follow the precepts without appreciating their internal coherence and 
consistency. Ilie structure of Islamic law is in fact a remarkably rational one, but when 
it is argued back to first principles it is found to depend on a consensus of spiritual 
certainty which is shared by the community of believers but which is not open to 
objective critical investigation. Wittgenstein argues that it is impossible to find criteria 
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by which to judge that the religious views of one community are inferior to those of 
another, one is simply committed to them or not, and it is impossible to justify (or 
condemn) such a commitment outside the way of life of which it forms a parL Within 
its own system, it may be totally coherent and justifiable, but the fundamental principles 
on which it is based can only be understood by those who accept the system. As 
Wittgenstein (1958, p 226) says, 'What has to be accepted, the given, is - so one could 
say - forms of life!, and by 'forms of life' he appears to mean what Muslims call 
umma. 
Islamic education involves encouraging children to develop commitment to the 
shared way of life in the hope that they may in due course come to understand the 
underlying principles of that way of life and find spiritual certainty for themselves. To 
encourage such commitment to the way of life of the community of believers into which 
a child is bom cannot be viewed on indoctrinatory in the strong sense defined above, 
but is a normal part of the socialisation process, important for the stability of the 
community and the security of the child. Islamic education respects individual freedom 
with regard to the private development of spiritual qualities or emotions but does not 
extend that freedom to the public face of religion, the commitment to the shared way of 
life (though that commitment could become increasingly reflective as the pupils 
become older). One of the purposes of Islamic education is thus to enable the Islamic 
community to pass on the beliefs and values that it shares to the next generation; to fail 
to do so would have every appearance of the wilful self-destruction of the community. 
If MacIntyre is right, it may be only through such communities that'civility and the 
intellectual moral life can be sustained through the new dark ages which are already 
upon us' (19 8 1, p 244 f). 
The discussion has already begun to move into the third Islamic response to the 
liberal critique; this involves the claim that there are limits to people's control over their 
own lives. On a liberal view, individuals should strive to be free agents, able to make 
196 
Chapter Eight 
choices and plan their commitment to religious beliefs according to rational principles, 
not necessarily in isolation from the community to which they belong, but at least in a 
way which enables them to balance the influences of that community against other 
considerations which may affect their beliefs. By equipping children with the means to 
make rational choices and base their beliefs on appropriate evidence, education, on this 
view, should help children to become independent of the pressures of socialisation, of 
moral and religious persuasion and of vocational utility. White argues that the only real 
alternative to this kind of autonomy, which gives. one the ability to resolve conflicts for 
oneself, is 'blind reliance on authority' (1982, p 50 f), but he rejects the latter on the 
grounds that there are no authorities on how best to live (as distinct from those who 
claim to be authorities: 1984, p 119). 
In its extreme form, the liberal notion of encouraging rational choice and the 
individual construction of belief is easy to discredit. O'Hear writes disparagingly of 
'lonely autonomous agents in an emotionally empty state of rational reflection' (1982, p 
127 f) and Pole e1equently reminds us of the damage too rigid an emphasis on 
rationality might inflict on unformed minds: 
to their potential flowering or promised crops ... this bright insecticide, 
preterlucid 'rationality, meant only for pests, proves a blight, sterile and 
fatal. 
(1972, p 174) 
It is clearly necessary therefore to distinguish the more extreme form of autonomy 
from one which is rather less severe. What I shall call strong autonomy insists that all 
beliefs must be held open to a rigorous criticism based on rationality (cf Dearden, 1968, 
p 48) and that each person must work out a life plan for himself, similarly work out 
how to resolve the particular conflicts that inevitably occur in his life and ultimately be 
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judged by his own moral standards. In what I shall call weak autonomy, the individual 
needs at least to come to see the point of social or moral rules and to give his consent to 
them. This is close to what Berger and Luckmann (1967, p 149 ff) call the process of 
'internalisation', except that it is here the result of conscious reflection, in which the 
stage is reached where the individual no longer needs to be ordered or reminded what to 
do. There is no passive, blind or unreflective reliance on authority, and a person's 
thoughts and actions are his own, understandable only by 'reference to his own activity 
of mind! (Dearden, 1972, p 453). The difference between strong and weak autonomy 
is thus a matter of degree. The former emphasises critical investigation and the creation 
of a value system for oneself-, the latter, reflective understanding and an informed 
commitment to a (perhaps pre-packaged) value system. The former puts a heavy stress 
on individualism; the latter acknowledges the need for respect for the social context and 
social tradition in which the individual grows up (cf Dearden, 1984, pI 11; Pring, 
1984, p 73). The former requires people to find rational justification for every belief 
they hold. The latter allows people to accept things on authority so long as it is 
reasonable to do so and only requires that if they reason, they should avoid partiality, 
incoherence, inconsistency and irrelevance; it does not require that everything should 
be subjected to rational scrutiny (cf Barrow, 1975, p 188). 
I have argued elsewhere (Halstead, 1986, ch 4) that weak autonomy is broadly in 
harmony with Islamic education, but that strong autonomy is neither consistent with 
Islamic principles nor philosophically sound. If each individual has to work out a life 
plan for himself, then how is he to find any criteria for his choices except on the basis 
of further criteria he chooses until he finally just plumps for something (cf O'Hear, 
1985, p 149)? Autonomous choice ultimately lacks weight if it ignores human 
community and human history. There are practical problems with strong autonomy as 
well. It has an element of elitism, in that the critical rationality which it requires is likely 
to be attained more fully and more quickly by some people than by others. Even White 
(1982, p 137) concedes that not all children will find in autonomy a realistic life-aim. 
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While people in higher social brackets are likely to find the possession of autonomy an 
asset in their work, others may find it a positive hindrance. It can thus be argued that to 
emphasise strong autonomy in education is simply a new way of bolstering up a 
hierarchical structure of society and of perpetuating social inequalities. Strong 
autonomy may also breed a sort of arrogance, which rejects tradition just because it is 
old or unfashionable (Ward, 1983, p 54). In stressing rationality, it may underestimate 
the need to feel what it is to be a person among other persons (O'Hear, 1982, p 128). 
In encouraging people to question their moral beliefs, it may merely make them 
confused and'unmeshed with the society as it is! (Barrow, 1975, p 188) with the result 
that the social stability of the community comes under pressure. Integrity is much more 
likely to be found, not when each individual tries to become his own authority on 
morality (as would be required by strong autonomy), but when individuals develop a 
rational attitude to tradition and authority (through a form of weak autonomy), with due 
respect for their social roots. So White (1982, p 50) is setting up a false dichotomy 
when he claims that the only real alternative to autonomy is 'blind reliance on 
authority'. A middle path, which aims at achieving a reflective reliance on authority 
by emphasising understanding, sound judgement, breadth of knowledge and a 
respectful appreciation of authority and expertise, is a genuine alternative, and is much 
more in line with Islamic education. Peters proposes something very similar when he 
says that all children should be initiated into a conventional morality (i. e. doing what 
others say is right), but as and when they are able, they move towards a rational moral 
code in which they develop 'a rational attitude both to tradition and to authority' with 
the result thatauthority becomes rationalised, not superseded! (1981, p 134). 
The Islamic approach is broadly in line with Peters' here, except that it puts less 
emphasis on the individual and more on the rational consensus Qjma) of the learned 
('ulama) or of the community as a whole (umma), thus tending to avoid the dangers of 
extremism or fanaticism. It is important in Islam that the beliefs which the community 
agrees on, whether moral or religious, come to be seen initially as objective reality by 
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children. Gradually children will develop (and will be encouraged by schools to 
develop) an awareness of how their own personhood (their rational, emotionalt 
spiritual, social and moral natures) locks into this objective reality. The aim of this kind 
of education is simply (if one may be excused the horticultural image) to produce strong 
roots, which will be able to support a fuller blossoming into understanding and 
reflective commitment in the course of time. Both direct teaching and the school ethos, 
on an Islamic view, will encourage students to see beyond the outward manifestations 
(or 'pictures' to use Wittgenstein's term) until they reach the stage of understanding the 
deeper spiritual truths behind the outward form of the social and moral rules that they 
have learned, and make them their own. But at the same time, those who have not 
reached, or perhaps will never reach, this form of weak autonomy, will not be treated 
with disdain or left to flounder, but will have a stable base for their own lives. This 
form of education is thus more egalitarian, more morally coherent and more attentive to 
the full personality of the child than the starker forms of liberal education that are 
currently fashionable in some quarters; it is also more conducive to social order. For 
many Muslims, to encourage such a spirit of reflective commitment in young people is a 
first priority of education. 
**** 
In the present chapter I have attempted to sketch an Islamic view of education in 
line with the framework of Islamic values presented in Chapter Seven. Ibis view was 
presented first in strictly Islamic terms, but then in response to a liberal critique of the 
Islamic view, it was re-expressed in terms that are more accessible to liberals. In 
addition to outlining an Islamic view of education, therefore, it is hoped that the present 
chapter has established that some sort of dialogue is possible between liberals and 
Muslims, in spite of their very different world views. Chapter Nine now takes the 
process of dialogue and negotiation further, to see if sufficient common ground can be 
found on which to construct an agreed common system of education. 
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ISLAM AND LIBERALISM: 
THE SEARCH FOR COMMON GROUND 
The purpose of the present chapter is to consider whether Muslims and liberals 
can find sufficient common ground for a common education system to be developed 
that is acceptable to both. Such a position can obviously be reached only by a process 
of dialogue and by a willingness for each side to come to understand the other. Both 
liberals and Muslims are in fact committed in principle to the process of dialogue, 
liberals because they see it as a means of persuasion which they consider preferable to 
coercion and more in harmony with democratic ideals, and Muslims because as a 
minority in the West they recognise (as a very minimum) that far from being able to 
insist on a system based on Islamic values for their own children, they are unlikely even 
to have their views acknowledged in educational planning if they are not willing to enter 
discussions with non-Muslims. 
It has already been shown that Islam and liberalism do in fact have some 
common ground in their views of education. For example, both are dubious about the 
educational value of too strong an emphasis on vocational training. Both stress the 
need for some sort of integrated curriculum, with due attention paid to breadth and 
balance. Both are anxious to discourage elitism and to promote individual 
development. But in other areas the gulf remains quite wide, and on closer examination 
even areas of apparent agreement (such as a commitment to the pursuit of truth and 
justice) cannot be taken for granted, for it became clear in Chapter Seven that terms 
such as'truth' andjustice'do not necessarily mean the same to Muslims as they do to 
liberals. The question that is now to be explored is whether any shifting of positions is 
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possible that will bring Muslims and liberals genuinely closer without involving a blind 
eye being turned to the very real differences that do exist between the two perspectives. 
In Chapter Eight it was shown that perhaps the biggest difference between the 
liberal and the Islamic perspectives on education is that the latter is based on a set of 
values that cannot in liberal eyes be justified rationally. In Chapter Five, these were 
called community values, as distinct from public values (those which can be justifiably 
be presented as universally appropriate) and individual values (those which belong to 
the domain of free personal choice and commitment). In the first section of the present 
chapter it is intended to consider whether the existence of community values as a 
distinct category could be conceded by liberals, and if so, whether it could be accepted 
that they have an important part to play in education. In the second section, the 
possibility is explored that Muslims might come to hold their beliefs in a manner which 
leaves them more open to critical debate. The implications for educational practice are 
touched on briefly here, but will be examined more fully in Chapter Ten. 
**** 
Some clarification of the concept of 'community values! is needed to begin with. 
I am using the term'values! in the sense of beliefs about what constitutes right, good or 
desirable actions or situations. In other words, values can provide the basis for moral 
or other judgements about actions or states of affairs. Some sociologists (e. g. Berger 
and Luckman, 1967) have been concerned to explore the relationship between values 
and the way situations are defined, the way that values help us to understand the 
meaning of social situations, and the origin of values themselves, whether in isolated 
individuals rebelling against their own society, in individuals interacting in any given 
social situation or in whole communities or societies which 'produce definitions of the 
overall reality of human life' (Berger and Berger, 1974, p 368). Weber (1967), for 
example, has argued that the Protestant ethic produced exactly these values (such as 
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honesty, hardwork, rational planning and so on) that were conducive to the growth of 
capitalism. In the particular strand of liberal thought which has been under 
consideration in the last few chapters, the sociological claim is accepted that all beliefs 
and values are 
the result of conceptual schemes that have been devised or constructed to 
'capture'human experience, 
(Hirst, 1983, p 2) 
but this is used as the basis for the normative argument that all beliefs and values 
should be kept open to rational investigation. Hirst argues, as we saw in the previous 
chapter, that in all areas people must expect their beliefs and values to be challenged in 
the light of new circumstances, evidence, experience and the development of alternative 
forms of belief. Such rational investigation may confirm that there are certain values 
(e. g. equality) that can 'justifiably be presented as universally appropriate' (Swann 
Report, 1985, p 4), but in all other cases, the fundamental freedom of individuals to 
differ over the beliefs and values that they hold must be respected (cf Hirst, 1974b). 
This has important consequences for education. Liberals do of course recognise that all 
education takes place in a particular social context whose way of life involves beliefs 
and values which 'must necessarily be communicated to young childrew (Hirst, 1983, 
p 3); but education is in no way concerned to reinforce those beliefs and values. 
Rather children are to be encouraged to engage in critical reflection on their beliefs and 
values, so that they may come to understand, for example, what it is about certain 
values which makes commitment to them'universally appropriate' and so that in areas 
of legitimate diversity they may come to assent freely to beliefs and values 'on 
appropriate grounds' (ibid). In a sense, Muslims, too, accept the social construction of 
their beliefs and values. The sharia (Muslim law), for example, is a rational 
development of a legal system based on four sources: the Quran, the hadith (sayings 
of the Prophet), qiyas (analogy) and ijma' (consensus). The formulation and the 
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interpretation of the sharl'a is the task of the Wama' (the learned), whose authority is 
accepted on account of their religious insight, wisdom, intellectual expertise and 
knowledge of the Quran and the Prophet Muhammad. However, although the beliefs 
and values embodied in the sharid cannot be justified (at least to the satisfaction of 
liberals) as universally appropriate, Muslims do not accept that 'education cannot 
operate on the assumption of the justification of those beliefs' (Hirst, 1983, p 4). On 
the contrary, it is central to the Islamic view of education that these beliefs and values 
are taken for granted and are presented to Muslim children as appropriate for their 
acceptance and commitment. To do otherwise would, on an Islamic view, be to 
promote doubt or scepticism at the expense of faith and commitment, to stress the 
importance of individual judgement over that of the community and perhaps eventually 
to undermine the way of life of the whole community. This set of beliefs and values, 
that liberals wish to see taught in a critically open way which respects individual 
freedom and which Muslims wish to be taken for granted in the education of their 
children, is what I mean by the phrase 'community values'. 
Community values are precisely those values that are shared by a whole 
community, but not by those outside the community (though they may of course 
overlap to a greater or less extent with the values of other communities). I have so far 
referred exclusively to the Islamic community, which may be understood on the local 
level as the Muslims of a particular town or district or, more fundamentally, as an 
international group (umma) which transcends barriers of race, language, state, culture 
or class but is united by a common religious adherence. But it is a feature of any 
community - and by community I mean a social group which is bound together by at 
least one significant shared characteristic, such as nationality, region, language, culture 
or religion - that it has its own distinctive values. Taking his example from the Greeks, 
Hampshire (1982, p 150-1) argues that 
204 
Chapter Nine 
the glory of being Greek emerged infollowing the social customs, the habits 
in matters of address and social manners and in conduct generally, which 
are distinctively Greek; and the glory of being Athenian, or being Spartan, 
rather than of being just Greek, resided infollowing the very different and 
distinctive customs of these two very discriminating cities. If the word 
'glory'seems too highflown and seems an exaggeration in this context, one 
could say instead that the point of thinking of oneself as Greek or as 
Athenian resided in the thought of the distinctiveness of their way of life; 
and their way of life consisted not only of social customs and habits of 
address and habits of conduct more generally, but also of distinctive moral 
codes and principles, with typical prescriptions derived from them. This 
implies that no convergence to general agreement is required in a 
justification of these prescriptions. 
Durkheim, too, appears to maintain that membership of any group or community 
involves, and is to be understood in terms of, a distinctive set of values and a distinctive 
way of life. He argues (1933) that individuals need to be integrated into a wider moral 
community if they are to avoid the dangers of anomie (loss of norms and values), and 
that social unity and order are possible only because people share a conscience 
collective (a consciousness of common moral values). The values, beliefs and normal 
patterns of behaviour that make up this collective consciousness in any given 
community achieve coherence and unity by being linked to an overarching view of 
reality, which Durkheim (1915) calls 'religion', though it must be remembered that 
Durkheim uses the term'religion' in a much wider sense than common usage, to cover 
any framework which claims to provide ultimate meanings for human experience and 
activities (including nationalism, Marxism and so on, as well as specific religions). 
Religion is thus an expression of basic social or community values, and any 
accompanying rituals serve to reinforce the unity of the community. Berger and 
Luckmann (1967) go further and argue that religion plays a crucial legitimating role in 
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the social construction of reality. By providing ultimate meaning for human experience, 
religion serves as a 'shield against the terror of anomie' (Berger, 1969). It is hardly 
surprising therefore that religion and the community values which it legitimates under 
its overarching fi-amework have traditionally occupied a central place in the education of 
the young. Durkheim sees the transmission of community values as a major function of 
education: 
Education is the influence exercised by adult generations on those that are 
not yet readyfor social life. Its object is to arouse and to develop in the 
child a certain number ofphysical, intellectual and moral states which are 
demanded of him by both the political society as a whole and the special 
milieufor which he is specifically destined. 
(Durkheim, 1956, p7 1) 
On this view, education primarily serves the community's interests and constrains 
the individual to conform to its collective values and norms. Its main function is one of 
socialisation. Durkheim's analysis seems equally applicable at a time of increasing 
secularisation, at least in the West, when organised religions have experienced 
difficulties sustaining their influence on social life; for on DurkheinYs definition, 
society always has religion, but 'religion' may now take the form of national identity, 
ethnicity or whatever, rather than being grounded in a belief in God, or gods or other 
supernatural entities. Some sort of overarching framework still exists which provides 
the values which are transmitted through education. Thus sociological research has 
uncovered the typically American values of ambition, competitiveness and individual 
achievement that are reinforced by American education, in contrast with Soviet 
education which lays stress on the values of discipline, loyalty and co-operation with 
others for collective achievement (Berger and Berger, 1974, p 74-5). Of course, the 
transmission of such community values is often tacit rather than overt. Children were 
(and perhaps still are) encouraged to internalise the values and norms of white middle- 
206 
ChapterNine 
class culture in the U. K., we are told, more through the hidden than the overt 
curriculum (cf Keddie, 1973). Sir Keith Joseph, on the other hand, when Secretary of 
State for Education, argued that the shared values which are distinctive of British 
society and culture should feature openly in education (Kimberley, 1986, p 107-8). 
It rnýst be emphasised that in the above discussion I am concerned with values 
outside the minimum framework which rationality legitimates and the public interest 
demands. Schools have virtually always provided education which is in excess of what 
is required by the public interest, as was pointed out in Chapter Five, and Strike 
(1982b, p 88-9) claims that with the expansion of the influence of schools at the 
expense of that of the family, the church and the community, schools are under a 
stronger obligation than ever to promote such supernumerary values. As was shown in 
Chapter Two, what many Muslims in the U. K. are now seeking is not an education 
which is in conflict with fundamental values or with the public interest; rather, they are 
demanding that where community values are passed on to children, it should be their 
own Islamic community values that are passed on to their own chidren. They are quite 
happy to respect the right of any other community to do the same (cf Khan-Cheema et 
al, 1986, p 14). 
So far, I have tried to make clear what community values are. They differ from 
individual values, because far from depending on individual choice and self 
determination, they have a fixedness and a closedness which enables them to be 
perceived as objective reality by those who have internalised them (Berger and Berger, 
1974, pp 80-5). They differ from public values in that, although they are not 
untouched by criticism or reflection (cf Hampshire, 1978, p 6), they are culturally 
rather than rationally justified; they are part of what'is involved in being a member of a 
group. In describing community values, I have inevitably touched on some of the 
arguments that can be raised in support of giving them an important role in education; 
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but I will set these out more fully in due course. Before going any further, however, I 
want to sketch out a liberal response to the notion of community values. 
From a liberal perspective, there are three major problems with the notion of 
community values. The first relates to the liberal view of beliefs, which has already 
been discussed. On this view, all beliefs and values are essentially challengeable and 
should be held in an open-ended way that recognises that they may need to be revised 
after critical investigation. Certain values, such as justice, may emerge from such 
appraisal as universally appropriate, in which case they will provide a boundary within 
which individuals can develop their own concepts of the good (Rawls, 1982, p 160- 
61). But as far as all other beliefs and values go, they need to be held in a way which 
recognises that they may be challenged in the light of new circumstances or evidence 
(Hirst, 1983, p 2), whether they are 'community' values or not. The presentation of a 
particular set of beliefs and values to children for their uncritical acceptance and 
commitment thus runs counter to the most fundamental principles of liberalism. No 
special status can be given, on a liberal account, to a set of values simply because they 
are traditional, are shared by a whole community and form the basis of the distinctive 
identity of individuals in that community. 
The second problem from a liberal perspective is precisely that if community 
values are presented in education as something fixed and requiring uncritical 
commitment, this robs the individual of his rightful freedom to make decisions for 
himself and'reduces him from a free person to a bee tied to a hive! (Dahrendorf, 1968, 
p 34). It fails to respect the person as an individual and thus buys social cohesion and 
stability at too high a price to the individual. As was made clear in Chapter Four, a 
distinctive feature of liberalism is that it does not provide all the answers, but'leaves the 
ethical problem for the individual to wrestle with! (Friedman, 1962, p 12). This raises 
questions about the concept of personhood, which will be discussed shortly. 
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The third problem is that there can be no justification on a liberal view for 
presenting one particular set of community values as fixed in a pluralist society. It was 
shown in Chapter Six that a pluralist society is necessarily characterised by the 
existence of different beliefs, values and ways of life. Yet if a pluralist society is to be 
a society, there has also to be a sufficiently broad range of ideals, values and 
procedures held in common, and the groups that make up the society'must have regard 
for the common good in the pursuit of their own objectives' (Crittenden, 1982, p 21). 
But how is a sufficiently broad framework of common values to be achieved? Clearly 
what have so far been described as public values (those which can be justifiably 
presented as universally appropriate in a pluralist democracy) will provide the basis on 
which a common framework can be constructed, but they are not sufficiently broad to 
provide the complete framework. Similarly, as White (1987, p 16-17) points out, a 
framework consisting of the highest common factor of values actually held in common 
by all the groups in a pluralist society, will be too thin to serve any significant 
function. Yet the Swann Rel2ort (DES, 1985, pp 5-7) argues convincingly that it is 
impossible for each community to retain its own values untouched by other groups; and 
the attempt by any one group in society (whether or not it forms the majority) to impose 
its values on other groups, except where this is justifiable in terms of the public interest, 
would be seen as contravening the spirit of liberalism. The liberal answer, according to 
Haydon (1986,1987), White (1987) and others, lies in negotiation. What is envisaged 
is that groups will come together, aware of their different value orientations but aware 
also of the need for a common framework in areas of common life (especially legal, 
political and economic life) and willing therefore to enter into discussions with a view to 
reaching agreement on certain matters of values. This approach is justified on the 
grounds that what an ethical theory needs to be, in order to offer a resolution of 
problems, is not true, but agreed (Haydon, 1986, p 98), and that there is value in the 
process of democratic negotiation per se (White, 1987, pp 20-23). 
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To sum up, in so far as liberals are prepared to concede the importance of 
community values at all, they are not conceptualised in the same way at all as they are 
on an Islamic view. To liberals, they consist of a negotiated framework of commonly 
accepted values, and even if broad agreement is reached over them within society, they 
are still to be considered challengeable and must be transmitted to children in a critically 
open manner and in a way which respects the ultimate freedom of individuals to make 
choices for themselves. 
Before we proceed with a response to the liberal critique, one specific Islamic 
reaction must be noted. It would not be possible in principle for an Islamic group to 
enter into the sort of negotiation of a framework of common values that Haydon talks 
of. What matters for Muslims more than that an ethical framework is agreed is that it is 
true, and it is precisely because the Islamic ethics are considered to be based on divine 
revelation that they are not open to open-ended negotiation. If Muslims are to enter into 
dialogue with non-Muslims over values (which is what the present chapter is about), 
the aim of the engagement on an Islamic view must be to share ideas, to achieve greater 
mutual understanding, to see if more common ground can be discovered than was 
realised before, which may justify greater co-operation. The aim cannot be to 
compromise fundamental beliefs and values in any way in the interests of wider 
agreement and co-operation with non-Muslims. 
We can now move on to a more detailed response to the liberal objections to the 
notion of community values, and in so doing consider the main arguments in support of 
giving them a significant place in education. The arguments that follow are not drawn 
directly from Muslim writers, but it is intended that they should be in harmony with the 
Islamic principles set out in Chapter Seven. 
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Problems arise immediately if the idea of negotiating a framework of commonly 
accepted values implies that the final agreed framework will contain some values drawn 
from one community, some from another. As Hampshire (1978, p 12) points out, 
the virtues typical of several different ways of life cannot be freely 
combined. 
It may be that a way of life can only be understood as a whole (cf Toulmin, 1950, p 
153) and that its coherence depends on a well-established set of inter-related values 
which cannot be discussed separately. It is further argued by some Wittgensteinians 
that any given way of life can only be understood from the inside, and that no 
justification for commitment to a way of life is possible that is developed outside the 
way of life itself. Wittgenstein himself writes, 
What has to be accepted, the given, is - so one could say -form of life. 
(1958, p 226) 
Although it is uncertain exactly what Wittgenstein means by the term 'form of life', 
Phillips (1956, p 27; 1970, p 14), Malcolm (1984, p 72) and others have based 
arguments on the assumption that religion is a form of life and as such is 'given' or 
axiomatic so that religious beliefs do not need to be justified and indeed cannot be (see 
below). Sherry (1977, p 23), on the other hand, argues that specific religions or 
specific religious practices may come closer to what is meant by 'form of life'. Trigg 
(1973, p 64) takes the phrase to refer more generally to 'a community of those sharing 
the same concepts. But however we understand the phrase, the Wittgensteinian notion 
of 'forms of life' presents a twofold challenge to liberalism as defined in Chapter Four. 
First, it implies that the rules which govern the behaviour of any given community can 
only be understood through the eyes of members of that community. If one fails to 
accept this, one may simply be imposing'a set of alien categories on a culture one has 
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failed to understand' (Lear, 1984, p 146); but if one does get inside the culture of a 
community, its beliefs and practices may be seen to make sense. Secondly, it implies 
that when liberal demands for the justification of beliefs have followed through a chain 
of explanations they may be found to be grounded in a particular recognisable 'form of 
life!. What emerges from this line of reasoning, as Lear (ibid. ) points out, is 
the autonomy of a culture's beliefs and practices. From outside the culture 
there is no legitimate vantage point from which to criticise them. From 
inside the culture the beliefs and practices will 'make sense. 
Berger and Berger (1974, p 386) reach a similar conclusion via the quite different, 
sociological route which has already been considered, when they write that society is 
'constituted by the definitions of reality that prevail in ie. According to Phillips (1967), 
the society and the definitions of reality cannot be understood independently of each 
other, and he criticises those philosophers who fail to consider the contexts of religious 
beliefs, who try to discuss, for example, the question of the existence of God without 
taking into account the form of life in which belief in God is a central part (Phillips, 
1967, p 4,63; cf Sherry, 1977, p 118). If sets of beliefs and values are as intricately 
tied to specific communities as is being suggested here, this has two consequences. 
First, it makes the liberal notion of negotiating a framework of shared values essentially 
problematic, since this would involve wrenching beliefs and values from their context 
and thus making them meaningless. Secondly, it casts doubt on the liberal value of free 
individual choice; for if the community's beliefs and values are to be considered 
autonomous, the individual can have no rational grounds outside the community's own 
framework for accepting or rejecting them. Just as it was shown in Chapter Five that 
the principle of the autonomy of the individual is in constant conflict with the principle 
of the autonomy of the family (cf Fishkin, 1983), so too it sits uneasily with the 
principle of the autonomy of the community. Communitarians like MacIntyre, 
Hauerwas and Sandel consider the latter of prior importance. They argue that our 
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identity is not independent of our attachments and we are therefore necessarily involved 
in the purposes and ends which characterise the communities we inhabit. Sandel points 
out that'since others made me, and in various ways continue to make me, the person I 
anY (1982, p 161)9 
I am situatedfrom the start, embedded in a history which locates me among 
others, and implicates my good in the good of the communities whose 
stories I share. 
(1984, p 9; cf MacIntyre, 1981, p 205) 
On this view, a major purpose of education must be to provide a fairly stable set 
of guiding values for the child, i. e. those of the community in which the child grows 
up; Toulmin makes what appears to be an obvious point that the child who is brought 
up according to a consistent set of moral principles is the one who is most likely to 'get 
the idea' of ethics (1950, p 169). Durkheim (1956) denies that this sort of education, 
even though it involves constraining children to a socially determined set of values, is 
tyrannous. He argues that it is justified because the children themselves are the 
beneficiaries (cf Gutmann, 1982, p 270). Equally, however, a purpose of education 
must be to preserve, maintain and transmit community values, for these are where the 
individual's interests primarily lie, rather than in the supposed liberation from the 
present and the particular (Bailey, 1984). Wolff (1968, p 145) puts the point more 
forecefully: 
It seems, ifDurkheim is correct, that the very liberty and individuality which 
Mill celebrates are deadly threats to the integrity and health of the 
personality. So far from being superfluous constraints which thwart the 
free development of the self, social norms protect us fiom the dangers of 




suffocating is actually our principal protection against the soul-destroying 
evil of isolation. 
Liberalism has often been attacked of late for failing, though its strong emphasis 
on individual freedom and choice, to take sufficient account of an individuaXs ties and 
attachments (Williams, 1981; Sen and Williams, 1982, p 5; O'Hear, 1982, p 127 f; 
1985, p 149). Older proponents of liberal education have argued that a group or 
community 'has no consciousness or life apart from that of the individuals who 
compose if (Peters, 1966, p 216) and that the trouble with a group discussing what 
ought to be done by the group as a whole is that it may ignore 'the stake of any 
individual in the future' and 'the role of the individual in determining his own destiny' 
(ibid, p 215). But more recently we find some liberal educationalists willing to distance 
themselves from what they call'abstract individualism' (Haydon, 1986, p 97-8; 1987, 
p 27). Haydon, indeed, emphasises the need to view persons not as free-floating 
individuals but as firmly rooted in the practices and traditions of their cultural 
inheritance, which he considers to provide 'at least the initial basis of their values' 
(ibid). The reasons for this liberal shift, of course, are not hard to see. Too severe a 
form of individualism would sit rather uncomfortably with the idea of negotiating a 
framework of commonly accepted values which Haydon expounds, for in practice such 
negotiation would have to be carried out by representatives of specific groups or 
communities, rather than by every individual member of those communities. The point 
of negotiated values would be lost if they were not accorded some degree of fixedness 
but were constantly challenged in a fundamental way by individuals. 
In view of the foregoing discussion, there is clearly some uncertainty about the 
second and third liberal challenges to the notion of community values (the need for 
individuals to be free to determine their own destiny, and the need for a negotiated 
framework of values in a pluralist society), and some shifting of ground may be 
possible. The first liberal challenge, however, is harder to undermine. This involves 
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the claim that since all beliefs are challengeable, they should be presented in an open 
way to children, and that education should be concerned with'achieving commitment to 
justified beliefs on appropriate grounds' (Hirst, 1983, p 3). Tbe biggest problem here 
is how to find out what constitutes 'appropriate grounds'. For the liberal, such 
grounds must be based on rationality, however that is to be conceived. But community 
values, as expounded in this chapter are not necessarily values which can be rationallly 
defined or justified, at least to the satisfaction of everyone. The domain of morality will 
serve to illustrate the point. Certainly some moral principles, such as the disposition to 
treat all men and women alike in some respects, in recognition of their common 
humanity, are rationally defensible and not contingent upon any type of social order, 
and such a principle prescribes a fairly specific, settled set of norms for human 
behaviour. I have called these principles 'public values. But there are other values 
such as love and friendship (cf Hampshire, 1982, p 148), altruism (pace Nagel, 1970), 
loyalty (cf Wolff, 1968, pp 51 ff), hope and patience (cf Hauerwas, 1981, p 5), charity 
(cf MacIntyre, 1981, p 162 f) and ultra-obligations generally (cf Grice, 1967, pp 155 
ff), that are held in as high esteem as justice in many contests, and yet do not share 
either the same rational justification or the same fixedness as far as behaviour is 
concerned. Rational considerations may set the parameters for behaviour based on the 
latter type of value: the behaviour should not cause avoidable unhappiness or offend 
the principle of fairness. But, as Hampshire (1982, p 154) points out, 
These bare requirements plainly underdetermine the full, complex morality 
of the family and of sexual relationships and offiriendship in any man's 
actual way of life. ' 
Community values are based on the specific habits and conventions associated, 
probably over a long period of time, with one particular way of life and the way of life 
gains'coherence from the harmonious interlocking of its various elements. Hampshire 
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argues that there is a rational justification for respecting some set of not unreasonable, if 
ultimately arbitrary, moral claims of a conventional kind, 
because some moral prescriptions are necessary in the areas of sexuality and 
family relationships andfiiendship and social customs and attia&s to death; 
and that men are reasonably inclined to respect those prescriptions which 
have in fact survived and which have a history of respect. 
(ibid, p 155) 
But even Hampshire concedes the liberal claim that such values must be rationally 
defensible if challenged and argues that there is no virtue in clinging to such values if 
there are compelling grounds of a rational kind for rejecting them (for example, because 
they are unfair). 
What is the case with morality applies even more so to the domain of religion. 
For here there is no set of principles corresponding to justice which can be justifiably 
presented as universally appropriate. On the contrary, all religious beliefs and values 
seem to fall into the category of community values whose truth can never be established 
objectively but whose coherence depends on the specific way of life of which they are a 
part. In an article entitled of Belief, Malcolm (1977, p, 154-5) 
criticises the assumption that because religious belief has no rational justification it 
cannot be considered intellectually respectable. He claims that religion and religious 
belief are indeed ultimately groundless, and that although of course within the 
religious framework there is criticism, explanation and justification, no similar rational 
justification can or need be applied to the religious framework itself (ibid, p 152). On a 
communitarian point of view, the fact that the way of life exists, is rooted in history, is 
internally coherent, provides values which are traditionally respected by the community, 
and is consistent with fundamental moral principles or public values, provides sufficient 
grounds for giving it a central place in education. On the one hand, if any of a 
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community's values are worth preserving, education may be the only way to do that; on 
the other, if children are to grow up with a sense of what it is to be a person among 
other persons they need the stability and identity which socialisation into a fixed set of 
shared beliefs and values is most likely to provide. Contemporary liberalism may be 
prepared to go a certain way down this path but only on condition that such beliefs and 
values are passed on to children in a critically open way, in recognition of the fact that 
no religious beliefs can be shown objectively to be true and that challenge and change 
must be accepted in principle if compelling reasons for such change can be justified 
rationally. 
We can now return to the dialogue between liberalism and Islam directly. For 
proponents of the Islamic view of education, the fact that fundamental Islamic values 
are shared and have been shared over a long period of time by the whole Islamic 
community provides sufficient grounds for using education to encourage the children of 
the community to develop commitment to those values. The fact that the values are 
considered to be based directly or indirectly on divine revelation objectifies them 
further, and makes the transn-dssion of them to the next generation a sacred duty. On 
a liberal view, however, there is nothing special about Islamic community values 
which gives them the right to immunity from criticism; on the contrary, they must, like 
those of all religions, be subject to searching examination (Trigg, 1973, p 59-60). And 
if religious claims are 'essentially contestable' (O'Hear, 1982, p 14), there can be no 
right on the part of any community to prejudge the truth of their own claims on behalf 
of their children. Many liberals accept that certain moral rules have to be transmitted to 
children before they understand the justification for them or can evaluate them for 
themselves (Peters, 1969, p 106; O'Hear, 1982, p 122 ff-, J and P White, 1986, p 156); 
some argue that certain religious values and beliefs may be transmitted in the same way 
(McLaughlin, 1984,1985). But such education would be quite unacceptable from a 
liberal point of view if children were not encouraged sooner or later to recognise 
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contestable beliefs as contestable or allowed to challenge the culture in which they were 
brought up and form their own ideals. 
It is time to look again at the Islamic position to see if any room can be found for 
the notion of critical openness, for it appears that unless some accommodation can be 
made to this fundamental liberal principle, an impasse will have been reached in the 
dialogue between liberalism and Islam with which the present chapter is concerned. 
**** 
Critical openness involves ensuring that one's fundamental beliefs and 
commitments are open to public, rational, critical test and acknowledging that they are at 
least in principle revisable after appropriate investigation. It therefore also entails a 
willingness to adopt an attitude of serious reflection towards new ideas and new 
possibilities. In other words, critical openness is simply an extension into other 
domains of the critical-speculative view of the advancement of scientific knowledge; 
Popper and others have argued that scientific knowledge develops by means of the 
critical examination of existing knowledge to discover its weaknesses, and the 
production of new theories, by a process of imaginative speculation, which are then 
subject themselves to further critical appraisal. At first blush, it seems that there can be 
no point of contact between the critical-rationalist attitude and the religous (cf O'Hear, 
1984, p 247; Hirst, 1985, p 197 f); the former involves casting doubt on existing 
knowledge and using human faculties to weed out weaknesses and reconstruct more 
rationally justiable beliefs, while the latter is concerned with the preservation of sacred 
and eternal truth. There is a significant number of Christians, however, who wish to 
argue not merely that religion is compatible with critical openness, but that the inner 
nature of the Christian religion requires a critically open response (Smart, 1968). Hull 
goes so far as to argue that'it is God! s wise decree that his creatures should be critically 
open' (1984, p 216) and that God himself 'has the kind of critical openness appropriate 
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to a perfect being' (ibid, p 218). While this idea perhaps represents only one strand of 
Christian theology, its educational concomitants have taken a firm root in religious 
education in the U. K. in the last twenty years. Smart (1966,1968,1969) argues that 
Christian education cannot ignore philosophical problems which are raised by Christian 
doctrine; that it necessarily overlaps with areas of scientific and historical enquiry (e. g. 
the story of creation and the death of Jesus); and that it cannot ignore the truth claims of 
other varieties of religious experience. For these reasons, Christianity cannot be taught 
as 'a self-enclosed, self-authenticating system of truth! (Hull, 1984, p 95), but should 
be taught in a critically open, descriptive, comparative way which does not prejudice the 
final outcome as far as the beliefs that children may come to hold are concerned. Smart 
sees this approach to religious education as (happily) in line with both his liberal 
concept of education and his understanding of the nature of society. If education is to 
encourage children to become personally and morally autonomous, it requires 
openness, and this is seen as the essential characteristic of the RE teacher, rather than a 
deep personal faith (1966, p 15). Education is the public activity of the state (in 
contrast to nurture, which is the domestic activity of the church), and since countries 
like the U. K. are to all intents and purposes secular in their institutions and pluralist in 
their cultural and religious beliefs, the open, neutral religious education which Smart 
claims is required by the logic of religion, is also reinforced by sociological factors. 
Thus he concludes, 
The test of one who is teaching reasonably in a society such as ours is 
openness. 
(Smart, 1968, p 98) 
More recently, Hughes (1985, pp 16 ff) has argued that the Church must seek to 
integrate religious belief with everyday experience. If it fails to do so, it can only 
survive by insisting on the unquestioning acceptance of authority and by denouncing 
criticism and proscribing contrary teaching; in the long run, he claims, such attempts to 
219 
ChapterNine 
stifle free discussion will lead to a decline of religion. If, on the other hand, the Church 
welcomes discussion and the free exchange of ideas, it must 
expect to be questioned and challenged by its members and it must be 
prepared to change its own ways of thinking and acting, submitting itse4f to 
the light of truth. 
(ibid, p 21) 
What I now want to explore in this section of the present chapter is whether there 
is any possibility in principle that the notion of critical openness and the free exchange 
of ideas may be incorporated into an Islamic view of education. 
Some Western sociologists have argued that there is an historical inevitability 
about the process of secularisation which is bound sooner or later to affect all 
institutions, including the teaching of religion. Weber, who sees secularisation as the 
social product of Protestantism and capitalism (1967), claims that it is characterised by a 
pluralism of conflicting values and the institutional relegation of religion to purely 
private choices (1965). Berger (1969), following Weber, distinguishes between 
objective secularisation (the institutional isolation of religion) and subjective 
secularisation (the loss of religious credibility at the level of human experience) and sees 
both at work in the West. But Berger pays little attention to Islam and the question 
remains whether secularisation is a global process or merely a Western phenomenon (cf 
Turner, 1974, p 158). Lerner (1964) argues that the process of modernisation in the 
West has global significance because it provides the pattern for all modernising 
societies; and according to this theory, modernisation, which involves urbanisation, 
literacy, media participation and electoral participation and, more generally, the freeing 
of individuals from the established customs and values of traditional society, is clearly 
related to secularisation (cf Turner, 1974, p 161). However, any global theory about 
the inevitability of secularisation will have to take into account the reality of religious 
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revival in a variety of different contexts, not least the well charted Islamic resurgence, 
and the common Western assumption that sooner or later Islam would follow the 
pattern of Christianity and become increasingly secularised may be held with less 
confidence now than it was ten or twenty years ago (cf Voll, 1982, p 275 f). 
Certainly there are Western scholars and orientalists who have been anxious to 
find evidence of a liberal spirit in Islam. Some have looked backwards to the 
Mu'tazilites, who have (rather misleadingly) been called the 'liberal theologians of 
Islarn' by Horten (1912), and who have more recently been used (again rather 
misleadingly) to establish that not all religious thinkers even in Islam'would insist that 
the primary aim of religious education was to support religious practice' (O'Hear, 
1982, p 13). Others have spoken with approval of attempts, particularly on the Indian 
sub-continent by people like Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan and Ameer Ali and particularly in 
the period before 1945, to re-express Islam in terms which are more in keeping with 
Western liberal values (Smith, 1946; Gibb, 1947; 1969, ch 10; Cragg, 1965). Yet 
others have argued that there now exists 'a large, mainly silent, body of liberal opinion 
in Islad (Watt, 1988, p 143; Hourani, 1985, p 276), though it must be pointed out that 
Watt is using the term'liberal' in a very broad sense, to refer to any Muslims who hold 
that the traditional world view needs to be corrected in some respects. As evidence for 
an increasing liberal-minded spirit in Islam, he refers to a new willingness to participate 
in dialogue with Christians (Watt, 1979, p 238 f; 1988, p 120 f) and to the work of two 
scholars who combine their Islamic faith with an awareness of contemporary thought: 
Fazlur Rahman and Mohammed Arkoun. Rahman has proposed a new approach to 
Qur'anic exegesis: first, consideration must be given to the historial situation in which 
a specific rule was formulated; then the general moral principles underlying the rule 
must be discovered4 and finally these general principles may be used for guidance about 
present-day problems (1982, p5 ff). Arkoun (1984; 1986, p 159) comments on the 
urgency of the need to open up what Muslims have traditionally treated as impensable 
or impense to critical analytical thinking; he appears to be suggesting that Quranic 
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assertions should be treated as historical facts to which the methods of historical 
criticism may properly be applied (cf Watt, 1988, p 2). Indeed, Gibb (1947, p 124 f), 
Wati (1988, p 86f) and others have argued that the loss of the earlier flexibility in 
Islamic thought about the fourth Islamic century is seen particularly in its disregard of 
historical thinking, and that one of the greatest needs of Muslims today is the acceptance 
of historico-critical methods, even if this entails the abandonment of 'some inessential 
and secondary points of traditional belief (Watt, 1988, p 88). Unless Muslims are 
willing to take on board at least some forms of Western historical and scientific method, 
Watt fears that they may become totally isolated from the modem world, incapable 'of 
entering the universe of discourse of Westem scholars and thinkers' (1979, p 238). 
Hurst goes further and argues that it is impossible to pursue modem scientific education 
without adopting the critical-speculative method; yet once a mind acquires the critical 
habit, it will not restrict the process of questioning to one particular dimension of 
knowledge (the scientific), even if ordered to do so by religious leaders (cf Hirst, 
1985). He therefore sees it as inevitable that the process of Islamicising the curriculum 
discussed in Chapter Eight will fail: 
Either it will produce a curriculum that is moribund, in which case it will 
produce no-one capable of outstanding research, or it will succeed despite 
itsey in producing people who are genuinely capable of critical-speculative 
thinking. In which case, they will waste no time in throwing it out and 
replacing it with a better one. 
(Hurst, 1985, p 199 f) 
To what extent all this is merely wishful thinking on the part of some Western 
liberals is not immediately obvious or easy to establish. Certainly the situation in the 
Muslim world is much more complicated than is suggested by Watt's distinction 
between traditionalists and liberals (Watt, 1988, p2 f) or by Sardar's opposing 
paradigms of taqlid (uncritical faith; blind, unquestioning obedience) and ijdhad (effort, 
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struggle, independent judgement). First, the West has clearly made significant 
intrusions into the Muslim world, though these have taken a variety of forms. As was 
mentioned in Chapter Eight, the left-overs of Western imperialism are still very much in 
evidence, both in institutions such as education and in ideas, attitudes and values such 
as nationalism (cf Nuseibeh, 1956; Zeine, 1973). Some prominent figures in the 
Muslim world, such as Ataturk, have been happy to throw in their lot entirely with 
Western culture; the Egyptian writer Taha Husain, for example, once wrote: 
Let us adopt Western civilisation in its totality and all its aspects, the good 
with the bad and the bitter with the sweet. 
(quoted in Badawi, 1978, p 14) 
Others (often called modernists) have sought a synthesis of Islamic and Western 
ideas, and even where Western values are rejected there often remains a dependence on 
the West for technology; in any case modern communications ensure a continuing 
access to Western ideas. Secondly, Islamic resurgence is a well-documented reality 
(Voll, 1982; Watt 1988; Ayoob, 1981), though the term is used in a number of different 
ways including the Islamisation of the social and legal framework of Muslim countries, 
political opposition to the West and the strengthening of the traditional conception of the 
Islamic faith. Thirdly, genuine debates are going on within the Muslim community, for 
example about the status of women, the charging of interest on loans, the collection of 
zakat (alms), the issue of family planning and the punishment of crime (Rahman, 1982, 
p 136; Watt, 1988, p 108 ff). Fourthly, it is clear that not all Muslims adhere strictly to 
all the requirements of the faith, such as praying five times a day. It is impossible to 
generalise about the reasons behind this state of affairs, however, while some may have 
serious intellectual doubts about the Islamic tenets of faith (e. g. Fyzee, 1963), others 
may be resentful of the intolerance and arrogance of certain self-styled Islamic leaders 
(Sardar 1979, pp 58,68), while others simply find their faith squeezed into the 
background by the pressures of modem life and perhaps openly acknowledge that they 
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are backsliders. Finally, it is clear that a willingness to criticise the passive acceptance 
of authority, and the closed-minded intolerance of some traditional scholars does not 
make a Muslim a modernist. Sardar, for example, describes modernism as 
even more destructive than the narrow, rigid confinement of traditionalism. 
(1979, p 59) 
and speaks highly critically of Fazlur Rahman as a neo-orientalist in the mould of 
Schacht, Gibb and WC Smith (ibid, p 73). In all this confusion, one fact remains 
indisputable, that 
the thinking of theftindamental Islamic intellectuals and of the great masses 
of ordinary Muslims is still dominated by the standard traditional Islamic 
world view and the corresponding seýf-image offslam. 
(Watt, 1988, p 1) 
I find it impossible, however, to assess the truth of Watt' s claim that there is a large, 
mainly silent, body of liberal opinion in Islam (ibid, p 143); it seems to me that perhaps 
he overstates this. 
The other claims made by Western scholars seeking to establish the existence of a 
liberal spirit in Islam are more open to appraisal, however, and I intend now to look at 
each in turn. To recapitulate briefly, the claims were, first, that the Mu'tazilites held 
parallel views to liberals; secondly, that evidence of a new openness can be found in a 
recent willingness to enter into dialogue with Christians; thirdly, that Muslims such as 
Fazlur Rahman have proved willing to apply Western critical techniques to Islam; and 
fourthly, that it is inevitable that once Muslims have accepted the principle of critical- 




First, the Mu'tazilites. They were the first school of systematic theology in Islam, 
coming into existence in Iraq about a hundred years after the death of the Prophet 
Muhammad and continuing to be influential for about three centuries. Certainly they 
were not free thinkers or rationalists in any modem Western sense, as Nyberg's article 
on them in the Encyglopaedia of Islam makes clear. But in seeking to face up honestly 
to some of the problems of religious belief, they did develop some rationalist tendencies 
expecially in the domain of ethics. Their method was to start from a few broad 
principles stated or implied in the Quean, such as. the unity and justice of God, and then 
to deduce their logical consequences. Thus they applied human, rational ideas about 
justice to Quranic statements about God! s justice, and deduced that God would deal 
out rewards and punishments on the day of judgement in accordance with this 
intelligible justice. They further deduced that evil doers would be punished only for sins 
they had the power to avoid, which in turn implies that people had the power to choose 
their own conduct; but such human freedom is not compatible with divine 
predestination of human affairs and therefore they argued that God has delegated to 
human beings the power to decide and even to 'create' their own actions. The 
Mu'tazilite commitment to rationality can also be seen in their belief that the value of 
many things can be recognised by the intellect independently of revelation (e. g. the 
intuition that 'irreligion (kufr) is evil') and that other true judgements can be inferred 
from these primary ones through rational study (Hourani, 1985, pp 69,126). But they 
also stressed that revelation was an equally important source of knowledge, and never 
in disagreement with reason; revelation tells us truths that reason unaided could not 
have discovered, although 
reason can recognise and accept them as rational when once they have been 
revealed - e. g. the value ofprayer in building character. 
(ibid, p 18) 
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Whether or not these are to be viewed as liberar tendencies in any broad sense, I 
can find no evidence for O'Hear's claim that 
members of Mutazilite tradition argued, like St Thomas Aquinas in 
Catholicism, that men had a religious duty to use their reason to assess the 
claims of revelation. 
(1982, p 13) 
On the contrary, Mu'tazilites to my knowledge never questioned fundamental Islamic 
doctrines such as the unity of God and his creation, or considered them challengeable, 
but merely used their reason to understand and clarify these basic beliefs as best they 
could. They can hardly therefore be said to have been critically open in any way that 
approximates to the contemporary liberal sense; it is hard even to judge what importance 
they placed on reason, for although Westerners are understandably interested in this 
dimension of their thought, Watt (1948, p 69) points out that reason is not in fact 
mentioned very much in their writings. 
Secondly, the willingness of Muslims in recent years to enter into and even initiate 
dialogue with Christians (and to a less extent with other religions) is well documented. 
Muslim-Christian conferences have been held in many places including Libya under 
Colonel Gadhafi and Iran under Ayatollah Khomeini (Watt, 19779, p 238; 1988, p 120 
f), and the Islamic Academy has sponsored seminars with Christians in the U. K. and 
elsewhere and is currently working with Christian scholars on a number of joint 
curriculum projects (Ashraf, 1988b). Again, however, this is not really the'liberalising 
tendency' that Watt claims it to be (1979, p 239); still less is it a sign of critical 
openness. Such dialogue is justified in Muslim eyes by the special place accorded to 
Christianity in the Quran (e. g. Sura 5 verse 82, Sura 57 verse 27) and the belief that all 
religions have the same origin and many shared concepts (Ashraf, 1988c, p 3). 'Mere 
226 
ChapterNine 
appears to be a growing feeling that ultimately Christianity and Islam are on the same 
side in the spiritual battle against secularisation. 
Thirdly, we must consider the claim that certain Muslim thinkers such as Fazlur 
Rahman have been willing to apply Western critical techniques to Islam. It is true, as 
already mentioned, that Rahman has argued the need to understand the spirit of the 
Qur'an as a whole before trying to interpret particular passages. A slavish literalism in 
approaching the Quran might lead to the argument that since it is a pillar of Islam to pay 
zakat (alms), some people must remain poor in order for the rich to earn merit in the 
right of God; but Rahman (1982, p 19) pours scom on such an argument as totally 
contrary to the spirit of Islam. Elsewhere, (ibid, p 38), Rahman speaks somewhat 
nebulously of the minds creativity in reaching out to the unknown Qjtihad). However, 
he is totally opposed to the secularisation of learning (ibid, p 133 f), and the main 
purpose of his book is to show how important, though difficult, the task will be of 
systematically reconstructing knowledge and education along Islamic lines. 1jdhad is a 
difficult Arabic word to translate; it combines the notion of exertion, effort and diligence 
with that of independent judgement, and thus seems to have affinities with Hull's sense 
of'thinking for yourself, which is related to both autonomy and cAtical openness. But 
the opening of the gate of ijt1had, which Rahman (ibid, p7 f), Sardar (1979, pp 56 f, 
152 ff) and others recommend, neither leaves it up to the individual to work out his 
own faith nor involves the questioning of the fundamentals of the faith. It is simply a 
way of tackling the stagnation resulting from the old emphasis of some Islamic 
traditionalists on blind, unquestioning obedience (El Tom, 1981, p 41), and restoring 
IslanYs more dynamic qualities. In any case, the iitihad being proposed is generally 
conceived of as an institutional activity (Sardar, 1979, p 156) or an activity of the entire 
umma (community) (Saqib, 1981, p 49). 
The case being argued here by Rahman and others clearly falls short of Hirst! s 
strong sense of critical openness, as set out earlier in the present chapter. But perhaps a 
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weaker form of critical openness can be identified. This may require the believer to 
adopt a critical, enquiring attitude in which he thinks for himself, accepts responsibility 
for his own beliefs, rejects authoritarianism, adopts an attitude of appraisal towards his 
beliefs, but does not actually question their foundation (cf Barrow, 1975, p 188 ff). 
This weak sense of critical openness seems to be what Hull (1984, p 209-10) has in 
mind when he suggests that in the case of Islam, critical openness may mean 'the 
process of drawing contemporary inferences from a received theological structure'. If 
that is what critical openness means then Muslims can have no real argument with it, 
except perhaps to view it as more of a community process than an individual one, for it 
leaves the foundational beliefs and values of Islam (as set out in Chapter Seven) 
unchallenged and untouched. And these are the beliefs that unite all the members of the 
Muslim community; as Rahman writes, 
it is also something of an irony to pit the so-called Muslim fundamentalists 
against the Muslim modernists, since ... the Muslim modernists say exactly 
the same thing as the so-called Muslim fundamentalists say: that Muslims 
must go back to the original and definitive sources of Islam and perform 
ijdhad on that basis. 
(1982, p 142) 
As we saw in Chapter Seven, even the most conservative Muslims recognise the need 
to'translate the truths of Islam into a contemporary language' (Nasr, 198 1, p 32). 
Finally, Hurst! s claims that sooner or later Muslims will get caught up in critical- 
speculative thinIdng whether they wish it or not must be examined. He writes, 
if some propositions about the world are potentially erroneous, and if 
scientific knowledge proceeds by cumulatively uncovering the error and 
correcting it, why (if there is no contradiction between revelation and 
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research) are some propositions in a reserved category, whose truth is 
unquestionable? If we create an educational system (as we presumably wish 
to) which successfully transmits the critical-speculative method to at least 
I some of its graduates, they will be bound to ask why there are some 
propositions (other than tautologies, which are not about the world) which 
are necessarily true, when all the rest arefalsiftlable in principle. To reply 
'because God uttered them' is not calculated to satisfy a mind imbued with 
the critical-speculative ethos. 
(1985, p 199) 
Hurst seems to imply that as soon as Muslims acquire the questioning habit, the whole 
structure of Islamic authority will crumble and there will be nothing left to support such 
activities as the Islamisation of the curriculum. There are various problems with this 
thesis. To start with, it presupposes that all areas of knowledge and belief are 
sufficiently homogeneous that if it can establish that critical openness and the critical- 
speculative method are appropriate for one, the scientific, they will be found equally so 
for all other types, including the religious. Callan (1985) adopts a similar approach in 
arguing against the parental right to give one's children a religious upbringing; he draws 
his main examples from the inculcation of political beliefs in children and then 
unapologetically transfers these arguments to religious beliefs. However, it is possible 
to argue that religious beliefs differ from other forms of belief in their nature, their 
origin, their justification and their object and that there is therefore no evidence as yet 
that religious beliefs should, or even can, be subjected to the same kind of critical 
investigation that we consider appropriate for, say, scientific or political beliefs. 
Let us look at these differences between religious belief and other forms of belief 
in more detail. Kenny (1983, p2 f) proposes that there are three senses of belief in 
God. The first is simply that God exists. The second is accepting that something is 
true on the basis that it has been revealed by God; it is not so much believing in God, 
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says Kenny, as believing God. The third is trust in God and willingness to commit 
oneself to him. The first type of belief has a similar form to a scientific belief and 
appears to be open to rational investigation. The third is a matter of personal choice and 
may well involve some form of mystic experience. The second, though it takes for 
granted the truth of the first, does not itself have the form of a verifiable proposition; 
and this is the sense of religious belief that occurs most commonly in Islam. It consists 
of 'intellectual assent to doctrines as revealed by God' (Kenny, 1983, p 3). One cannot 
reach a justifiable belief in God in this sense through the process of open critical 
reflection. To the Muslim, belief in God is a gift which comes through divine 
revelation, whether in the form of the Quran or in the form of an inner illumination 
which sweeps away doubt. Criteria of rationality, at least if starkly construed, cannot 
be all-pervasive in a discussion of appropriate grounds for assent to such religious 
beliefs. If, as is claimed, the beliefs are founded on divine revelation rather than on 
humanly constructed conceptual schemes, then a reflective investigation of them can 
only concern itself with the structure of beliefs that has been built upon this foundation 
of divine illumination, not with the divine illumination itself. The process might 
reasonably involve examining the socially constructed system of beliefs for internal 
coherence by measuring it against the fundamental claims made by the religion, but 
even this kind of 'measuring' is likely to be more productive if it is based on spiritual 
insight and wisdom rather than on the narrow rationality of the critical- speculative 
approach. Indeed such a process may not be called critical, rational investigation at all 
unless rationality is conceived in very broad terms as taking into account the 
development of the whole human personality: intuition, the conscience, the feelings, 
the will, the dispositions and the moral, social and spiritual dimensions of personality 
as well as the narrowly rational. 
When Muslims maintain that their fundamental religious beliefs are based directly 
on divine revelation, then that is the end of the debate about their justification as far as 
they are concerned. They are simply God-given. The Q&an says, 
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When God and his messenger have decreed a matter, it is not for any 
believer, man or woman, to have the choice in the affair. Anyone who 
disobeys God and his messenger has gone astray into manifest error. 
(Sura 33, verse 36) 
If the non-believer attempts to insist that the believer holds his fundamental beliefs in a 
way that acknowledges that those beliefs might change, then this is requiring him to 
accept, while he is still a believer, that the beliefs which God has given him might turn 
out to be false. This is doing more than asking him to entertain doubts where before he 
had certainty; it is asking him to be prepared to deny his faith in God himself. In Islam, 
however, both doubt and unbelief are seen as a sign of a person's confusion and 
ignorance, or else wilfulness, rather than as an exercise in rationality, independence or 
critical openness. 
To put it another way, a political belief (in Conservatism, for example) might 
reasonably be held in a critically open manner, because not only is the adherent's 
understanding of Conservatism likely to change with time, but also Conservatism is 
itself recognised as a humanly constructed conceptual system which is liable to change 
and error. In religious belief, on the other hand, though few would deny that the 
believer's understanding of God might grow and change and develop, the object of that 
belief, God himself, is not similarly subject to change. The belief is thus anchored in 
the absolute in a way that political beliefs are not. For the Muslim, God! s nature is real, 
objective and unchanging, and so is the response which he requires from human 
beings, as indicated in his final revelation to them, the Quran. This response involves 
experiencing the world as the field of God's activity, and therefore fundamental 
religious beliefs cannot be treated as a self-contained entity that -may be dealt with 
separately from the rest of life and may be retained, modified or rejected in the light of 
alternative beliefs, new circumstances, experience or reason. For the believer, his faith 
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is what glues the whole of knowledge together, and if God created the world, it seems 
perverse to seek to understand any part of it - whether history or art or the physical 
structure of the world - without reference to the purposes of God. Where Hurst's 
argument goes wrong on an Islamic view is that he treats religious beliefs as just one 
more set of propositions about the world, which sooner or later even Muslims will seek 
to open up to rational, critical appraisal. To Muslims, however, though scientific, 
political and all other beliefs that are the product of human activity may be changeable 
and challengeable, fundamental religious beliefs emanate from God, not from man, and 
are therefore unchanging. Muslims thus can make no sense of the claim that they 
should be held and taught in a way which leaves them open to critical challenge. 
To sum up. Very many Muslims are aware that there have been and still are 
serious faults in the traditional Muslim system of education: it is often backward- 
looking, out-of-date, authoritarian, intolerant, constricting and intellectually stagnant (El 
Tom, 1981, p 41). But this does not necessarily mean that they are prepared to swing 
to the other extreme and cease to teach Islam to their children altogether or teach it in a 
way which is'open-ended in the outcome of particular beliefs which pupils might come 
to hold' (Hirst, 1983, p 3). On the contrary, what is being sought is a systematic 
reconstruction of knowledge and education which is truly in harmony with Islam. 'Me 
idea of holding religious beliefs tentatively and presenting them to children as open to 
question and potentially revisable or disposable is a kind of nonsense in Islam. From 
an Islamic viewpoint, therefore, any proposed common system of education that is 
based on either the secularisation of education (involving the abolition of religious 
education and worship) or on religious neutrality (in which Islam is presented as on a 




A serious impasse has now been reached. A coherent common education would 
have to be based on some sort of systematic and unified set of values. But it has 
become clear that there is not agreement over a sufficiently substantial set of shared 
values even between liberalism and Islam. Neither perspective appears willing to accept 
that the value of an agreed common educational system is sufficient to justify the 
concessions that are necessary to make it possible. A dilernma now faces liberalism, in 
so far as it is the dominant underlying philosophy of Western democracies and therefore 
in a position to impose its views on minorities such as Muslims in the West. Should it 
concede that the principle of common educational experience for all children is incapable 
of realisation, and hence allow Muslim parents and others to educate their children, if 
they choose to, in religious schools? Or should it in fact impose its values (in the name 
of protecting the best interests of the children) on an unwilling minority and run the risk 
of being branded totalitarian and intolerant? A way of resolving this dilemma forms the 
main topic of the next chapter. 
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MUSLIM DENOMINATIONAL SCHOOLS RECONSIDERED 
It is clear that significant numbers of Muslims in the U. K. do not share a 
sufficiently substantial set of values with the majority to enable agreement to be reached 
over a common educational system. It is equally clear that many Muslims are not 
satisfied with the concessions currently being granted by some LEAs (see Chapter 
Two), including the retention of single-sex education, the provision of halal meat for 
school dinners, permission to be absent from school on religious feast days and 
permission to wear a school uniform and games kit that is in keeping with Islamic 
notions of decency and modesty. Although such concessions have succeeded in 
defusing some of the anger felt by Muslim parents when they have seen their children 
put in a position where they are expected by schools to act in a way that is contrary to 
their faith, the concessions are still in one sense tokenistic. This is because they are 
piecemeal concessions which relate to the external manifestations of Islam without 
paying any attention to the underlying spiritual beliefs and values which give them 
coherence (see Chapters Seven and Eight). A failure to take account of these 
underlying, unifying, Islamic beliefs and values makes the concessions appear 
arbitrary, eccentric, even devoid of meaning; it might also lead to the conclusion that 
Muslims would be unreasonable not to welcome, for example, the retention of an all- 
girls school committed to feminism (cf Khan-Cheema, 1984, p 10; McElroy, 1985, p 
7) or the establishment in a predominantly Muslim area of a community school with a 
public bar and mixed bathing. However, it is hard to see how adequate attention may 
be paid in education to the underlying beliefs and values of Islam except in some form 
of Muslim denominational schools. Only in such a school would it be possible to 
provide both direct religious teaching of Islam and an Islamic ethos, where the values, 
aims, attitudes and procedures (cf Dancy, 1980) are consistent with Islamic principles 
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and importance is placed on the personal beliefs of the teachers. The Islamic ethos 
would help to promote consistency between the home and the school, which in turn 
would help children to feel secure in their religious and cultural roots and to avoid the 
well-documented tension and conflict of loyalties that Muslim children often experience 
in state schools (cf Morrish, 1971; Iqbal, 1977; Rahman, 1977). 
Muslim denominational schools may take one of three forms: independent, opted- 
out or voluntary-aided. Current evidence suggests (e. g. HMI, 1984,1987a, 1987b, 
1987c) that Muslim groups in the U. K. often lack the financial resources and 
educational and administrative expertise to run independent schools to a standard 
comparable to that of state education. Although some Muslim groups have given 
serious consideration to the possibility of taking advantage of the right conferred by the 
1988 Education Act to opt out of local authority control, subject to the wishes of the 
majority of parents and governors (cf The Times Educational Supplement, 16th October 
1987, p 1), many are aware of the problems that would accompany such action 
particularly the loss of good-will, co-operation and advice from the LEA (cf Ashraf, 
1988a). The preferred solution among Muslims seems to be to request voluntary-aided 
status, both for independent Muslim schools wishing to join the maintained system (as 
in the case of the Islamia Primary School in Brent and the Zakariah Girls' High School 
in Batley) and for existing state schools which have a considerable majority of Muslim 
pupils (as in the case of the five schools in Bradford which the Muslim Parents' 
Association sought to take over as voluntary-aided schools; see Appendix One). Such 
schools are financed mainly by the state and have their standards of general education 
laid down by the DES, but their governors have the freedom, within certain boundaries, 
to determine their own admissions policy, to appoint teachers (in which case, attention 
can be paid to the teachers' personal faith) and to determine the nature of the religious 
education and worship in the school (which could thus be planned according to Islamic 
principles). The right of Muslims, like other religious groups, to seek to establish their 
own voluntary-aided schools is firmly enshrined in the 1944 Education Act (cf Swann 
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Rag1l, 1985, pp 499,515). The right is currently exercised by other major religious 
groups and sects in the U. K., notably Anglicans, Roman Catholics, Methodists and 
Jews. Ile call for Muslim voluntary-aided schools, which has been frequently heard in 
very recent years, may thus be seen as a call for parity of treatment with other minority 
religious groups in the U. K. 
Ibis leads to the liberal dilemma with which Chapter Nine concluded. Should 
liberals accept in principle that Muslim parents and others should be free to educate their 
children, if they so choose, in their own denominational schools? This would involve 
recognising that the principle of a common educational experience for all children is 
incapable of realisation, and acknowledging the right of non-liberal groups to use 
education to maintain their own world views. Or should liberals, in so far as they are in 
a position to do so (for liberalism is the don-dnant underlying philosophy of Western 
democracies), seek to insist that all children do receive a common educational 
experience and that this experience is defined in terms of liberal values? This would 
involve imposing liberal values (in the name of protecting the best interests of the 
children) on an unwilling minority, who may be excused for judging liberalism to be 
intolerant and tyrannous. There is no completely clear-cut solution to this dilemma. In 
a democracy, the assumption is that people can do what they want unless there are good 
reasons for not allowing them to do so. So the question is whether or not there are 
good reasons for not allowing Muslims to send their children to denon-driational schools 
if they choose to do so. Some liberals suggest there are good reasons, some not. A 
further question which must be asked is whether, even if there are good reasons for not 
allowing Muslim, denominational schools, it may nonetheless be wiser and more 
expedient on practical rather than, principled grounds to accept them and to avoid 
compulsion. 
In the first section of the present chapter, two extreme liberal responses to the 
dilemma will be considered, the first arguing for the freedom of Muslims to educate 
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their children as they wish, and the second against I shall then propose a middle path 
between these two extremes. The remainder of the chapter will be devoted to an 
examination of the implications of this middle path. 
**** 
The first liberal response to the dilemma, then, involves recognising the freedom 
of Muslims to educate their children as they wish. This response is grounded on three 
liberal doctrines. The first is the fundamental value of freedom from tyranny including 
the tyranny of the majority; such freedom lies at the heart of the liberal ideal of 
democracy (cf Popper, 1966, p 125). The second is the recognition of the need to 
respect different values within society (cf Crick, 1977); this is commonly put more 
strongly, expecially in discussions of multi-cultural education, as the 'celebration of 
diversity' (cf Saunders, 1982, p 13). Thus the Swann Rel2ort claims that 
the concept ofpluralism implies seeing the very diversity of such a society 
... as an enrichment of the experience of all those within 
it. 
(DES, 1985, p 5) 
The third factor is the willingness of liberals to defend what they oppose. This is based 
on the principle that the state has no right to impose a preferred way of life, but should 
leave its citizens as free as possible to choose their own values and ends, consistent 
with a similar liberty for others (Sandel, 1984, p 1). 'Mus liberals distinguish between 
permitting a practice (pornography, for example) and endorsing it. Permitting a practice 
in this sense is based on the liberal principles of toleration, freedom of choice and 
fairness. 
It is considerations such as these which lead Lustgarten to argue that 
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ethnic minorities shall be permitted unrestrictedfreedom to follow their own 
customs and religious practices, be governed by their personal law, and 
receive education in their language and cultural tradition. This is subject to 
but two limitations. The first is that a practice may rightly be outlawed 
where it results in severe physical abuse or worse. The second is that 
institutional accommodation to different patterns of life among minorities is 
required unless it can be shown to be wholly impracticable. 
(1983, p 101) 
Clearly, the notion of liberty which underpins this argument is very different from 
Mill's (1972b). Though it may make use of Mill's principled objection to compulsion 
and coercion, where he claims that 'all restraint, qua restraint, is an evil' and 'leaving 
people to themselves is always better, caeteris paribus, than controlling them! (ibid, p 
150- 1), it does not accept the high value Mill places on individuality or his dismissal of 
actions based on inherited custom. Though Lustgarten presents his arguments within a 
liberal framework, the views he expresses are to be found more frequently among 
conservatives or those writing Within a religious tradition. Thus Hiskett argues that 
from a conservative point of view, granting Muslims permission to have maintained 
denominational schools 
is faithful to the principle of limited government - that government ought 
simply to set up an arena in which citizens can work out their own solutions 
but should not attempt to construct those solutionsfor them. Under such a 
free market discipline the education of Muslims in Britain is most likely to 
find its own level within the law and culture of the land. 
(1989, p 39-40) 
Writing from a religious perspective, Haldane argues that members of religious 
communities such as the Muslims are more likely to accept the value of religious 
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tolerance if they are themselves beneficiaries of it, that is, if, instead of being required 
to send their children to secular schools, they are given support to maintain their own 
institutions. He argues that 
if cultures are to be taken seriously, non-aggressive commitments are to be 
respected andfreedoms are to be acknowledged, then there is no option but 
to extend the system of voluntary-aided schools to the Muslim community. 
(1988, p 233) 
As a liberal, however, Lustgarten is aware of some of the problems with his 
position. One problem is what ki: ndl of groups are to be permitted the unrestricted 
freedom to follow their own customs and religious practices that he proposes. Another, 
more fundamental, problem, arises in consideration of the well-documented case of the 
Amish: how far should parents' views of the proper way of life govern their children's 
behaviour until they leave home, and are they entitled under any circumstances to 
foreclose their children' s ability to participate in the wider society or at least to opt out 
of the group (cf Lustgarten, 1983, p 104-5)? It is the desire to protect the life chances 
of children from being foreclosed in this way that leads many liberals to reject the 
position advocated by Lustgarten. 
The second liberal response to the dilemma set out at the beginning of the chapter, 
then, involves a rejection of the freedom of Muslims to educate their children as they 
wish. White, who advocates this view, argues that the upbringing of children is a 
special case, where the liberal principle of freedom of action is subject to certain 
limitations. On the whole, he is happy for the values of ethnic minority communities to 
be left to 'flourish or wither as the reflective judgements of their members determine' 
(1987, p 24). He argues that there is no case for any adult members of such 
communities to be forced to relinquish their group values, however out of step they 
may be with 'the national consensus!, so long as they bring no harm to others. But as 
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far as children are concerned, the larger community may sometimes have to interfere 
with minority group values in their upbringing. This is because 
children must be brought up in such a way as to enable them freely to 
participate in [the larger community]. This sets limits to howfar they can be 
brought up to believe that the values of their [minority] community are the 
only ones they shouldfollow. 
(ibid, p 24) 
Raz (1986) adds more substance to White's argument. After establishing that 
autonomy is a constituent element of the good life on a liberal view (p 408) and that 
harm occurs when autonomy is threatened (p 412 ff), he turns to the problem of how to 
treat communities such as religious sects whose culture does not support autonomy. In 
so far as such communities insist on bringing up their children in their own ways, they 
are, on Raz's view, harming them (p 423); so the question arises whether coercion can 
justifiably be used to break up such communities, for example, by refusing to allow 
them permission to run separate schools for their children. Raz suggests that although 
in theory people may be justified in taking action to assin-dlate the minority group, in 
practice such action might cause more harm than tolerating what would on a liberal view 
be an inferior way of life. However, if the minority community were judged to be 
condemning its young to 'an impoverished, unrewarding life! and denying them the 
opportunity 'to thrive outside the community, then 
assimilationist policies may well be the only humane course, even if 




Hirst (1983) adopts a rather different approach in rejecting the freedom of 
Muslims to educate their children as they wish, as has already been seen in Chapters 
Eight and Nine. He suggests that an open, pluralist society will 
be intolerant of individuals, groups and practices, etc., which seek to 
undermine open, critical debate on any matter. 
(p 5) 
His vision of the liberal society is less concerned with 'the mutual toleration of different 
moralities' (Wollheim, 1959) between which the individual is free to make a rational 
choice, and more with Mill's notion of refining and developing moral beliefs and values 
through a continuous process of experimentation and debate (cf Mitchell, 1967, p 89). 
Hirst further argues that separate schools for the adherents of particular religious faiths 
are educationally and socially less desirable than pluralist schools. The educational 
argument against such schools has been considered in detail in Chapters Eight and 
Nine, and highlights the fundamental disagreement between liberals and Muslims to 
which the present chapter is seeking a practical solution. In brief, his argument is that 
such schools would be used to advocate a particular religious position and to confwrn a 
minority in their own culture, whereas education should be concerned to promote 
justifiable beliefs through an understanding of different possibilities and their 
implications, and should be open-ended as far as the particular beliefs which pupils 
might come to hold are concerned. The social argument is that such schools tend to be 
socially divisive and that the isolation of minority groups is likely toprolong injustice 
and intolerance at the hands of the majority' (1983, p 6). 
Wolff (1968, p 74) has drawn attention to some of the problems with this more 
hard-line liberal approach: non-liberals will only be permitted to bring up their children 
as they wish so long as they first subscribe to certain liberal principles. With some 
irony he comments that true believers always find it impossible to imagine that decent 
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men could honestly disagree with them. Even more seriously, the hard-line liberal 
approach lays itself open to criticism as tyrannous and intolerant - the very qualities 
which liberalism is committed to eradicate. Strike reminds us how serious an attack it is 
on an individual or a group to compel them to violate their own fundamental convictions 
(1982b, p 94); in fact, he goes further and argues that it is incompatible with the 
principles of liberalism to seek to impose any beliefs or versions of the good life on any 
citizen of a liberal democratic state. All beliefs - even such f6ndamental ones as 
autonomy and respect for persons - must be arrived at without any compulsion by 
government; indeed, it is this fact that makes liberalism 'inevitably vulnerable to self- 
destruction as a coherent moral ideology' (Fishkin, 1984, p 155-6). But to compel all 
children to undergo a common educational experience based on a particular framework 
of fundamental liberal beliefs whether or not these are shared by the children or their 
parents comes perilously close to the kind of imposition of beliefs which is unjustiflable 
from a liberal perspective. 
**** 
There is, however, a middle path between the two extreme liberal positions which 
have so far been examined. To recapitulate, the problem is that the Muslims in the 
U. K. form a largely self-contained community and that there is no way that satisfies 
criteria of freedom, equality and justice of incorporating them into the educational 
system of the broader community whose values they do not share. I want to argue that 
the middle path, which represents a compromise between the two extremes, holds the 
best chance of providing a satisfactory solution to the problem. This approach involves 
accepting that Muslims should be free to establish their own denominational schools, 
but only subject to certain conditions, which will be specified shortly. To reach this 
position, the liberal 'wets' like Lustgarten will have to concede that the freedom of 
ethnic minorities to educate their children in their own denominational schools must be 
dependent on their meeting certain criteria relating to the public interest and the interests 
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of the children themselves. On the other hand, the liberal 'hard-liners' like White and 
Hirst may have to concede that, in our present contingent circumstances, 
denominational schools may be the lesser of two evils. Such an approach is in fact a 
familiar one to liberals. I referred in Chapter Six to Crittenden's argument (1982) that a 
liberal pluralist society is likely to tolerate ways of life that are not rationally defensible 
so long as these are not in conflict with fundamental liberal values such as justice and 
freedom, because if members of groups committed to such ways of life cannot be 
persuaded by rational means to give them up, it may be the lesser of two evils merely to 
tolerate them rather than attempting to remove them by force. Raz (1986, p 423) argues 
some kind of test of viability may be the most important consideration in determining 
policy towards such groups. So long as the culture of the group enables its members 
'to have an adequate and satisfying life' (however this is defined), and so long as it 
does not lead them to harm others or to diminish the options open to people outside the 
group, then the continued existence of the group 'should be tolerated, despite its scant 
regard for autonomy' (ibid, p 423). Strike (1982a, p 56) discusses arguments from 
Mill (1972b) which seem to suggest that even if liberalism is 100 per cent right and the 
religious approach to education 100 per cent wrong, there may be utilitarian benefits in 
tolerating the continued existence of the religious approach, because a true opinion 
needs to be challenged if its vitality and basis in rationality is to be appreciated. 
Certainly there are strong contingent arguments in favour of the establishment of 
Muslim voluntary-aided schools, as I have pointed out elsewhere (Halstead, 1986). 
First, in cities like Bradford with a large Muslim population, separate Muslim schools 
are currently being created by default. This is because when the proportion of Muslim 
(or other ethnic minority) pupils in a school reaches a certain level, indigenous parents 




de facto 'separate' schools for particular ethnic minority groups in all but 
name and legal status, since they have a considerable majority of ethnic 
minoritypupils. 
(Swann Report, 1985, p 499) 
Thus, far from being a threat to 'the stability and cohesion of society as a whole' (ibid, 
p 7), separate schools are in fact being created by the actions of the white majority, and 
in such circumstances it seems unfair not to allow the minority group concerned the 
right to a major say in the running of the school, the curriculum and the appointment of 
teachers. 
Secondly, as members of the dissenting group on the Swann Committee pointed 
out (ibid, p 515), it appears unjust and discriminatory to refuse to allow the 
establishment of Muslim voluntary-aided schools while Christians and Jews continue to 
enjoy the right to their own voluntary-aided schools. Haldane (1986, p 163-5) 
comments on the irony that Muslims are expected to be satisfied when their own 
requests for such schools are turned down so long as other religious groups are not 
allowed them either. 
a society that would respond to [Muslims] expression of deep attaclunent to 
tradition by casting off its own inheritance might not be wholly sincere in its 
commitment to respect the integrity of Muslim and other essentially religious 
immigrant cultures. 
(Haldane, 1988, p 232) 
Ibirdly, to argue, as the Swann Rej2ort does (1985, p 509), that it is not desirable 
for groups of Asian children to be taught exclusively by teachers of the same ethnic 
group without similarly criticising schools where groups of white children are taught 
exclusively by teachers of the same ethnic group appears to be discriminatory. And to 
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suggest that Muslim voluntary-aided schools might not do a good job, when other 
voluntary-aided schools are often both over-subscribed and academically successful, 
again gives the impression of prejudice against the Muslim community. 
Fourthly, if the Muslim request for voluntary-aided schools is refused on the 
grounds that the presence of Muslims in multi-cultural schools is needed to help the 
white majority to shed their racist tendencies (ibid, p5 10), then this is another, if more 
subtle, form of exploitation, since the rights of the Muslim minority would be denied 
for the benefit of the white majority. A strong case can therefore be made that Muslims 
should have the right to choose for themselves whether such schools should be set up, 
and if they are, whether to send their own children to them. At least such an approach 
would enable the debate to be conducted outside the framework of the interests of the 
white majority and would avoid the dangers of Paternalistic Racism that were discussed 
in Chapter Two (cf Halstead, 1988, p 151-3). 
Fifthly, if any minority refuses to conform to a cultural norm, it is frequently the 
case that what is presented by the majority as a just and rational compromise does in 
fact discriminate against the minority. For example, the non-smoker whose eyes water 
in a smoke-filled staffroorn is liable to feel discriminated against if each member of the 
staff is given the right to choose freely whether or not to smoke; and the bus traveller 
who is susceptible to draughts suffers at the hands of the fresh-air fiends who, quite 
reasonably, open only the window nearest to them. There are some situations where 
the only solution appears to be separate provision. Many Muslims will argue that this is 
the case with education, for a multi-cultural compromise which involves presenting 
Islam, communism, humanism and atheism, for example, as if they were all equally 
valid views of the world is abhorrent to many Muslims (cf Hull, 1984, p 205). It is not 
the knowledge of different ways of life per se that they object to, but the failure to 
present them from the standpoint of commitment to the truth of one particular world 
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view, i. e. Islam. Commitment merely to the procedural value of critical openness 
seems to many Muslims like a recipe for moral and religious chaos. 
Sixthly, on a more practical level, it has been argued that there are significant 
benefits in encouraging private Muslim schools to seek voluntary-aided status, since 
entry into the state sector may be a way of guaranteeing certain academic standards (cf 
Straw, 1989, p 9). 
Finally, the various international codes of human rights (in particular, the 
European Convention on Human Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights) appear to lend support, subject to certain conditions, to the establishment of 
denominational schools. Bailey (1988, p 126-7) sets out three principles which are 
derived from the international codes of human rights: 
I Subject to the maintenance of minimum educational standards, religious 
communities or other groups should beftee to establish and maintain, at 
their own expense, schools in which children are educated in accordance 
with their own beliefs, and parents should beftee to send their children to 
such schools. 
2 The state is five to contribute flnancially to the maintenance of such 
schools, but is under no obligation to do so. 
3 The state should ensure that neither its own schools, nor those 
established by religious communities or other groups, will promote or 
sustain divisiveness: indeed, it has an obligation to ensure that all 
schools, and not only its own, will be so established and run as to 
promote understanding, tolerance andfriendship among different groups, 
including religious ones. 
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The middle path which I am proposing takes account of these arguments and 
accepts that Muslims should be allowed, subject to certain conditions, to establish their 
own voluntary-aided schools. This would give them the right, within certain 
boundaries, to determine the form of religious education and worship to be provided in 
the school, and to seek to establish an Islamic ethos in the school. Priority would no 
doubt be given to the task of eradicating both direct bias against Islam , as in the 
traditional reporting of the Crusades in Western textbooks, and un-Islamic attitudes 
such as the'development of doubt and scepticism! (Islamic Academy, 1984, p 4). The 
school governors, the majority of whom would be Muslim, would also have the right to 
appoint teachers and to determine the admissions policy of the school. With regard to 
the latter, however, Muslim organisations have already made it clear that in principle 
they would be happy to admit non-Muslim pupils and to employ Christians or other 
believers as teachers (cf Muslim Parents' Association, 1983; Halstead, 1988, p 44). 
Ashraf (1986a, p viii; 1988d, p 77) makes the important point that it is not 
realistic to imagine that enough voluntary-aided schools will be quickly established to 
cater for all the Muslim children in the U. K. There are nearly 20,000 Muslim school- 
children in Bradford alone. It seems inevitable that for many years to come large 
numbers of Muslim school-chilren will be educated in state schools and receive 
religious instruction separately in mosque schools. The Muslim community may 
therefore be expected to keep up its campaign for single-sex education and for other 
concessions that prevent Muslim chidren being put into a situation where they are 
required to act in a way that is conamy to their faith (see Appendix One), as well as for 
factually correct teaching about Islam in state schools and for LEA support for mosque 
schools. Nevertheless, Ashraf believes that Muslim voluntary-aided schools will set'a 
pattern and an ideal' for the education of Muslim children in the U. K., showing that it 




The point of having voluntary-aided schools is to leave the Muslim community 
free to direct the personal development of their own children according to Islamic 
principles. However, since education is an activity which occurs in and affects the 
broader society, to say nothing of being financed through local and central government, 
it is clear that the broader society and the state have a legitimate interest in what goes on 
and the right to insist on certain conditions being met, whether through legislation or 
through advice from HMI and LEA inspectors. Most of these conditions are implicit in 
what has already been written in the present chapter. For example, no less than other 
maintained schools, voluntary-aided schools have a responsibility to take account of the 
needs of industry, to promote tolerance and to prepare children for citizenship. No less 
than other maintained schools, they have a responsibility to ensure that children are 
educated in such a way that they can enjoy a satisfying economic and social life. 
Finally, Hirst's point about social divisiveness needs to be considered: the state has a 
right to expect that voluntary-aided schools should not further the isolation of minority 
groups or play into the hands of racists. These various points can be brought together 
under two headings, the first relating to the public interest and the second to the 
interests of the child. 
The public interest (as defined in Chapter Five) requires that a minimum set of 
common values and standards of behaviour should be accepted as axiomatic in all the 
schools of a given society or state, including voluntary-aided schools. 'Mere are three 
dimensions to any such minimum set of common values. The first is a basic social 
morality without which no form of social life would be possible (in particular, a respect 
for justice and a recognition that other groups have as much right as one's own to avoid 
physical pain and death among their members). The second is the acceptance of a 
common system of law and government by all groups within the broader society, and a 
commitment to seek to change these only through democratic means. Since all citizens 
share the same laws, the same political rights and the same economic system, it is 
249 
Chapter Ten 
important that they should be able to'communicate intelligibly' and'function properly 
in a just society', and it is 'a legitimate object of public concern' that they should 
become good citizens and become economically productive (Strike, 1982a, p 159). The 
third is a commitment to at least some of the values presupposed by the pluralist ideal, 
particularly the toleration of groups with different ideals to one's own and the rejection 
of violence as a means of persuasion. The state has a legitimate right to protect the 
public interest from harm and therefore has the right to insist, for example, that they do 
not educate children in a way that might fuel intolerance or undermine social co- 
operation. There is much evidence to suggest that the teaching of a basic social morality 
would present few problems for Muslim denominational schools, and that the 
preparation of pupils for citizenship would be accepted as an important part of the 
school's role (cf Halstead, 1986, p 23), but I shall argue shortly that Muslim 
organisations currently need to give much more thought to practical ways of promoting 
tolerance towards groups with different values and beliefs from their own. 
Although accepting that Muslims should be free to set up their own voluntary- 
aided schools involves accepting that the Muslim community has the right to direct the 
personal development of Muslim children, this does not mean that the state washes its 
hands of any need to protect the interests of the child. On the contrary, the social and 
economic interests of the child are still very much part of the state's domain. There is a 
need to ensure, for example, that the quality of education provided in the voluntary- 
aided school is high enough for its pupils to compete in the job-market on equal terms 
with pupils from other maintained schools; of course, voluntary-aided schools are open 
to inspection by HMI and LEA advisers, and are required to follow the National 
Curriculum. Some of the problems which might arise as a result of this requirement are 
outlined below. The state also has a duty to ensure that pupils at voluntary-aided 
schools do not experience injustice and intolerance at the hands of the majority as a 
result of their institutional separation from the broader society. This points to the need 
both for a continued emphasis on tolerance and mutual understanding in all schools, 
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and for a significant interaction with the broader community on the part of pupils at 
Muslim voluntary-aided schools. 
Muslims who have in recent years pressed the case for the establishment of 
Muslim voluntary-aided schools have, not surprisingly, tended to concentrate on the 
kind of religious teaching that such schools would offer and the way in which they 
would seek to cater for the personal interests of their children. In the final section of 
this chapter I want to indicate some of the other areas of educational provision within 
the proposed Muslim voluntary-aided schools which are in urgent need of clarification 
and more detailed investigation. The final section therefore considers where further 
investigation may profitably build on the work which has been carried out in the present 
thesis. 
**** 
The first area which needs much greater clarification is the extent to which, 
leaving aside the specific area of religious education and worship, Muslims would be 
happy in their own voluntary-aided schools to work within the framework of the 
National Curriculum. Very little work has been done so far by Muslims on this specific 
issue, but an examination of the curriculum of existing independent Muslim schools in 
the U. K. provides some idea of where the problems may lie. The curriculum of the 
Islamic College, Whitechapel Road, London, for example, does not include any music 
(apart from Quranic chanting), art (apart from calligraphy), design, technology or a 
European language other than English (11iskett, 1989, p 12-13) though there is no 
reason in principle why the last three should not be provided. Other areas which may 
be problematic for Muslims are dance and sex education, and they may wish to change 
aspects of the science curriculum to allow for belief in creationism (see Chapter Eight). 
Each problematic area of the curriculum needs to be examined in detail, and Muslim 
leaders must be willing to explore the reasons why the subject is included in the 
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National Curriculum and perhaps reconsider their own attitude to the subject. Western 
music, for example, is never, to my knowledge, included in the curriculum of any 
independent Muslim school in the U. K., but it is by no means clear whether this is 
because of cultural prejudice or because the music is seen to be in conflict with Islamic 
principles. It is very difficult to imagine the reasons for a principled objection by 
Muslims to certain kinds of classical music that have been directly inspired by religion 
and that represent man! s search for the infinite. Hiskett (1989, p 35-6) makes some 
sensible suggestions about how to fit religious teaching and Arabic into the curriculum 
and how to compromise over sex education, but there is clearly much more to be done 
in this area as well (cf Ashraf, 1988c). 
The second area where much more work must be done by Muslims is the 
clarification of how other world views would be presented in Muslim schools. It is one 
thing to accept the principle of tolerating groups with beliefs and values different from 
one's own, but something else to encourage children and young people to practise 
such tolerance. Practical tolerance is made easier if people understand the group they 
are tolerating, and Muslims need to make clear how they would present to their pupils 
not only the beliefs and values of other faiths, but also the values of non-religious 
world views. What is needed, for example, is for Muslim children to be given an 
introduction to liberal values, to what liberals believe about autonomy, about critical 
openness, about indoctrination, about sexual equality and so on. Certainly such an 
introduction could be presented from an Islamic point of view, but unless it was not 
unsympathetic in its approach, it would hardly serve the interests of tolerance and 
mutual understanding within our society. To my knowledge, Muslims have not begun 
to address this issue as yet. 
There is clearly a danger that if Muslim children attended Muslim voluntary-aided 
schools, this would further increase the isolation of the Muslim community which was 
noted in Chapters One and Two. Ile third area where work needs to be done is thus to 
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explore ways of reducing the isolation of the Muslim community. Clearly it is not 
enough that Muslims should understand the beliefs and values of the broader society. 
Some way must be found of engaging in dialogue and co-operation with non-Muslims, 
so that bridges may be built between communities and divisiveness avoided. Perhaps 
the only argument that could be developed for allowing voluntary-aided schools for 
Catholics, Anglicans, Methodists and Jews but not for Muslims is that the Muslims, 
unlike the others, are not fully integrated into the dominant British culture and are not 
members of cross-cutting groups that mingle freely in the pub, the dance-hall or the 
rugby club, for example. As Hiskett (1989, p 11) points out, to grant denominational 
status to a Jewish school does not involve the state in cutting its pupils off from 
significant areas of British, indeed Western European, culture, but to grant it to a 
Muslim school might well seem to do so. It is incumbent on Muslims therefore to spell 
out the specific steps they would take to avoid their children becoming isolated from 
contact with the culture and the people of the broader community. 
It may be that Muslims will find it easier to interact, co-operate and enter into 
dialogue with members of the other faith-communities in the U. K. than with other 
members of the broader community. Watt (1979, p 203) detects certain indications that 
Islam is abandoning its earlier isolationist attitude with regard to Christianity and 
suggests that there is a growing feeling that 
Islam and Christianity are ultimately on the same side in the spiritual 
struggles that lie before humanity. 
Nasr (1981, p 36) argues that it is time for Muslim scholars to carry out more serious 
studies of other religions and that 
the best way to defend Islam in its integral nature today is to defend refigio 
perennis, the primordial religion (al-din al-hanif) which lies at the heart of 
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Islam and also at the centre of all religions which have been sent to man by 
the grace of heaven. 
Yamani (1983, px) says that apart from a few crucial differences, there is Va vast 
expanse of human conduct and behaviour'in which Christians and Muslims will find 
they are at one. The time thus seems ripe for serious dialogue to begin between Islam 
and other religions, especially Christianity (Nasr, 198 1, p 35). By dialogue, I mean the 
mutual exchange of views between groups who have a genuine interest in each other 
and are prepared to learn from each other. Indeed, such dialogue has already begun in 
practice. For example, The Centre for the Study of Islam and Christian-Muslim 
Relations has been established for a number of years in Birmingham. The Islamic 
Academy in Cambridge is currently engaged in dialogue with Hindu representatives as 
well as with Christians, and is seeking to co-operate with the Farmington Institute and 
with projects at King's College, London to establish a faith-based curriculum which 
may be acceptable to believers from different faith communities (Ashraf, 1988b, 1988e; 
1989b). This is an ambitious project which is only just at its inception at the time of 
writing. 
Another way forward which may help to avoid the damaging isolation of the 
Muslim community might be the establishment of joint Muslim-Christian voluntary- 
aided schools. No such project has as yet been proposed, but it would seem to be a 
possible solution to a problem that occurs not infrequently in some inner-city districts, 
that a Church of England voluntary school finds itself with a majority of Muslim pupils. 
The idea of a joint voluntary-aided school is not without precedent; indeed, there are 
now about half a dozen joint Catholic/Anglican schools, including one which was 
established in Cambridge in 1988. Nonetheless, it would be foolish to underestimate 
the difficulties. A systematic approach to the project would involve first, making clear 
the fundamental values which were agreed between the two (or more) religious groups 
responsible for establishing the school; secondly, defining the extent of the co-operation 
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between the two groups; and thirdly, establishing procedures for resolving the 
disagreements and conflicts that would inevitably occur. With regard to the first of 
these tasks, Watt (1983) has stressed how many fundamental beliefs and values are in 
fact shared between Islam and Christianity. Yandell (1984, p vii ff) makes a useful 
distinction between 'context beliefs' and 'core beliefs'. Context beliefs are 
presupposed by, and provide the context for, the more specific core beliefs. A context 
belief, for example, might be that religious knowledge is gained primarily through 
revelation; a core belief, that the Quran was revealed by God to the Prophet 
Muhammad. The belief that God governs the course of history might be a context 
belief, whereas a belief in the second coming of the Messiah would be a core belief. It 
may be possible to produce a shared religious ethos for a joint Muslim-Christian school 
based on context beliefs, and to allow separate religious instruction within the school 
for core beliefs. Clearly, however, very much more work is needed on such a project 
before it could ever become a viable possibility, and it is beyond the scope of the 
present thesis to explore it more fully here. 
What it is hoped the present thesis has achieved, however, is a clarification of the 
reasons why many Muslims are dissatisfied with the education provided for their 
children in the U. K., as well as of the values that would underpin a genuinely Islamic 
education, and the fundamental conflicts between liberal and Islamic views of 
education. An understanding of the genuine difficulties, both practical and conceptual, 
that lie in the path of providing an education for Muslim chidren which is acceptable to 
Muslims themselves is a pre-condition for successful policy-making in this area, 
whatever way forward is eventually adopted. 
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EDUCATIONAL DEMANDS OF MUSLIMS IN BRADFORD 
AND LOCAL AUTHORITY RESPONSES 
(1) The Teaching of Islam in State Schools 
Not surprisingly, the first demand to be made by the Muslims in Bradford was for 
the teaching of Islam in schools, though this demand was not made until the late 1960s, 
when the Muslim cornmunity was already both sizable and well-established. Up to that 
time, the transmission of the Islamic faith and culture had been considered the 
responsibility of the family and the mosque school. Saifullah Khan (1975) has 
emphasised particularly the role of Muslim women in the transmission of religious 
traditions, and, in earlier research, Goodall (1968) reported that most children from 
Pakistani families in Bradford attended mosque schools from fifteen to twenty hours a 
week, to learn Arabic and Urdu and to read the Quean. 
As Muslim groups became aware of the general right of parents under the 1944 
Education Act to arrange denominational religious instruction for their children, either 
by bringing an outside instructor into the school or by taking their children out of 
school at the beginning or end of the school day for such lessons, so pressure began to 
mount for such instruction to be provided for Muslim children in Bradford! s secondary 
schools. The Muslim Association of Bradford and the Muslim Education Trust were 
the main pressure groups involved at this stage. In 1969, Bradford's Director of 
Education, FJ Adams, was worried by these requests, though he recognised the need 
in principle to respect the rights of minorities. He saw them as running counter to 
Bradford's policy of integration, and spoke of the danger of a 'divisive element 
creeping into the schools'. Initially, permission was given for instruction in Islam only 
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at Bradford! s immigrant education centres, but in 1972 this was extended to any 
secondary schools in the district. Commenting on this decision by Bradford's 
Educational Services Committee, Councillor Albert Swindlehurst said, 'Until there was 
integration and they perhaps had their own denominational schools, the committee 
should at least attempt to help thea. 
Thus Bradford's LAM No. 2/82, which is discussed in Chapter Two, was a 
clarification and codification of policy which had been instituted ten years earlier. 
Parents were free to withdraw children from school to receive religious instruction 
elsewhere, or to arrange for such instruction to be held on school premises. The last 
hour of school on Fridays was set aside for this purpose. In addition, imams were 
given permission to enter schools at lunch-time, on the request of parents, to lead 
Muslim children in prayer. 
The demand for the teaching of Islam in state schools had two further 
repercussions on local authority policy. First, it acted as a catalyst to the development 
of the city's new agreed syllabus for Religious Education, which sought to give a fair 
treatment of, and show equal respect for, all the major world faiths. Secondly, the 
proliferating mosque schools and other supplementary schools, which remained the 
main centres for instruction in Islam, were financially supported by the Council. In 
1983, a grant of 000,000 was temporarily withheld in an attempt to persuade the 
supplementary schools to improve standards of health and safety. 
Two main doubts hang over local authority policy. On the one hand, there is the 
question how far, if at all, local authority schools can be used to maintain and transmit 
any religious faith. On the other, it is questionable whether the Council should give 
financial support to supplementary schools whose method of teaching and discipline 
and dogmatic approach are fundamentally in conflict with contemporary educational 
belief and practice in this country. It has also been claimed that lengthy tuition outside 
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school hours curtails Muslim children! s chances of benefitting educationally from 
normal extra-curricular activities, and perhaps impairs their ability to obtain maximum 
benefit from their schooling. 
The Retention of Single-Sex Schooling 
Single-sex schooling, particularly for girls of secondary school age, has been one 
of the most sustained demands of the Muslims in Bradford (Iqbal, 1975). Islamic law 
and traditions do not allow the free mixing of the sexes outside the family after the age 
of puberty, and some Muslim parents have been prepared to keep their daughters away 
from school altogether, or to send them to Pakistan to complete their education, rather 
than allow them to attend a co-educational school (cf Selbourne, 1987, p 103). Apart 
from an unrealistic request in 1973 by the Muslim Association of Bradford for the law 
to be changed to allow the girls to leave school at the age of twelve, single-sex 
schooling appears to offer the only solution to this situation. Initially, the main 
pressure from groups such as the Muslim Parente Association, the Jamiyat Tablighul- 
Islam and the World Islamic Mission was for a separate school for Muslim girls to be 
established with financial assistance from the Council. Eventually in 1983 a fee-paying 
school was opened in Bradford by the Muslim Association, with places for 100 senior 
Muslim girls; however, this school has been criticised by Her Majesty's Inspectorate 
for its inadequate accommodation and resources, its lack of suitably qualified staff, its 
lack of a balanced curriculum and its low expectations of pupil performance (HMI, 
1987a). Ibis school could not in any case accept more than a small percentage of the 
Muslim girls in the city; by 1983, there were approaching 2,000 of upper school age, 
and Muslim pressure groups such as the Council for Mosques began to put their efforts 
into demanding that Bradford Council should reverse its co-educational policy, and at 
least retain the status of Belle Vue, the only remaining girls' upper school under its 
control. Ironically, there is a large Catholic girls' upper school in the city, St JosepWs 
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College, with significant numbers of pupils of Polish, Ukrainian, Italian and West 
Indian origin, but as it has voluntary-aided status the governors are entitled to fix the 
school's admissions policy. 85% of the places reserved for Catholics, and priority for 
the remaining places is given to parents specifically seeking a Christian education for 
their daughters. Many Muslim girls each year are refused admission on these grounds. 
The third all-girls upper school in the city is the now independent Bradford Girls' 
Grammar School, which has a small percentage of Muslim pupils. 
In the early 1970s, the Council merged most of its single-sex schools to form co- 
educational comprehensives, and it was Council policy to refuse permission for Muslim 
girls to transfer on cultural grounds to girls-only schools. Ilis policy was explained by 
Bradford! s acting Director of Education, B. J. R. Parker, in 1974, when he pointed out 
that if all Muslim girls in Bradford were free to transfer to Belle Vue Girls! School 
when it became the city's sole girls-only school, it would very soon become an all- 
Muslim school. When the policy was changed in 1980, and it was decided to allocate 
pupils to schools on the basis of parental choice (though pupils within the catchment 
area were given priority in the case of an over-subscribed school), Parker's prophecy 
rapidly became true: by 1984 the intake to Belle Vue Girls' School had become more 
than two-thirds Muslim (McElroy, 1985) and this proportion is still rising. The policy 
turn-around was completed in 1983 when a Labour motion to merge Belle Vue Girls' 
and Boys' Upper Schools was narrowly defeated in a Council debate. Since 1983, 
spokesmen of both main parties have promised to retain the single-sex option (cf Dawe, 
1987). 
As was pointed out earlier in the chapter, the CounciVs present policy on single- 
sex schools implies a value judgement that consistency with their parents' beliefs is 
more important in the education of Muslim children than the benefits of co-education, 
that the consequent segregation of Muslim girls into what some call'ghetto schools' is a 
worthwhile price to pay for such consistency, and that the rights of parents to make 
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educational decisions affecting their own children should take priority over all other 
considerations, even, if necessary, over the rights of the children themselves. Perhaps, 
however, this is merely another example of a pragmatic policy: at least it tackled the 
problem of the Muslim girls in the city who were being kept away from school 
altogether. But even the success of this intention is not guaranteed; in 1984 the 
headteacher of Belle Vue Girls! School reported that Muslim girls were four times more 
likely than their indigenous peers to be absent from her school. 
(3) The Abandonment of Mono-cultural Education 
It would be wrong to claim that before the 1980s there was a demand by any of 
the minority groups in Bradford for anything called multi-cultural education. However, 
some of the groups - particularly the Muslims again - did fear that their children were 
being subjected to moral, cultural and religious indoctrination in schools, although they 
did not always use those terms. They expressed concern about the effect of 'the 
permissive British society' on Pakistani girls and about the 'demoralization' of Muslim 
children. These misgivings about the moral atmosphere of schools tended to focus 
particularly on sex education, which many Muslims wanted to be discontinued, and on 
authority and discipline, which they wanted tightening up. No doubt this latter point 
underlies the desire among some Muslims to retain corporal punishment in mosque 
schools, which was highlighted in the national press in 1986. There were even greater 
misgivings about the un-Islamic practices which some Muslim children were being 
encouraged to engage in - the wearing of skirts, the exposure of girls' bodies in PE, 
swimming, dancing and showers, and fund-raising activities involving forms of 
gambling. Some Muslims have also objected to their children having to attend Christian 
assemblies, prayers and religious education classes and concern has increased in view 
of the specifically Christian provisions of the 1988 Education Act. The Muslim 
Parents' Association had been campaigning on these issues since 1974, and in early 
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1982 launched a vitriolic attack on Bradford Council in the form of a thirty-six page 
report entitled 'Transformation of Muslim Children! (Patel and Shahid, 1982). This 
report undoubtedly had a major influence on Bradford's LAM No 2/82, which was 
issued later the same year. Other concessions sought by Muslims to help their children 
to retain their religious identity included the provision of halal meat in schools, which is 
discussed below, and making the holy days of Eid ul-Fitr and Eid ul-Adha official 
holidays for Muslim schoolchildren. More recently, some Muslim groups have 
objected to the government! s inclusion of music, art and drama in the national 
curriculum, for these activities are in danger of violating the teachings of Islam, and 
some Muslim parents would wish to withdraw their children from such classes. 
The development of multi-cultural education was the response of Bradford 
Council to these demands. The multi-cultural policies fall into two categories: those 
which grant multi-cultural concessions to the minority groups, so that schools are never 
in a position to require pupils to act in a way that is contrary to their (or their parents') 
religious and cultural beliefs; and those involving the treatment of all religious and 
cultures with equal respect, so that a positive image of each is presented to all pupils in 
the city's schools. The first of these objectives was detailed in Bradford's LAM No 
2/82, which is discussed in Chapter Two: this document is partly prescriptive (children 
were to be allowed to cover their bodies as they chose for swimming, PE and showers 
and to wear traditional dress instead of school uniform) and partly advisory (teachers 
were to exercise tact and discretion in sensitive areas such as health education and 
lotteries and raffles). The second objective was reflected in the decision to include the 
variety of faiths in the city in the new RE syllabus published in 1974 under the title 'A 
Guide to Religious Education in a Multi-faith Community'; this was revised again in 
1983. For once, a pragmatic response to the presence of adherents of a variety of 
world religions in the city went hand in hand with new theoretical approaches to the 
teaching of Religious Education that had been developing since the-late 1969s. An 
Inter-faith Education Centre for RE teachers and others, catering for the five main faiths 
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in the city, was opened in 1986. Other attempts to treat the major world religions with 
parity of esteem include the granting of permission for Muslim, 11indu and Sikh 
children to be absent from school on religious festivals such as Eid ul-Fitr and Diwali, 
and experimental proposals for worship in schools (CBMC, 1986a, 1986b). 
The multi-cultural policies were actively disseminated by the LEA advisers and the 
local T. F. Davies Teachers' Centre, and headteachers were encouraged to organise in- 
school staff development to ensure that the policies were actually implemented as far as 
possible. The case of Wyke Manor Upper School provides a well-documented example 
of the response of one particular school to Bradford! s multi-cultural policies and 
guidelines; after an intensive period of discussion in working parties, faculty meetings 
and whole staff meetings with outside speakers and LEA advisers, school statements 
were drawn up on multi-culturalism as well as on anti-racism and prejudice, and the 
support of parents and governors was actively sought (Duncan, 1985a, 1985b; Lynch, 
1986, pp 82,152). 
The Council's policies sought to tread a middle path between trapping minority 
children within a restricting culture on the one hand and culturally uprooting and 
disorienting them on the other-, at the same time they sought to inculcate in all children a 
respect for a variety of cultures and an appreciation of multi-cultural education as an 
enriching experience. However, they have been criticised for attempting to present too 
many faiths and cultures to children, in too diluted a fashion, and not helping children 
to discriminate between them; for emphasising community differences and thus 
underlining their separateness; and for not stressing the need to master the dominant 
culture if one is to thrive economically and politically in society. 
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(4) The Cessation of the Policy of Dispersal 
The policy of dispersing Muslim and other ethnic minority pupils throughout the 
city's schools (commonly known as 'bussing') was introduced in 1964 in accordance 
with DES guidelines. The policy had two aims. The first was to assist the language 
development and general integration of minority children in the city by ensuring that no 
schools, even in areas of the city where the ethnic minorities were concentrated, had a 
majority of such children; the original limit of 10 per cent of immigrants in a school was 
quickly raised to 25 per cent, and raised again in 1 969 to 33 per cent. The second was 
to ensure that all indigenous children had some contact with the ethnic minorities; as 
Bradford's assistant education officer, P Bendall, explained in 1972: 'If we can give as 
many English children as possible the chance of growing up in school with immigrant 
class-mates, then there is a good chance they will learn to live in harmony with them, 
and carry on doing so after their schooldays. Another of the city's education officers, 
quoted by Troyna and Williams (1986), put it more bluntly: 'dispersal is ... quite 
simply a system of social engineering' (p 18). 
This policy was never popular with parents. Indigenous parents objected strongly 
if they found their own children refused a place at a local school to make room for 
ethnic minority children coming from a distance, and minority group parents were 
inconvenienced when it came to attending parents' evenings and other activities. 
Minority pupils were deprived of the benefits of a neighbourhood school, and most of 
the minority group parents hoped that their own children would not be chosen for 
'bussing'; about 15 per cent of ethnic minority children actually were chosen. 
Political opposition to the policy developed initially from the far right and the far 
left. The former objected to any degree of encouragement of racial mixing in schools, 
the latter to the manifest racial discrimination in the way dispersal was carried out; only 
children from ethnic minorities were being 'bussed' and this was seen as an example of 
263 
Appendix One 
what Hill and Issacharoff (1971, p 51) called the 'highly unequal interracial 
accommodation! which was operated in Bradford. The latter objection only made slow 
headway, however, for two reasons. First, to challenge intentional racial mixing as 
discriminatory seemed to be in direct conflict with the American experience of 'bussing' 
(where it was intentional racial segregation which was attacked as discriminatory). 
Secondly, to call for white children to be 'bussed into inner-city schools which were 
already bursting at the seams would appear perverse; 'bussing! was at least in part a 
reponse to overcrowding and a way of giving ethnic minority children the benefit of 
smaller classes. In the event, it was a complaint by a member of the National Front to 
the Race Relations Board which led to an investigation of Bradford's policy of 
dispersal, though somewhat ironically the complaint was expressed in terms of which 
most ethnic minority parents would have approved: 'bussing' was wasting their 
children! s time and denying them the benefits of a neighbourhood school (Kirp, 1979, 
p 96). Professor Hawkins of the University of York was appointed by the Race 
Relations Board to examine whether Bradford! s policy of dispersal could be justified in 
terms of language needs rather than of race. As a result of his report, a few minor 
modifications were made to the policy. 
Council support for the policy remained strong, however, long after it had been 
phased out in other parts of the country. Indeed the Labour whip was withdrawn from 
Councillor Rhodes in 1976 for opposing it. In 1978 Councillor Hussain claimed that 
the 'tremendous social, cultural and educational benefits' of the dispersal policy far 
outweighed the difficulties it caused for ethnic minority families. He also warned that 
abandoning the policy would lead to 'segregation and eventually to ghetto schools' and 
that a massive school-building programme in the inner city would be required. Both of 
these prophecies have since come true. Opposition to the policy gradually gained 
momentum, however, in the late 1970s. Councillors Ajeeb and Hameed called the 
policy racialist and considered it an affront to the freedom and dignity of ethnic minority 
parents. A petition rejecting 'bussing', with a thousand signatures from teachers, 
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parents and others, was presented to the Council in early 1979. 'Me last straw came 
when the Commission for Racial Equality decided to reactivate its investigation into the 
legality of 'bussing', and at the end of 1979 the Council decided to phase the policy 
out. 
Undoubtedly economic factors were a major consideration in the retention of 
'bussing' in Bradford for so long. Even when the 33 per cent limit on the number of 
ethnic minority children in a school had been abandoned as impractical in the mid- 
1970s, 'bussing' continued, because there was simply not enough space in the inner- 
city schools for the expanding population, while there was plenty in suburban schools. 
The political decision to permit all children to attend neighbourhood schools, however, 
meant that by 1984 there were nineteen schools in the city with over 70 per cent of 
ethnic minority children, and led to a major new building programme of additional first 
and middle schools in the inner city. The effect of the decision to abandonbussing' on 
the educational achievement of the children concerned, and on race relations generally, 
is difficult to assess because of the many other complicating factors, but it seems 
unlikely that cross-cultural understanding in the city has been improved by the growth 
of 'ghetto schools'. 
(5) The Provision of Mother-tongue Teaching 
The special language needs of pupils of Asian origin are not difficult to see. From 
an early age they are likely to communicate with their parents and elders in Punjabi, 
Urdu, Gujerati, Bengali or Pushtu; with some of their peers and in all of the contacts 
with the wider community they speak English; and, in the case of Muslim children, they 
use Arabic for religious purposes. Since the 1960s mosque schools and other 
supplementary schools have catered for these needs by providing tuition in Arabic and a 
number of mother-tongues; and, as we have seen, such schools have received financial 
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support from the Council. However, demands have not been widespread from the 
minority communities for mother-tongue teaching in Local Authority schools, though 
there have been some (for example, from the Hindu Society in 1984); parents have 
tended to give higher priority to an adequate level of attainment in English. It has been 
left to the Council to do most of the running in working out children's needs in this 
area. 
Over the last twenty years Bradford Council has tended to place rather less 
emphasis in its language policies on giving special help with English to ethnic minority 
pupils, and rather more emphasis on the positive use of minority languages in schools 
and in official publications. In the 1960's, three Immigrant Language Centres (later 
simply called Language Centres) were set up in Bradford to ensure that all children had 
a minimum level of proficiency in English before being transferred to Local Authority 
schools (Verma, 1986, p 52). 'Mis was considered an efficient use of resources by the 
Council, particularly in the days of 'bussing'; otherwise every school would have 
needed an EM specialist. Doubts developed, however, as to whether such separate 
provision was really in the best interests of the children concerned. The Language 
Centres were finally closed in September 1986, with their pupils being catered for 
henceforth within existing schools. 
Mother-tongue teaching has taken two forms in Bradford. First, minority 
languages, especially Urdu, have been introduced as options alongside French and 
German in the modem language departments of an increasing number of middle and 
upper schools. The mother-tongue teaching survey carried out in Bradford and 
elsewhere as part of the Linguistic Minorities Project reported a total of 183 ethnic 
minority language classes in the city's schools (Linguistic Minorities Project, 1983). 
Secondly, there have been experiments in the use of the mother-tongue of Asian pupils 
as a medium of instruction alongside English for the first two years of their school 
career. The first was a project sponsored by the EEC, which ran from 1976 to 1980, 
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and the second, the Mother Tongue and English Teaching for Young Asian Children 
Project (MOTEI) was funded by the DES from 1979 to 1981 and carried out jointly by 
the University of Bradford, Bradford College and the Council's Directorate of 
Education (Rees and Fitzpatrick, 1981). Its findings provided inconclusive evidence as 
to the value of such teaching, except perhaps as a means of boosting motivation, 
confidence and cultural identity, but the practice has been continued in Bradford on a 
small scale. Undoubtedly the biggest obstacle to the further development of both forms 
of mother-tongue teaching is the shortage of suitably qualified teachers. Both forms of 
provision have been criticised, however, for their cost and because it is not clear 
whether they actually are educationally beneficial for the pupils. 
(6) Permission for Extended Trips to the Indian Sub-continent 
This was not an issue in the minds of Asian parents until the local authority took 
steps in 1981 to restrict such trips. The restrictions were proposed because of concern 
that the education of Asian children was being damaged by trips abroad of anything 
from two months' duration to a year or more, and because, when there was so much 
pressure on inner-city school places, it was difficult to keep places open for children 
who had gone abroad indefinitely. The Council's Multi-Cultural Review Body 
therefore proposed that heads should be allowed to remove pupils from school registers 
and allocate their places to other children if they were absent for more than six weeks 
during term-time - an absence considerably longer than the two weeks allowed for in 
the 1959 Education Act. 
At a public meeting held at Drummond Middle School to discuss the proposed 
rule (a meeting later described by Honeyford, 1984), there were strong objections from 
Asian parents. They asked the Council to exercise greater flexibility in their approach to 
the problem, and pointed to the educational and cultural benefits that their children 
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might receive from such trips. The proposals were quietly dropped, but the issue was 
re-opened by Honeyford two-and-a-half years later (1983c), when he claimed that there 
appeared to be one set of rules for Asian children and another for the rest. 
(7) The Development of Anti-racist Policies in Education 
Anti-racism is, of course, a very broad concept, and if taken to include what is 
now sometimes called 'cultural racisnY (cf Seidel, 1986, p 129; Ashrif and Yaseen, 
1987, p 123; Gilroy, 1987, p 61), it encompasses all the demands listed so far. For 
example, Councillor Hameed's dismissal of the dispersal policy as 'racialise has 
already been noted. In the present section, I intend to concentrate on two specific 
demands associated with the development of anti-racist policies in education: the 
clamping down on overt racist behaviour involving or affecting schoolchildren, and the 
elimination of factors contributing to unintentional and institutionalised racism in 
schools. Overt racist behaviour covers everything from the 'unfriendliness, rudeness 
or indifference' which the Azad Kashmir Muslim Association said in 1982 was rife in 
Brafford (Yorkshire E=, 30 April 1982), to the graffiti, name-calling, racial bullying 
and gang fights in schools which are reported with increasing frequency in the local 
press (though the Revolutionary Communist party has claimed that a conspiracy of 
silence exists between the police, the press and the Council to conceal the real extent of 
racist attacks). I 
Racist attacks on Muslims increased in 1986 after the Honeyford affair, and again 
in 1989 in the wake of Muslim protests against Salman Rushdie. In March 1986, 
leaders of the Asian Youth Movement called for an official investigation into fighting 
outside Belle Vue Boys' School which led to the arrest of five pupils; the situation was 
serious enough for pupils at nearby first and middle schools to be sent home early to 
avoid getting caught up in the clashes. Sporadic activity in schools by the National 
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Front and other far-right groups has invariably increased tension; trouble flared up at 
Eccleshill Upper School following distribution of the British Nationalist, and some 
Asian pupils were reported to be 'too scared to return to school' (Hamilton, 1984). 
From time to time allegations are made of racism among Bradford teachers, especially 
since the announcement that a former Bradford head, Stanley Garnett, had joined the 
British National Party in 1983. Claims of racism among the staff at Wyke Manor 
Upper School directed against its black headteacher were made by a supply teacher in 
the News of the World; although the teacher who made the allegations was suspended 
and the allegations were officially denied, 300 pupils at the school went on strike in 
1984 to demand the dismissal of a 'racist' teacher. Marches against racism have 
become commonplace in Bradford, though education is of course only one of many 
areas covered by such anti-racist protests. 
Although activities like marches inevitably attract more media attention, other 
protests against less obvious forms of racism, such as the negative patronizing or 
stereotyped views of some races in school books and the sometimes unintentional 
racism of 'colour-blindness' (i. e. the denial of significant differences between ethnic 
groups), continue to be made by some minority groups in Bradford. In 1983 Raminder 
Singh, the Chairman of Bradford! s Community Relations Council, drew attention to the 
problem of racist school books, and in their publication entitled Reading, Riting, 
Rithmetic, Race in 1984, the Asian Youth Movement attacked complacency on racial 
issues among teachers and administrators and called for an anti-racist education centre 
to be set up in Brafford. Shepherd (1987) highlights the low expectations that teachers 
had of their Asian pupils at one of Bradford! s inner-city middle schools. 
The Council has sought to respond to both sets of demands. In an initial policy 
statement distributed to all its employees in 1981, the Council outlined a new twelve- 
point plan on race relations. This included commitment to a policyto encourage equal 
opportunities, to reduce racial disadvantage and to root out once and for all racial 
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discrimination'. The Race Relations Advisory Group was set up the same year to help 
other Council departments on racial issues, and the Council was already talking in terms 
of 'the vetting of books, materials and curricula to ensure that stereotyped images or 
prejudices are avoided! (CBMC Digest, 1981, p 23). In 1983, the local authority 
attempted to standardise procedures in schools on the challenging and correcting of 
racist behaviour. A Local Adminsistrative Memorandum (LAM Mo 6/83) entitled Racist 
Behaviour in Schooll was circulated to heads, giving guidelines and rules based on the 
earlier policy statement, and requiring them to identify and deal firmly and consistently 
with racist incidents in their schools, and to report them regularly to the local authority. 
'Me LAM emphasised the need: 
1. to deal with the alleged perpetrators of the racialist behaviour, 
2. to aid and support the victim; 
3. to lay down firm lines of responsibility for dealing with incidents; 
4. to deal with the impact of the incident on the whole community. 
Each school was asked to prepare a detailed statement of its own policy against racialist 
behaviour, based on the general principles set out by the local authority. These general 
principles included the immediate removal of racialist graffid or slogans from books or 
walls; the immediate confiscation of racialist litem ture, badges or insignia; reporting any 
activities of extreme political groups inciting racial hatred within the school to the police 
and the Directorate of Education; informing the parents of pupils responsible for 
racialist behaviour and involving them in any disciplinary procedures; and informing the 
victims of such behaviour of the action taken against it. 
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At the same time as attempting to deal with examples of overt racism, however, 
the Council has also taken some steps to eradicate its underlying causes and less 
obvious manifestations. The decision to keep ethnic records, made in 1981, 
represented a clear rejection of the 'colour-blind approach favoured by some teachers 
and an attempt to facilitate the monitoring of discrin-dnation resulting from ethnic 
diversity. The campaign against institutional racism can be seen in the abolition of 
separate Language Centres in 1986, the drive since 1983 to appoint more ethnic 
minority governors, the encouragement of schools and libraries to examine critically the 
image of minority communities presented in the books they use, and, perhaps most 
controversially, the Racism Awareness Training courses which all heads and others 
involved in recruitment were required to attend. Though these courses were 
discontinued in 1986, their activities were incorporated into the regular training and in- 
service courses run by the local authority. 
Perhaps the most important thing to emerge from the Council's actions so far is 
the great need for tact and sensitivity in bringing racial issues into consciousness and in 
attempting to correct misunderstandings and to change ingrained attitudes about race. It 
may be argued that if an anti-racist policy is perceived as a threat, as Bradford! s was by 
many headteachers (cf Halstead, 1988, p 29-30), it is almost certain to be counter- 
productive, and the best solution then is to approach the problem from a different angle. 
This appears to be the thinking behind the abandonment of the Racism Awareness 
Training courses, but such tact and sensitivity was not always evident in the Council's 
handling of the Honeyford affair. 
(8) The Establishment of Muslim Voluntary-aided Schools 
In January 1983 the Muslim Parents' Association submitted a request to Bradford 
Council for permission to take over two first schools, two middle schools and one 
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upper school as Muslim voluntary-aided schools. Among the schools concerned were 
Honeyfords school, Drummond Middle, and Belle Vue Girls' Upper School. The 
main reasons for the request were to provide a base for the preservation, maintenance 
and transmission of the Islamic way of life, to enable Muslim children to have a high 
level of general education while observing the laws of Islam, to protect children from 
Westernisation, secularisation and un-Islamic practices by providing schools with an 
Islamic ethos, and to ensure that the children were not taught by teachers who had 
themselves rejected religion. Admission would not be restricted to Muslim children, 
however. The request was justified in terms of rights granted under the 1944 Education 
Act, and was seen as a call for parity of treatment with other minority religious groups 
in the UK, such as Catholics and Jews, who already have voluntary-aided schools. 
Several respected figures in the British Muslim community visited Bradford to express 
support for the request, including Yusuf Islam (the former pop star, Cat Stevens). In 
Bradford, however, opinion within the Muslim community was divided over the value 
of such schools. The Council for Mosques voted 13-8 against the proposal, and both 
the Community Relations Council and the Asian Youth Movement strongly opposed it. 
The latter warned of the dangers of 'voluntary apartheid and the possibility of a'racist 
backlash', and saw the way ahead as depending not on religious schools at all but on a 
greater openness within a common educational system to ethnic minority needs and a 
greater commitment to anti-racist education. It was reported that only forty-eight of the 
pupils at Belle Vue Girls' School supported the MPA's request. Outside the Muslim 
community, however, the request was universally opposed. The staff at Belle Vue 
Girls' School were unanimous in threatening resignation, and one parent-governor at 
Drummond Middle school collected 7,000 signatures against Muslim voluntary-aided 
schools. The local newspaper ran several articles opposing the scheme, but none in 
favour. Bradfords Educational Services Committee voted unanimously in September 
1983 to reject the MPA's request. The official reasons provided for the refusal are 
interesting: no mention is made of the dangers of religious segregation, or indeed of 
any of the points made by the Asian Youth Movement; it was merely claimed that the 
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proposal lacked the support of a sufficiently broad section of the Muslims in Bradford, 
and that there were neither sufficient financial resources nor the necessary educational 
and administrative experience within the MPA to carry the project through. This 
avoidance of a principled stand against Muslim voluntary-aided schools, although many 
councillors clearly felt that such schools would contravene the whole spirit of the 
Council's multi-cultural policies (which were directed towards meeting the needs of 
ethnic minority children within the framework of a common school curriculum), 
perhaps illustrates the pragmatic and conciliatory nature of the Council's response to 
Muslim demands. But the Councirs response appears to leave the door open for a 
reapplication at a later date. Indeed, some Muslim groups have tended to wield the 
threat of such schools as an instrument of persuasion when they meet opposition to 
their demands (as in the call for Honeyford's dismissal). For many people, it appears 
that the call for the establishment of Muslim voluntary-aided schools marks the limit of 
what can be tolerated in a multi-cultural society, and it is the only serious request from a 
minority group in Bradford so far to meet with an outright refusal. 'Mere is little doubt 
that this fact influenced the local authority's determination to demonstrate its 
fairbandedness by pressing ahead with the multi-cultural policies such as the provision 
of halal meat in schools. 
The call for such schools raises a number of significant questions about the aims 
of education, which I have discussed in more detail elsewhere (Halstead, 1986). It 
forms part of the larger debate which has been carried on intermittently in the last three 
years in the correspondence columns of ne Guardian, ne Independent and The Times 
Education Supplement regarding the dual system of education and the justifiability of 
separate denominational schools. Interviewed on the BBC programme ne Heart of the 
Matter on 13th September 1987, Honeyford expressed provisional support for the 
establishment of Muslim voluntary-aided schools. Early in 1988, it was first 
reported that the Labour Party leadership was dropping its opposition to such schools 
(Straw, 1989), partly no doubt in response to rumours that some Muslim leaders were 
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urging schools with a Muslim majority to consider opting out of LEA control, as 
permitted by the 1988 Education Act. The Labour-dominated Association of 
Metropolitan Authorities, on the other hand, remains staunchly opposed to Muslim 
voluntary-aided schools. 
(9) The Provision of Halal Meat in Schools 
Halal meat is meat which has been slaughtered in accordance with Islamic law. 
The animal must be conscious at the time of slaughter, and the name of Allah is invoked 
as the animal's throat is slit. Meat killed in any other manner is haram (forbidden) to 
Muslims, and this is generally taken to include meat from animals which have been 
stunned before slaughter in accordance with the 1933 and 1974 Slaughterhouse Acts. 
These Acts, do, however, empower local authorities to allow both Jewish and Muslim 
methods of slaughter, and Bradford has for many years had a halal slaughterhouse to 
serve the needs of Muslim butchers in the city. But prior to 1983 no hatal meat was 
served in public institutions such as schools and hospitals where people of different 
faiths and cultures intermingle. In practice this meant that many non-vegetarian Muslim 
schoolchildren in Bradford schools, as elsewhere, were eating only vegetarian dishes in 
order to avoid contravening Islamic law. During the 1970s and early 1980s, demands 
intensified from Muslims for an acceptable meat dish to be provided for their children in 
schools. 
In September 1983 the local authority began a pilot scheme involving the 
provision of halal meat in ten schools. Within a year this had been extended to nearly 
sixty schools, and the eventual intention was to serve halat meals in all schools with 
more than ten Muslim diners. The policy met immediate and vociferous opposition, 
however, from local animal rights campaigners, and this opposition, highlighted by the 
refusal of one campaigner to pay her rates, received much attention in the local and 
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national press. Undoubtedly the issue also became a focal point for racial prejudice. 
The Muslims, worried that the concession they had won might be slipping away from 
them, began to make their feelings known more forcibly; an estimated 3,000 Muslims 
joined a pro-halal demonstration, and a 7,000-signature petition was handed in a City 
Hall. In March 1984 the full Council debated whether to continue the provision of halal 
meat in view of the protests against it. In spite of the opposition of some prominent 
Labour councillors, including the Lord Mayor, Norman Free, continuation of the policy 
was supported by fifty-nine votes to fifteen. Halat meat now seems to be established as 
one of the most permanent and secure provisions for Muslim children in the city. 
(10) The Removal of Honeyford from the Headship of Drummond 
Middle School 
Following the publication of Ray Honeyford's article 'Education and Race - an 
alternative view' in ne Salisb= Review early in 1984, a protracted campaign was 
launched against him calling for his dismissal from the headship of Drummond Middle 
School in Bradford, a post he had held since 1980. The affair became an educational 
cause celebre in the U. K. It received extensive media coverage and had political, legal, 
social and administrative repercussions both locally and nationally (Brown, 1985; 
Foster-Carter, 1987; Greenhalf, 1985; Halstead, 1988; Jack, 1985; Matthews, 1986; 
Murphy, 1987; Selbourne, 1987). 
11is was not the first article Honeyford had written about issues of race, multi- 
culturalism and the education of ethnic minority children. Indeed, since 1982 he had 
been arguing in the columns of Tlie Times Educational Supplement and elsewhere that 
multi-cultural education is misguided and that the main need of ethnic minority children 
is to master British culture and become full British citizens. The tone of his articles 
gradually became more strident, however, and they were sometimes far from positive in 
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their depiction of Muslim and West Indian culture and local authority policy. Not 
surprisingly, he was criticised by ethnic minority groups and cautioned by the LEA. 
His article in The Salisbu1y Review early in 1984 takes his arguments against multi- 
cultural education further. First, he claims that freedom of speech is becoming 'difficult 
to maintain', because the feelings of guilt induced by the 'race lobby' and the fear of 
giving offence are preventing 'decent people' from writing their thoughts honestly. 
Secondly, he expresses much stronger criticisms of some aspects of minority cultures 
than he did in earlier articles. The 'vast majority' of West Indian homes are described 
as lacking in educational ambition; a disproportionate number are Tatherless; and the 
West Indian is described as someone who creates'an ear-splitting cacophony for most 
of the night to the detriment of his neighbours sanity'. He criticises the 'purdah 
mentality' of some Muslim parents and describes Pakistan, the country of origin for 
most of BmdforXs Muslim families, as'obstinately backward!, plagued by'corruption 
at every level', and the 'heroin capital of the world'. Finally, he touches on the 
educational disadvantage suffered by the white children who now form a minority 
group in many inner-city schools; they are inevitably not so well initiated into their own 
language and culture as their parents were, and their plight is likely to become more 
serious since they lack a spokesman or pressure group to articulate their anxieties. It 
was this article which triggered off what has since become known as 'the Honeyford 
affair'. As soon as the article came to the attention of Bradford Council and the wider 
public (some two months after its initial publication), it drew a barrage of criticism from 
many quarters, and set in motion the chain of events, including serious disruption at 
Drummond Middle School, which eventually led to Honeyford! s early retirement. 
The affair itself, however, was one of enormous complexity, and it raises 
fundamental questions not only about multi-cultural education and anti-racism, but also 
about free speech, the accountability of teachers and the control of education. Certainly 
Honeyford had succeeded in alienating both the LEA and the mainly Muslim local 
community that his school served, but this does not mean that both parties co-operated 
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freely in seeking his departure from the school. On the contrary, the Drummond 
Parents' Action Committee (the first main pressure group campaigning for Honeyfords 
dismissal) saw itself in conflict with the LEA, which it accused of not implementing its 
race relations policies, while the LEA warned parents of possible legal action if they 
kept their children away from school. A significant number of Muslim groups, 
including the influential Council for Mosques, were active in the campaign against 
Honeyford, but not all the Muslims in the local community opposed him; in fact, two of 
the three pro-Honeyford community representatives who were co-opted onto the new 
governing body of his school in October 1985 were Muslims. The DPAC alienated 
another potential ally, the NUT, which consistently expressed opposition to 
Honeyford's views, by accusing Drummond Middle School teachers of 
unprofessionally threatening to punish children who attended the DPACs alternative 
school; the NUT threatened legal action against the DPAC for this allegation. 
Honeyfoids own union, the NAHT, championed him throughout the affair. The 
school governors also supported him throughout, though sometimes only by narrow 
margins and on one crucial occasion only as a result of a tactical error on the part of his 
opponents: a resolution calling for Honeyford's reinstatement after he had been 
suspended in April 1985 was passed by seven votes to four after four anti-Honeyford 
governors had chosen to boycott the meeting. Honeyford was frequently depicted as a 
racist; however, the NAHT took out a writ on his behalf against Bradford Council for 
alleged libel by seven racism awareness training officers who described him in a 
memorandum as a'known racise and refused to accept him on one of their courses, 
and his final early retirement package included a sum of E5,000 in settlement of the 
alleged libel. It was ironical to find that anti-racist protestors who by October 1985 had 
become a permanent feature of life at Drummond Middle School were made up of two 
distinct and physically separate groups - the white left-wingers on the one hand and the 
Asians on the other - while the children in the playground on the other side of the wall 
appeared to be completely integrated. Although nationally the debate about Honeyford 
tended to follow party political lines, with Conservatives like Sir Marcus Fox and 
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Nicholas Winterton speaking out in support of him in Parliament and Labour MPs such 
as Max Madden speaking against him, at a local level the decisions, at least at first, 
were less clearly along party lines. In March 1984, the Conservative chairman of the 
Educational Services Committee was one of Honeyford! s most outspoken critics, while 
his supporters included the Labour Lord Mayor. All three local political parties in the 
hung Council changed their position in the course of the affair on giving Honeyford a 
financial incentive to take early retirement. 
On top of these complexities are the tremendous emotions that were aroused on 
both sides of the debate and the distortions and misleading innuendoes that occurred 
with increasing frequency in reports of the affair both locally and nationally. On the 
one hand, demonstrators portrayed Honeyford as a devil on banners inscribed 
'Honeyford writes in the blood of the blacks'. On the other hand, he was described in 
a letter to the local Telegraph and ArgUs as 'a sacrificial lamb on the altar of race 
relations' (27th March 1985) and even compared to Christ. The popular press tended to 
depict the affair as a conflict between a 'decent chap' (News of the World, 31 st March 
1985), who'dared to speak his mind! (Daily Mi 9th April 1985) and the Thought 
Police who have bludgeoned Mr Honeyford into submission' Daily-ExRress. 30th 
March 1985). Honeyford's opponents had their own forms of distortion, however, a 
leaflet in Urdu purporting to be a translation of Honeyford's Salisbuil Review article 
converted his statement about 'fatherless' West Indian families into a dismissal of 
Asians as'illegidmate!. Some commentaries that have been written since the end of the 
affair have been even more fanciful in their distortions. West (1987), for example, 
somewhat sarcastically comments that Honeyford lost his job 'apparently for the crime 
of wanting to teach English children their own language, history and religion. 
On the other side, Gordon and Klug argue that 
the superiority of white (middle-class) culture is implicit throughout the 
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writings of Ray Honeyford. 
(1986, p 23) 
In fact Honeyford seems to have been much more in touch with many working class 
people than were the leaders of the campaign against him, who often turned out to be 
from liberalA-adical middle class backgrounds themselves. 
I have attempted elsewhere (Halstead, 1988) to pick my way through the bias and 
distortion in order to establish as fully and as objectively as possible what actually 
happened in the affair. A brief outline of the main incidents in the affair is perhaps all 
that is needed here. After the initial wave of protests and demands for Honeyford's 
dismissal in March to May 1984, the LEA decided to carry out a full inspection of 
Drummond Middle School. The aim was to check that LEA policies, particularly those 
relating to multi-cultural education, were in fact being carried out. The advisers 
reported that LEA policies were generally being carried out at the school, but spoke of 
the need for Honeyford to'regain the trust and confidence of a significant proportion of 
parents!. At a meeting of the Schools (Education) Sub-Comn-dttee in October, called to 
consider the report, a motion of no-confidence in Honeyford was defeated. He was 
given six months to prepare six reports on aspects of the school's provision, 
particularly relating to links with parents and the local community. The aim appeared to 
be to give him a chance to reconsider his attitude to multi-cultural education. 
Meanwhile, the Drummond Parents Action Committee kept up its pressure on the LEA 
to dismiss Honeyford, organising 238 parents to request the transfer of their children 
away from Drummond Middle School, and then organising an alternative school in the 
Pakistan Community Centre for children to attend when they were kept away from 
Honeyford's School. When the Schools (Education) Sub-Committee met again in 
March 1985 to consider Honeyford's reports, a vote of no-confidence in him was 
passed, and a few days later Honeyford was suspended by the LEA pending a special 
hearing of the case against him by the school governors. 
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The affair became a national issue at this stage, with debates in Parliament and 
with frequent reports in the national press, almost all of which tended to side with 
Honeyford. Ilie affair came increasingly to be depicted as a free speech issue. Various 
attempts were made to produce a pay-off deal for Honeyford. In June 1985, after a 
four-day hearing, the school governors decided that allegations against Honeyford were 
'not fully substantiated' and they recommended his reinstatement. Ile question of 
whether the governors' decision was legally binding on the LEA was taken to the High 
Court, and when the Court found in favour of the governors, Honeyford returned to his 
job at the school in September 1985. His opponents were horrified at the direction 
events had taken, and launched a new campaign of picketing, strikes and protests. For 
two weeks, only about a third of the children attended his school. The Council for 
Mosques called on all Muslim children in Bradford (over 16,000) to boycott school for 
one day in protest against Honeyford. Local interest focussed strongly on the new 
governing body that was to be set up for Drummond Middle School in October 1985, 
and when it emerged that Honeyford had the support of a clear majority of the new 
governors, his position seemed more secure. The next month, however, the tables 
were turned when the Appeal Court reversed the earlier decision of the High Court and 
ruled that the LEA still had the right to dismiss a head even if the governors did not 
agree. Meanwhile, community relations in the city were deteriorating rapidly as a result 
of the Honeyford affair and both Honeyford and his opponents became the targets of 
death threats. Honeyford eventually accepted an early retirement package in December 
1985. 
Ile Honeyford affair had serious repercussions on the local political scene and on 
race relations in Bradford. Although his departure became inevitable, in one sense it 
was a defeat not only for his supporters but for those occupying the middle ground who 
believed that behind the stereotypes of Honeyford as martyr or devil lay serious issues 
which could only be resolved in open, rational debate. It was a defeat because the 
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debate had been foreclosed. Perhaps the insensitivity and injudiciousness of his own 
contributions to the debate were partly to blame for this outcome, although he himself 
had written of the need to 'create a more honest, a more open and a less fearful 
intellectual climate' (1984) in which issues such as multi-culturalism, anti-racist 
education, tolerance, cultural continuity and the basis of shared values in our society 
could be discussed. But the strident tone of his articles was matched by that of the calls 
for his dismissal, and neither they nor the manner of his eventual departure did anything 
to bring reasoned discourse to bear on the debate or to facilitate discussion of the issues 
raised by his articles and by the campaign against him. 
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